were portrayed as a national menace, a cause of juvenile delinquency and other social ills. Congressional hearings were held. To ward off government regulation, *Mad*'s publisher, William Gaines, set up the Comics Code Authority to ensure that every comic book was certifiably "wholesome." He had no intention of making *Mad* meet that criterion, so in 1955 it became a "magazine" instead. *Mad* later took its revenge with an article that blamed juvenile delinquency on baseball.

Mad sent up its rival publications (by turning innocent teens Archie and Jughead into chain-smoking juvenile delinquents, for instance), along with movie stars, television shows, pop singers, politicians, and advertisers. After the magazine satirically exposed the ads for various consumer products hidden in TV shows and movies, the Federal Communications Commission and Congress pressured the TV networks to cut back on the practice. *Mad* itself ran spoof ads for bogus products such as "Ded Ryder Cowboy Carbine" rifles. Rooted in pop culture, the magazine anticipated pop art.



Mad ***continues to skewer American culture, though it may lack some of the bite of its original creators.***

Though Gaines always insisted that *Mad* had no political agenda, it took on politicians such as Senator Joseph McCarthy (in 1954), and "was not afraid to critique either side in the Cold War struggle," writes Abrams, who teaches modern U.S. history at the University of Southampton, England. Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev (who had a bald pate like the "Mr. Clean" of liquid cleaner fame) became "Mr. Mean: All-Commie Brainwasher" in a *Mad* parody of an ad that had asked, in all seriousness, "Is Your Bathroom Breeding Bolsheviks?"

Mad refused "to affirm or support" anyone or anything, says Abrams. It treated student radicalism of the 1960s with the same irreverence it did everything else. But it made enough of an impact that Marshall McLuhan and many other intellectuals of the day felt compelled to take its measure.

Mad, since absorbed by a media conglomerate, survives in body, if not in spirit, says Abrams. The familiar face of Alfred E. Newman still continues to stare out from *Mad*'s front page, his "toothy grin a reminder of [the magazine's] mordant history."

No More Mozart!

"Radio Silence: How NPR Purged Classical Music from Its Airwaves" by Andrew Ferguson, in *The Weekly Standard* (June 14, 2004), 1150 17th St., N.W., Ste. 505, Washington, D.C. 20036.

If less classical music seems to be coming from your local public radio station, it's not just your imagination. Even though the number of public stations has grown to more than 800 across America—boasting a listenership of 29 million—the number of those stations identifying themselves as "classical" has been cut in half since 1993. The stations still playing classical music increasingly fill their designated music hours (mostly at night) with a syndicated service called Classical 24 rather than local programming. Jazz, folk, blues, and bluegrass

have also all but vanished from the public radio airwaves. So what's filling all those hours? News-talk programs such as *All Things Considered* and *Morning Edition* have claimed much bigger shares of airtime.

There's nothing wrong with giving listeners what they want, writes *Weekly Standard* senior editor Ferguson, but there's an economic undercurrent driving the changes on public radio—and public radio was expressly supposed to be immune to such pressures.

Public radio began in the 1920s as a spate of low-output, community-run broadcasts mostly aimed at rural listeners. (*Broadcast* was originally a farmers' term for spreading seeds across a field.) After World War II, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) reserved the left side of the FM dial for educational radio. Classical music seemed particularly suited to stations free from commercial pressures: "an art form that was good for the polity and good for the soul," Ferguson writes.

Public radio existed in this blissful state until the 1980s, when President Ronald Reagan threatened to cut its government subsidies. At the same time, the FCC began relaxing the rules governing advertising on the public airwaves, allowing "underwriters" to subsidize programming. A vicious circle was created, writes Ferguson. Programmers "stepped up their solicitation of funds from corporations and foundations," and began studying how to attract "a better class of listener—the kind who could be relied upon to donate money to public radio, and . . . just as important, create a desirable target audience for underwriters." Radio consultants, such as the influential David Giovannoni, were quick to point out that *Morning Edition* and *All Things Considered* attracted the most listeners. (Consultants also characterized news-talk listeners as youthful "citizens of the world," and classical music listeners as older folks seeking escape.) The listener trough in the middle of the day occurred during the classical music hours. It didn't take a marketing genius to conclude that adding more news hours would increase the number of listeners.

The situation seems unlikely to reverse itself anytime soon. Bob Goldfarb, a program director in Seattle, says that most stations now broadcast what the station manager wants to listen to. "Nowadays not many of these people have been educated to a taste in classical music. They're news-talk people. And by now they've got a news-talk audience." It's a slippery slope. Individual stations pay large fees to NPR for news programming, often more than $1 million a year. As Ferguson points out, "These high costs accelerate and, in turn, require ever more listeners to cover them."

Other Nations

A Model Muslim State?

"Turkey's Strategic Model: Myths and Realities" by Graham E. Fuller, in *The Washington Quarterly* (Summer 2004), Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1800 K St., N.W., Ste. 400, Washington, D.C. 20006.

When Mustafa Kemal Atatürk founded modern Turkey in the 1920s, he wanted a thoroughly secular state that kept religion at the margins of public life. Now, after decades of repression, a moderate Islam has moved to the center of Turkish life. And Turkey, with its maturing democracy and growing independence, is fast becoming an appealing model for the Muslim world, argues Fuller, author of *The Future of Political Islam* (2003) and a former U.S. Central Intelligence Agency official.

"It was only natural that a key feature of the Turkish identity—its deep association with the protection and spread of Islam for hundreds of years—could not remain forever suppressed," he says. For all the economic progress that modernization brought, the vast majority of Turks remained religious. And as Turkey's commitment to democracy deepened in recent decades, in part because of its desire to join the European Union, the Turkish military, the zealous guardian of Atatürk's secularist legacy, "increasingly limited its previously interventionist role in politics." The overtly religious Justice and Progress Party, which "prudently describes itself as coming from an