Variations in pro-American sentiments by age, she says, suggest that personal experience counts and that U.S. foreign policy can have "a direct impact on foreigners' perceptions," contrary to the claims of some commentators on anti-Americanism.

In generally pro-American Poland, for example, people ages 30 to 44 are especially likely (59 percent) to regard U.S. influence as "mainly positive," according to a recent study. Those Poles, as youths in their teens and twenties, "would have been most directly affected by the experience of the Solidarity movement and martial law" under the Communist regime, Applebaum observes, "and they would have the clearest memories of American support for the Polish underground movement." In contrast, today's Polish youths, whose chief knowledge of the United States may concern the difficulty of getting visas, are less approving. Only 45 percent of those under 30 see U.S. influence as "mainly positive."

In Canada, Britain, Italy, and Australia, people older than 60, with memories of the U.S. role during World War II and the Cold War, "have relatively much more positive feelings about the United States than their children and grandchildren [do]," says Applebaum. In Britain, 64 percent of those over 60—but only 32 percent of those under 30—deem U.S. influence "mainly positive."

Aspirations also count. Many associate the United States with upward mobility, economic progress, and a classless society. In Britain, for instance, the greatest support for America comes from those with the lowest incomes and the least formal education—a trend that appears in many developed countries.

In some developing countries, such as India, the pattern is reversed. "Indians are much more likely to be pro-American if they are not only younger but wealthier and better educated." From Indians with very high incomes to those with average incomes to those with very low incomes, the percentage considering U.S. influence "mainly positive" runs steadily downward—from 69 percent, to 43 percent, to 30 percent. "Younger Indians have had the experience of working with American companies and American investors, whereas their parents did not. . . . The poor in India are still untouched by globalization, but the middle and upper-middle classes—those who see for themselves a role in the English-speaking, America-dominated international economy—are aspirational and therefore pro-American."

Yet another factor in the making of pro-Americans seems to be gender. "In Europe, Asia, and South America, men are far more likely than women to have positive feelings about the United States." Applebaum can only speculate about why—a female aversion to America's muscular foreign policy? A greater male interest in power and entrepreneurship?

One thing that Applebaum is sure of, though, is that the United States has many "natural constituents"—and they're "worth cultivating."

Overselling Democracy

"The Freedom Crusade" by David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker, in *The National Interest* (Fall 2005), 1615 L St., N.W., Ste. 1230, Washington, D.C. 20036; "Can Democracy Stop Terrorism?" by F. Gregory Gause III, in *Foreign Affairs* (Sept.–Oct. 2005), 58 E. 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

Invoking the Founding Fathers and Abraham Lincoln, President George W. Bush declared in his second inaugural address last January that "America's vital interests and deepest beliefs are now one," and that henceforth the United States would "seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world." Bush did not rule out the use of force to achieve this goal.

Far from fulfilling the vision of America's Founders, the Bush administration's campaign to promote democracy in the Middle East and the rest of the globe is, rather, at

odds with it, these authors argue. Even worse, the democracy campaign runs counter to the United States' national security interests.

For the Founders, the question of using force to revolutionize foreign governments arose early on, as a result of the French Revolution, according to Hendrickson, a political scientist at Colorado College, and Tucker, an emeritus professor of American foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University. The French Convention in 1792 decreed that "it will accord fraternity and assistance to all peoples who shall wish to recover their liberty." To Alexander Hamilton, this was "little short of a declaration of War against all nations, having princes and privileged classes," and was equally repugnant "to the general rights of Nations [and] to the true principles of liberty." Even Thomas Jefferson, who strongly sympathized with the French Revolution, said that the French should not force liberty on their neighbors.

Moreover, making the end of tyranny the declared aim of U.S. foreign policy turns all tyrannical regimes into enemies—which makes it harder to negotiate with them, as the crisis over North Korea's nuclear weapons capability illustrates. If the Bush doctrine were to be applied consistently, even friendly regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Pakistan would be pressed to democratize. There is little sign that the administration actually intends to press very hard.

Promoting democracy in the Middle East, Bush maintained last March, will "change the conditions that give rise to extremism and terror." Under dictatorships, "responsible opposition cannot develop, and dissent is driven underground and toward the extreme."

But there's "no solid empirical evidence for a strong link between democracy, or any other regime type, and terrorism," asserts Gause, a political scientist who directs the University of Vermont's Middle East studies program. During the 1970s and 1980s, various terrorist organizations arose in democratic countries, including the Red Brigades in Italy, the Provisional Irish Republican Army in Ireland and the United Kingdom, and the Baader-Meinhof Gang in West Germany. One study found that most terrorist incidents in the 1980s were committed in democracies, generally by their own citizens. There's no reason to think that Al Qaeda would be unable to recruit followers under democratic Arab governments—especially if those governments fashioned policies in tune with American interests or made peace with Israel.

EXCERPT

Bigger Than Terrorism

In the longer run, the greatest challenge faced by liberal democracies will not, in my view, be an external one such as defending themselves from international terrorism or managing a return to great power rivalry, but the internal problem of integrating culturally diverse populations into a single, cohesive national community. In this respect I am much more optimistic about America's long-term prospects than those of Europe. Fear of immigration has already helped to derail the European constitution, and the violence linked to unassimilated second- and third-generation Muslims in Holland, France, and Britain represents a political time bomb to which elites in those countries are late in waking up. The only possible solution is to invent a sense of national identity that is not exclusive like the blood-and-soil versions of 19th-century Europe, yet that is much more substantive than the thin gruel offered by being a "European."

—Francis Fukuyama, a professor of political economy at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, in the premier issue of *The American Interest* (Autumn 2005)

In reality, though, "Washington probably would not like the governments Arab democracy would produce," Gause says. Rather than push for free elections to be held soon in the Arab world, concludes Gause, the United States should encourage the growth of "secular, nationalist, and liberal political organizations that could compete on an equal footing with Islamist parties."

Of Maps and Men

"Lessons From the Swiss Cheese Map" by Shari Motro, in *Legal Affairs* (Sept.–Oct. 2005), 254 Elm St., New Haven, Conn. 06511.

The day before Yasir Arafat was due to sign the interim agreement at the Oslo II peace talks in September 1995, Israeli negotiators presented him with the infamous "swiss cheese" map of the West Bank as it would be altered by the agreement. "These are cantons!" the Palestinian leader shouted. "You want me to accept *cantons*! You want to *destroy* me!" He stormed out of the room.

After a further concession by Israel, Arafat did sign the agreement, but his Palestinian critics pointed again and again to the so-called swiss cheese map, as they excoriated him for capitulating to Israel. It was a dramatic illustration of the little-appreciated power of mapmaking.

While the negotiators had spent weeks meticulously working out the text of Oslo II, the map Arafat saw was produced almost as an afterthought. Nobody knows that better than Motro, who was then an Israeli soldier assigned to the talks as a translator. Late one night, her commanding officer took her to a room on an army base with large fluorescent-lit tables and piles of maps. "He handed me some dried-out markers, unfurled a map I had never seen before, and directed me to trace certain lines and shapes. Just make them clearer, he said. No cartographer was present, no graphic designer weighed in on my choices, and, when I was through, no [attorney] reviewed my work. No one knew it mattered."

And so the official map accompanying the agreement that provided for Israel's first significant withdrawal from the West Bank had dozens of bright yellow blotches for areas under joint Israeli-Palestinian control and eight brown blotches for areas under Palestinian control. The map seemed to suggest that the remaining three-fourths of the West Bank would remain permanently in Israeli hands.

"Maps record facts but, whether by design or by accident, they also project worldviews and function as arguments," says Motro, who is now a law professor at the University of Richmond and a senior fellow at Empax, a think tank in New York studying the role of graphics in peacemaking. "Every map reflects a set of judgments that influence the viewer's impression of the underlying data. The choice of colors and labels, the cropping, and the process of selecting what gets included and what gets left out all combine to form a visual gestalt." The three-fourths of the West Bank left for the time being in Israeli hands by Oslo II, for instance, could have been rendered in a color that linked it to Israel or the Palestinian-controlled areas, or it could have been given its own distinctive color, indicating that its future was still to be determined. "A skilled designer can make peace seem inevitable or impossible, reassuring or terrifying, logical or jumbled."

After the Oslo "peace process" fell apart in 2001, only one of the proposed peace plans, the Geneva Accord, included maps. When Motro saw them, she says, "my heart sank," for they were "filled with chartjunk, arbitrary colors and labels, inconsistencies, and omissions," obscuring "the simple reassuring elegance of the agreement's proposed solution."

The lesson isn't limited to the Middle East. Negotiators around the world, says Motro, must realize that a good map is worth a thousand words.