have also all but vanished from the public radio airwaves. So what's filling all those hours? News-talk programs such as *All Things Considered* and *Morning Edition* have claimed much bigger shares of airtime.

There's nothing wrong with giving listeners what they want, writes *Weekly Standard* senior editor Ferguson, but there's an economic undercurrent driving the changes on public radio—and public radio was expressly supposed to be immune to such pressures.

Public radio began in the 1920s as a spate of low-output, community-run broadcasts mostly aimed at rural listeners. (*Broadcast* was originally a farmers' term for spreading seeds across a field.) After World War II, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) reserved the left side of the FM dial for educational radio. Classical music seemed particularly suited to stations free from commercial pressures: "an art form that was good for the polity and good for the soul," Ferguson writes.

Public radio existed in this blissful state until the 1980s, when President Ronald Reagan threatened to cut its government subsidies. At the same time, the FCC began relaxing the rules governing advertising on the public airwaves, allowing "underwriters" to subsidize programming. A vicious circle was created, writes Ferguson. Programmers "stepped up their solicitation of funds from corporations and foundations," and began studying how to attract "a better class of listener—the kind who could be relied upon to donate money to public radio, and . . . just as important, create a desirable target audience for underwriters." Radio consultants, such as the influential David Giovannoni, were quick to point out that *Morning Edition* and *All Things Considered* attracted the most listeners. (Consultants also characterized news-talk listeners as youthful "citizens of the world," and classical music listeners as older folks seeking escape.) The listener trough in the middle of the day occurred during the classical music hours. It didn't take a marketing genius to conclude that adding more news hours would increase the number of listeners.

The situation seems unlikely to reverse itself anytime soon. Bob Goldfarb, a program director in Seattle, says that most stations now broadcast what the station manager wants to listen to. "Nowadays not many of these people have been educated to a taste in classical music. They're news-talk people. And by now they've got a news-talk audience." It's a slippery slope. Individual stations pay large fees to NPR for news programming, often more than $1 million a year. As Ferguson points out, "These high costs accelerate and, in turn, require ever more listeners to cover them."

Other Nations

A Model Muslim State?

"Turkey's Strategic Model: Myths and Realities" by Graham E. Fuller, in *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2004), Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K St., N.W., Ste. 400, Washington, D.C. 20006.

When Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded modern Turkey in the 1920s, he wanted a thoroughly secular state that kept religion at the margins of public life. Now, after decades of repression, a moderate Islam has moved to the center of Turkish life. And Turkey, with its maturing democracy and growing independence, is fast becoming an appealing model for the Muslim world, argues Fuller, author of *The Future of Political Islam* (2003) and a former U.S. Central Intelligence Agency official.

"It was only natural that a key feature of the Turkish identity—its deep association with the protection and spread of Islam for hundreds of years—could not remain forever suppressed," he says. For all the economic progress that modernization brought, the vast majority of Turks remained religious. And as Turkey's commitment to democracy deepened in recent decades, in part because of its desire to join the European Union, the Turkish military, the zealous guardian of Atatürk's secularist legacy, "increasingly limited its previously interventionist role in politics." The overtly religious Justice and Progress Party, which "prudently describes itself as coming from an

'Islamic background,'" scored a spectacular victory in the 2002 elections, becoming the country's ruling party. Meanwhile, the popular Nur movement, springing from "the same traditional Anatolian heartland," calls for an apolitical revival of Islam as the moral basis for civil society, stressing the need for education, democracy, and tolerance.

As "the first state in the history of the Muslim world to freely elect to national power an Islamist party," Turkey seems to have accomplished "the management and political integration of Islam," which is "the leading challenge to the Muslim world today," says Fuller.

Seeking to become an advanced, Westernized nation, Turkey under the Atatürkists tied itself closely to the West. But with the Soviet threat gone, Ankara can now be more independent of Washington. "Arabs sat up and took notice that a democratic Turkey could say no to Washington on assisting the U.S. invasion of Iraq, something despotic Arab rulers dared not do."

For decades under the Atatürkists, Turkey tried to ignore the Arab world and Israel. But threats from regionally ambitious authoritarian regimes in Iran, Iraq, and Syria led Turkey's leaders to develop ties with Israel. Now that those threats are much diminished (thanks, in part, to the United States), Turkey "is almost surely moving toward improved relations" with the three Muslim countries. And Ankara's decision to meet some of the demands of its Kurdish population for cultural autonomy and linguistic rights has muted Kurdish separatism and eased Turkish anxieties about neighboring Iraq, which also has a large Kurdish population.

"This new independent-minded Turkey, moving toward resolution of its traditional Islamist and Kurdish issues and away from the old, hackneyed vision of a secular pro-U.S. state," concludes Fuller, "is on its way to becoming a genuine model for the Muslim world and gaining acceptance among many Muslims as such."

EXCERPT

Target: Canada

Reading a book composed entirely of excerpts from textbooks may seem an unpromising activity, but history texts reveal much about national perspectives and prejudices. . . .

According to Canadian texts (six are cited), the United States planned to conquer and annex Canada during the Revolution, the War of 1812, the Civil War, and at various points in between. During the Cold War, the United States repeatedly bullied Canada into supporting its aggressive military policies. Canadian officials hoped that NATO would evolve into a North Atlantic community that would act as a counterweight to U.S. influence in Canada, but in vain: Canadian governments had to toe the U.S. line or suffer humiliation. During the Cuban Missile Crisis, Prime Minister John G. Diefenbaker, concerned that [President John F.] Kennedy's belligerence might lead to a nuclear war, waited three days before announcing that Canadian forces had gone on the alert. In the next election, the Americans used their influence to topple the truculent prime minister. Diefenbaker's successor, Lester Pearson, aligned Canada more closely with the United States, but in 1965, he annoyed Lyndon Johnson by calling for a bombing pause and a negotiated settlement to the Vietnam War. In a meeting after the speech, Johnson grabbed Pearson by the lapels and shouted, "You pissed on my rug."

Thus have Canadian texts immortalized the Johnson vernacular.

In few countries are the texts so consistently critical of the United States as they are in Canada.

—Frances FitzGerald, author of *America Revised: History Schoolbooks in the Twentieth Century* (1979), reviewing Dana Lindaman and Kyle Ward's *History Lessons: How Textbooks from Around the World Portray U.S. History*, in *The Washington Post Book World* (Aug. 8–14, 2004)