

139 coup plots. Eighteen countries suffered more than one coup, and Nigeria, Benin, and Burkina Faso had six apiece. West Africa, with one-third of the states but 45 percent of the coup attempts, is the most coup-prone region.

Only six African countries have been completely free of coup plots and attempts, but three of those (Namibia, Eritrea, and South Africa) became independent or majority ruled only in the 1990s. "Only the multiparty democracies of Botswana, Cape Verde, and Mauritius," McGowan observes, "have been both independent for more than 25 years and entirely free of the coup virus."

Despite the trend toward democratization in the 1990s, the African propensity for coups hardly changed, though their success

rate diminished. In the dozen years before 1990, there were 54 attempted coups, 26 of them successful; in the next dozen years, there were 50 attempts, 13 successful. "New, weakly institutionalized democratic governments are as apt to suffer from the coup virus as are weak one-party and military regimes," McGowan points out.

But since 1990, a slim majority (27) of the African states have had no coup attempts. The reasons vary, says McGowan. In some countries, "the military has been bought off by sharing in the spoils of the regime"; in others, civil wars are in progress. And a dozen of the coup-free states have "functioning multiparty democratic political systems." Democracy, even when well-established, does not eliminate the risk of a coup, he observes, but it helps.

Europe à la Carte

"Europe Divided? Elites vs. Public Opinion on European Integration" by Liesbet Hooghe, in *European Union Politics* (Sept. 2003), Sage Publications, 2455 Teller Rd., Thousand Oaks, Calif. 91320.


When it comes to an integrated Europe, leaders and led appear far apart, with the former enthusiastic and the latter not very. But that common perception is something of an illusion, contends Hooghe, a political scientist at the University of North Carolina. In reality, the elites and the citizenry are looking to the European Union for different things.

"Elites," she says, "desire a European Union capable of governing a large, competitive market and projecting political muscle; citizens are more in favor of a caring European Union, which protects them from the vagaries of capitalist markets."

Recent surveys seem at first to confirm the oft-sighted huge gap between national leaders, 93 per-

cent of whom regard EU membership as, on balance, a good thing, and the public, of whom only 53 percent agree. But when the questioning gets to specific policy areas, the gap narrows or disappears.

The real elite-public difference, Hooghe argues, is in the sorts of issues the two groups want the EU to handle. Some 69 percent of the national lead-



Europe's leaders attempt to put the best face on European unity.

ers, on average, want the EU to be responsible for matters of “high politics,” such as foreign policy, defense, and currency. Only 55 percent of the public, on average, agrees.

When it comes to policies to aid disadvantaged people or regions, more than 60 percent of the public says yes to the EU, compared with 41 percent or less of the national leaders. Strong majorities in both groups want the EU to stay out of areas such as education and health, where ex-

pensive but popular national programs are well established. Both groups overwhelmingly favor putting more environmental regulation in the EU’s hands.

Europe’s elites seem to follow a “functional” logic, aiming for an EU that will capitalize on economies of scale (as with defense) or overcome member nations’ lack of incentives to act in the common interest in key areas. Ordinary Europeans, however, prefer to design the new Europe à la carte.

Staying Cool in Pakistan

“The Jihadist Threat to Pakistan” by Stephen Philip Cohen, in *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2003), Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K St., N.W., Ste. 400, Washington, D.C. 20006.

It’s a scary scenario that’s sure to figure in a minor motion picture someday: Islamic radicals take over nuclear-armed Pakistan and terrorize the world—or worse. But film is as far as that scenario is likely to get during the next few years in this “deeply Islamic yet still moderate country,” writes Cohen, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. The Pakistani army stands in the way.

Though Pakistan (population: 151 million) was founded by secularists after the 1947 partition of India, and is dominated by a secular oligarchy, the state since 1970 has sporadically used Islamic terror squads to murder and intimidate opponents of the regime. “Pakistani terrorist groups supported or tolerated by the state operate within their own country, in Indian-administered parts of Kashmir, and in India itself,” Cohen says. Despite a pledge to Washington, President Pervez Musharraf hasn’t reined in these groups.

Pakistan’s Islamic organizations range from militant to moderate. Most influential is the relatively centrist Jama’at-i-Islami (JI). Beginning with President Zia ul-Haq (1977–88), political leaders have developed ties to the JI and other religious political parties as a counterweight to more influential secular parties. The JI favors a return to civilian rule (Musharraf came to power in a military coup in 1999) and a strict parliamentary system, and while sup-

porting the Kashmiri “freedom fighters,” has eschewed the sectarian violence that has plagued the country for two decades.

“Support for groups such as Al Qaeda has thus far been limited,” Cohen writes, “but recent reports indicate that JI functionaries provided several fugitive Al Qaeda leaders with safe houses and, of course, the more radical Islamic parties were allied with Al Qaeda in their support of the Taliban in Afghanistan.”

Religion historically has not been a dominant issue in Pakistani politics. “Most middle-class and urban Pakistanis” favor “a modern but Islamic state, with the Islamic part confined to just a few spheres of public life,” says Cohen. An alliance of the JI and five other Islamic parties won 11 percent of the national vote in a 2002 election, gaining 53 seats in the National Assembly and control of the Northwest Frontier Province. Cohen doubts that the religious parties can muster enough national support to win power. And there’s no sign that the army is seething with Islamic radicalism.

Still, Cohen isn’t betting on anything after the next five years: “Pakistan’s educational and demographic trends, its enfeebled institutions, and its near-flat economy could produce a situation where even the army would be unable to stem the growth of radical Islamic groups and might even be captured by them.”