mediately following World War I. Consider these lines from "Burbank with a Baedeker" (1920): "The rats are underneath the piles./ The jew is underneath the lot." The debate over Eliot has recently heated up again, and some academics now even refuse to teach his work in their courses.

Schuchard, an English professor at Emory University, argues that the poet's own complex views regarding religion help to explain the controversial passages. A recently uncovered 33-year correspondence with American intellectual and Zionist Horace Kallen reinforces the view that Eliot was no bigot. In the "sustained and cordial dialogue between Eliot the conservative, believing Christian and Kallen the liberal, freethinking Jew," Kallen often asked Eliot to intercede on behalf of certain European Jews who were fleeing Nazi persecution. In every case the poet responded vigorously, using his influence to secure a position for economist Adolph Löwe at the New School for Social Research in New York City, for instance, and also befriending sociologist Karl Mannheim and introducing him to other academics in London. Eliot counted many Jews among his friends, including such luminaries as Supreme Court justice Benjamin Cardozo, and, unlikely as it seems, the comedian Groucho Marx. Eliot's detractors point to his friendships with known anti-Semites—Wyndham Lewis and Ezra Pound, among others.

Schuchard says that during the time that Eliot was writing the troubling poems he was also preparing to join the Church of England, converting from the Unitarianism of his youth, which he detested because of its humanistic separation from traditional Christianity. In fact, says Schuchard, Eliot *admired* the Hebrew faith for its grounding in ancient tradition. Deeply affected by the horrors of the Great War and immersed in the difficult creative process that would lead to "The Waste Land," with its vision of the disintegration of Western culture and society, Eliot frequently employed Jewish characters in his poems, according to Schuchard, as a metaphorical device, to represent the decay of tradition. That was effective, but it made for dangerous art, and Eliot's critics recoil at some of the imagery he used. In "Gerontion" (1920), for instance, a Jew "squats on the window sill," his skin "patched and peeled" by a loathsome disease.

Equally damning, in the critics' view, is a published remark from 1933, when Eliot declared that "reasons of race and religion combine to make any large number of free-thinking Jews undesirable." Schuchard counters that, to the archconservative Eliot, freethinking intellectuals of *any* stripe were anathema. Eliot later retracted the word *race*. (He also claimed ignorance of the persecutions that were already under way in Nazi Germany, and Schuchard, relying on several recent studies of newspaper accounts of the time, says that is completely plausible.)

The invited commentators mostly remain unconvinced by Schuchard's arguments. The milder voices, such as University of Rochester English professor James Longenbach, allow that "Eliot's poems are powerful because their language invites us to call him a bigot." But Anthony Julius, author of *T.S. Eliot, Anti-Semitism, and Literary Form* (1995), says that "critics who excuse Eliot's anti-Semitism, or worse, pretend that it does not exist, merely carry on his own work of contempt toward Jews." The *Modernism/Modernity* debate concludes on a wistful note, with Schuchard's hope that future discoveries on the scale of the Eliot-Kallen correspondence might shed new light on Eliot's personal views. Until then, the truth about his beliefs may remain as elusive as the meaning of some of his poetry.

Other Nations

Muslim Europe

"Europe's Muslim Street" by Omer Taspinar, in *Foreign Policy* (Mar.–Apr. 2003), 1779 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Europe's reluctance to join the U.S.-led war against Iraq reflected more than a different orientation toward power. Europe has a much stronger Muslim constituency than the United States, observes Taspinar, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center for

Middle East Policy: "The 15 million Muslims of the European Union—up to three times as many as live in the United States—are becoming a more powerful political force than the fabled Arab street." That France and Germany alone have nearly 10 million Muslims and only 700,000 Jews helps to explain Europe's different perspective on the Middle East.

Muslims in Europe have seen their clout increase with their growing enfranchisement. Nearly half of the five to seven million Muslims in France (population: 61.4 million) are already citizens. Germany, which began granting citizenship on the basis of birth rather than ancestry in 2000, counts a half-million Muslims among its 82 million citizens, and is adding 160,000 a year. Newly enfranchised "German Turks" gave the incumbent Social Democrat-Green coalition vital support in last September's close election.

Turks, Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians, and Pakistanis came to Europe as invited "guest workers" during the 1950s and 1960s, when European countries wanted to ease their postwar labor shortage. But when recession hit in the 1970s, the workers stayed, often joined by their families. Today, Taspinar notes, the Muslim birth rate is three times the non-Muslim rate. By 2015, if current trends continue, the Muslim population in Europe is expected to double, while the non-Muslim population is projected to shrink by 3.5 percent.

"Whether Brussels, Berlin, Paris, or Washington likes it or not," concludes Taspinar, "Europe's Muslim constituencies are likely to become an even more vocal foreign-policy lobby."

Where Politics Is All Too Local

"Decentralization and Political Parties" by Christopher Sabatini, in *Journal of Democracy* (Apr. 2003), 1101 15th St., N.W., Ste. 800, Washington, D.C. 20005.

Political power has shifted massively to the local level in Latin America in recent decades. New local political parties and leaders have sprung up, neglected wants and needs are being addressed, and many more citizens now feel part of the political process. There's just one problem: Decentralization has been undermining the established *national* political parties that are critical to the long-term prospects of these countries.

That wasn't supposed to happen, says Sabatini, senior program officer for Latin America at the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington. Take the Andean countries—Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Peru. When they adopted decentralization in the 1980s and 1990s, providing for the transfer of money and responsibilities from the national governments and for the direct election of mayors and governors, "most decision makers and foreign donors [such as the World Bank and U.S. Agency for International Development] expected to see a reinvigoration of party systems as national parties sought to respond to local constituents, issues, and leaders. In practice, however, national parties have often floundered."

Latin America's national political parties have never been particularly strong. Economic woes and austerity measures after 1986 cost many parties public confidence and many of the patronage jobs they had used to sustain their power. Venezuela's two major parties, Acción Democrática and COPEI, embraced state decentralization after riots shook Caracas in 1989. In Colombia, leaders hoped that direct election of mayors and governors "would relegitimize a political system battered by years of civil war."

But "decentralization struck squarely at long-favored means of maintaining party discipline and cohesion," Sabatini notes. Local leaders no longer need the help of party higher-ups in the capital to satisfy their constituents or run for higher office. And the creation of thousands of locally elected positions has brought many new politicians, movements, and parties to the fore.

But "the lack of coherent links to national-level issues, institutions, and candidates," says Sabatini, has made it harder for the national governments to govern and to be held accountable. His remedy: decentralize the national parties themselves, making them better able to meet local demands and establish the missing "links."