

says, is the Krauthammerian “confidence that the United States could transform Iraq into a Western-style democracy, and go on from there to democratize the broader Middle East.” For decades, neoconservatives had warned of “the dangers of ambitious social engineering” at home. What made them think they could avoid those dangers abroad?

Fukuyama also writes that Krauthammer’s ideas about how the United States should deal with the Arab world are colored by the experience of Israel, which is surrounded by “implacable enemies.” But Arabs neither surround the United States nor implacably op-

pose it (though U.S. policies could solidify widespread hatred of America).

What now? Fukuyama thinks that Washington should continue to promote democracy, particularly in the Middle East, but that it must be more realistic about its ability to succeed at nation-building and needs to create a permanent U.S. organization to carry it out. And if existing international institutions aren’t able to meet today’s global challenges, U.S. leaders, like their post-World War II predecessors, must create new ones to do the job. That, says Fukuyama, should have been the neoconservative agenda from the beginning.

The Fog of Quotation

“Can Reading Clausewitz Save Us from Future Mistakes?” by Bruce Fleming, in *Parameters* (Spring 2004), 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, Pa. 17013–5238.

“No military strategist shall fail to deploy quotations from *On War* when engaging in verbal battle.” The author of *On War*, Prussian army officer Karl von Clausewitz (1780–1831), never said that, but America’s military strategists seem to revere what he left unsaid almost as much as his actual words. And why shouldn’t they? asks Fleming, an English professor at the U.S. Naval Academy. After all, Clausewitz can be used to justify almost any point of view.

Take his most famous pronouncement, popularly rendered in English as, “War is a continuation of politics by other means.” To many commentators, the statement means that civilian authorities should set the goals of a war and then allow the military to determine the strategy. But other analysts, such as Bernard Brodie, author of the magisterial *War and Politics* (1973), reject that reading, contending that Clausewitz favored “genuine civilian control” over the conduct of the war.

In criticizing the much-publicized “shock and awe” campaign at the start of the Iraq War last year, Mackubin Thomas Owens, a professor at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, said that such effects should not be presupposed because, as Clausewitz pointed out, “war takes place in the realm of chance and uncertainty” (what the famous theorist called “the fog of war”). On the other hand, Owens noted that Clausewitz also developed a theory of war with “universal and timeless” elements that offer “a guide for action.”

Owens is right about these contradictory aspects of Clausewitz, says Fleming. He was “as wedded to the theory, his need to see war as predictable, as he was to his admissions that it was not. The interest of the work is precisely the tension between the two.”

Which is why Fleming believes that invoking Clausewitz “at every turn is both so satisfying and ultimately so pointless”: “When



Karl von Clausewitz

war turns out according to his ‘timeless theories,’ Clausewitz told us to expect it. When it turns out otherwise, Clausewitz told us to expect that too.”

On War is a great work, Fleming con-

cludes, but it should not be used as a rhetorical bludgeon. Rather, it should be taught “as poetry, even in the staff colleges, an expression of the intrinsic contradictions of the human condition.”

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

Murk at the WTO

“The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence” by Alan O. Sykes, in *World Trade Review* (Nov. 2003), Cambridge Univ. Press, 100 Brook Hill Dr., West Nyack, N.Y. 10994–2133.

When the Appellate Body of the World Trade Organization (WTO) upheld the European Union’s case against American steel tariffs last November, the decision was hardly a surprise. Since the WTO was created in 1995, the appeals court has thrown out every “safeguard” protectionist measure that has come before it. The problem is not that all safeguards were meant to be illegal under the WTO, but that the law lacks any coherent guidance as to when they are permissible, argues Sykes, a law professor at the University of Chicago.

The WTO Agreement on Safeguards lets nations temporarily impose tariffs to protect domestic industries threatened by “serious injury” resulting from a surge in imports. The 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) did the same in cases in which “unforeseen developments” after a trade concession led to increased imports and “serious injury.” But over time, as the practical meaning of the GATT provision proved elusive, it fell into disuse, and countries resorted to extra-legal direct negotiations with one another to “voluntarily” limit exports.

The WTO safeguards agreement was designed to end that practice. Yet the text is murky. (What does “serious injury” mean? And how do you determine that increased imports “caused” it?) The WTO Appellate Body’s decisions haven’t clarified the “conceptual muddle.” Since the WTO agreement isn’t likely to be renegotiated, it would take a dose of judicial activism by the Appellate Body to clarify matters.

Is that necessary? Sykes himself is agnostic. “Purist” advocates of free trade say that the only thing safeguard measures really safeguard is wasteful protectionism. Others warn that trade negotiators will be reluctant to agree to future free-trade measures if they lack the political cover afforded by the ability to protect certain industries. Then there are the “somewhat cynical” observers, who argue that the current system provides sufficient political cover by allowing national political leaders to noisily announce trade restrictions that are only later struck down by the WTO. Today’s illegal but temporary trade barriers, these observers say, are better than yesterday’s long-lived and extra-legal “voluntary” agreements.

Over the Rainbow

“The Economics of Happiness” by Richard A. Easterlin, in *Daedalus* (Spring 2004), Norton’s Woods, 136 Irving St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

Most Americans cherish family and health, but few will turn down a higher-paying job even if it cuts into their time at home or in the gym. The extra money, most people believe, will buy additional happiness. Presented in one opinion poll with a hypothetical job that would give them higher pay but less free time

than their current job, none of the 1,200 respondents said that it was “very unlikely” they would take the job.

Americans hold no monopoly on materialism, notes Easterlin, an economist at the University of Southern California. In the early 1960s, social psychologist Hadley Cantrill con-