

equality of all nations, the bedrock principle of international law.”

The real issue is European influence over U.S. policy. During the Cold War, European influence was guaranteed by the fact that the protection of Europe itself from the Soviet Union was the paramount U.S. strategic goal. All that has changed.

Yet there’s still an important link. The United States “is and always has been a revolutionary power,” Kagan believes, a force for liberalism and democracy around the world. And that’s the real reason it needs the legitimacy that only Europe can provide: “The world’s sole superpower needs to demonstrate that it wields its great strengths on behalf of its principles and those who share them.” The American people won’t indefinitely

support efforts abroad “in the face of constant charges of illegitimacy by the United States’ closest democratic allies.”

Yet if the United States is to grant Europe influence over its exercise of power, possibly through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, there must be agreement on “the nature of today’s global threats and the means to counter them,” warns Kagan. Such agreement doesn’t currently exist. Most Europeans think that the United States has exaggerated the risks of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

Kagan says it’s time for “the wisest heads in Europe” to ask themselves if they really want to bet that “the risks posed by the ‘axis of evil,’ from terrorism to tyrants, will never be as great as the risk posed by the American leviathan unbound.”

## *A Chink in the Armor*

“Missile Defence Myopia: Lessons from the Iraq War” by Dennis M. Gormley, in *Survival* (Winter 2003–04), International Institute for Strategic Studies, Arundel House, 13–15 Arundel St., Temple Pl., London WC2R 3DX, England.

America’s Patriot missile defenses, such a dud in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, worked far better in the Iraq War last year. But amid all the dazzling displays of U.S. firepower, it wasn’t widely recognized that the United States was still operating with “only half a missile defense”—a dangerous condition that now cries out for correction, contends Gormley, a senior fellow in the Monterey Institute’s Center for Non-proliferation Studies.

The Patriot intercepted and destroyed each of the nine Iraqi ballistic missiles that posed serious threats. (Ten others, mis-aimed, were allowed to land harmlessly in the desert or gulf waters.) But low-flying Iraqi cruise missiles and aircraft—hard to distinguish on radar screens from all the friendly choppers and planes flying close to the ground—were another story.

“American and Kuwaiti missile defenses and warning systems apparently failed to detect or intercept four of five” Iraqi cruise missiles that were fired, Gormley reports. One of those missiles “came per-

ilously close to a U.S. Marine encampment,” while another hit just outside a large Kuwaiti shopping mall. In addition, two Iraqi ultralight aircraft, which could easily have been carrying deadly chemical or biological agents, flew over a U.S. Army encampment—and thousands of American troops—before being detected.

This record provides what one missile defense officer called “a glimpse of the future,” in which cruise missiles and piloted or drone aerial vehicles such as ultralights could constitute “a poor man’s air force.” Simple, inexpensive kit airplanes that hobbyists buy could readily be adapted to serve as weapons. The very success of the Patriot in dealing with ballistic missiles, Gormley observes, makes the cheap alternative that much more attractive to potential enemies.

In addition to stronger diplomatic efforts to curtail proliferation of cruise missile technology, he concludes, the United States should seek closer coordination among the relevant army, navy, and air



*America's Patriot missile defenses, like this unit deployed in the Kuwaiti desert in March 2003, performed well against ballistic missiles, but cruise missiles and low-flying aircraft escaped detection.*

force units, possibly under a single Pentagon agency. And deployment of a new "wide-area surveillance and battle man-

agement platform," which is not scheduled to occur until 2011, may need to be speeded up.

## *The Roots of Terrorism*

"Education, Poverty, and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?" by Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Malečková, in *Journal of Economic Perspectives* (Fall 2003), Macalester College, 1600 Grand Ave., St. Paul, Minn. 55105.

The notion that poverty and ignorance breed terrorism seems to have a seductive appeal that transcends mere facts. Public figures left and right continue to repeat it, even though there's little evidence to support it, write Krueger, an economist at Princeton University, and Malečková, a professor at the Institute for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Charles University, Prague.

As a rule, they note, better-off and better-educated people are *more* likely to support and participate in terrorist or militant acts than their less fortunate peers. In a December 2001 opinion survey of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, for

example, 86 percent of adults who had attended high school supported armed attacks against Israeli targets, compared with 72 percent of their illiterate peers. And outright opposition to such attacks was much higher in the ranks of the illiterate: 26 percent voiced opposition, compared with only 12 percent of better-educated Palestinians.

Many studies of those who actually commit terrorist attacks follow the same general pattern. Of 129 Lebanese Hezbollah militants who became *Shahids* (martyrs) between 1982 and 1994, only 28 percent came from impoverished families (while 33 percent of all Lebanese were living in poverty). Thirty-three