

side homes, though some were inside warehouses or barns. But they shared a key characteristic, as did the embassy chapels: None looked like a place of worship from the street. In Amsterdam, Catholics maintained 20 such churches in 1700, while the Mennonites had six and other groups four. The Dutch *schuilkerken*, Kaplan points out, had thousands of counterparts elsewhere in Europe, with various names, including house churches, prayer houses, meeting houses, mass houses, house chapels, oratories, and assembly places.

The embassy chapels stirred a new issue: Could native religious dissidents attend services in an embassy? “For an entire century,” writes Kaplan, “from the 1560s through the 1650s, this issue provoked clashes in London, some of them violent, between authorities and citizens, on the one hand, and the personnel of the Spanish, French, and Venetian embassies on the other.” The 1583 “Throckmorton plot”—which involved the Spanish ambassador

and an Englishman who aimed to restore Catholicism in England—seemed to confirm English suspicions about the foreign embassies of Catholic powers.

But despite frequent tensions and occasional violence, Kaplan says, most embassy chapels in Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries effectively served “significant congregations that included native dissidents.” And out of that practice developed the modern legal doctrine of extraterritoriality: the pretense that an ambassador and his embassy were on the soil of his homeland. Thus, embassy chapels did not violate the religious laws of a host country, and native dissidents who attended chapel services did not violate local laws. It was all part of a larger fiction, says Kaplan, “that enabled Europeans to accommodate dissent without confronting it directly, to tolerate knowingly what they could not bring themselves to accept fully . . . to go on living as if civic and sacral community were still one and the same.”

Is Good Luck Unfair?

“What is Egalitarianism?” by Samuel Scheffler, in *Philosophy & Public Affairs* (Winter 2003), and “Equality, Luck and Hierarchy” by Ronald Dworkin, in *Philosophy & Public Affairs* (Spring 2003), 41 Williams St., Princeton, N.J. 08540.

“Life is unfair,” President John F. Kennedy once famously observed. A school of philosophers has arisen in recent decades with a (theoretical) solution: Redistribute economic resources to compensate for advantages conferred by luck, and let advantages stemming from individuals’ own choices stand. But this “luck egalitarianism,” as it’s been dubbed, misconstrues the ideal of equality, contends Scheffler, a professor of philosophy and law at the University of California, Berkeley.

According to Scheffler, “luck egalitarians” such as Ronald Dworkin, Will Kymlicka, and John Roemer deny “that a person’s natural talent, creativity, intelligence, innovative skill, or entrepreneurial ability can be the basis for legitimate inequalities.” On the other hand, earning more money than others by choosing to work more hours than they do is fine—and

so, luck egalitarians argue, the extra money shouldn’t be taxed.

But the ideal of equality, as commonly understood, Scheffler says, “is opposed not to luck but to oppression, to heritable hierarchies of social status, to ideas of caste, to class privilege and the rigid stratification of classes, and to the undemocratic distribution of power.” As a moral ideal, equality asserts the equal worth of human beings; as a political ideal, the equal rights of citizens. Questions about the distribution of economic resources are important but secondary considerations.

Dworkin, a professor of philosophy and law at New York University and the author of *Sovereign Virtue* (2000), tries “to anchor luck-egalitarian principles in a more general ideal of equality,” Scheffler says. But his ideal “is perfectly compatible with social hierarchy.” For example, “an auto-

cratic government might impose an economic system that treated individuals as equals in Dworkin's sense, but that would not transform the society into an egalitarian political community."

Dworkin rejects Scheffler's characterization of his views on taxation and other

subjects, as well as the "luck egalitarian" label. But he insists that political or social equality should not be regarded as "more fundamental" than economic equality: "A genuine society of equals must aim at equal stake as well as equal voice and equal status for its citizens."

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY & ENVIRONMENT

Double Helix Double Cross?

A Survey of Recent Articles

The observance this year of the 50th anniversary of the momentous discovery of the double helix structure of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) has been marked by reflections on an alleged scientific injustice almost as much as by celebration of the great scientific achievement.

Was Rosalind Franklin (1920–58), the British scientist whose x-ray data on DNA played a crucial role in the discovery, denied proper credit for her contribution by codiscoverers James Watson and Francis Crick? A *Nova* television documentary, "Secret of Photo 51," broadcast on PBS on April 22 (see www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/photo51), was the most recent account to suggest as much. But the truth of the matter may be more complicated.

Though feminists have turned her into "an icon for the oppression of women scien-

tists," observes Nicholas Wade, a science writer for *The New York Times*, there's no evidence that Franklin herself—no shrinking violet, and known to object vigorously to unfair treatment—felt that she had been robbed by Watson and Crick. "She became friends with both men afterwards," Wade writes in *The Scientist* (Apr. 7, 2003; see also www.the-scientist.com), "and spent her last convalescence in Crick's house before her death, at age 37, from ovarian cancer."

In their 1953 article in *Nature* announcing the discovery—which was accompanied by an article by Franklin telling what she knew about DNA—Watson and Crick, of the Cavendish Laboratory in Cambridge, England, said merely that they had been "stimulated by a knowledge of the general nature of the unpublished experimental results and ideas of Dr. M. F. Wilkins,

Dr. R. E. Franklin, and their co-workers at King's College, London." When they accepted the 1962 Nobel Prize in physiology or medicine (which they shared with Maurice Wilkins, the deputy director of King's College and Franklin's colleague and rival there), Watson and Crick made no mention of Franklin. And in his best-selling book *The Double Helix* (1968), Watson portrayed her in condescending terms. Watson also noted that Wilkins, in highhanded fashion, had shown him Franklin's x-ray photograph 51, without Franklin's knowledge. Crick, meanwhile, obtained a King's College report containing Franklin's data. Watson and Crick's model of the double helix soon followed.



How much did James Watson and Francis Crick rely on Rosalind Franklin's 1953 x-ray photographs to fashion their model of DNA's double helix structure?