

“larger issues of democratization (within the union and within the larger polity), social justice, and economic equality. . . . Members pay dues and strike but are also expected to mobilize on behalf of causes beyond their own.” Such “social-movement” unions, Levi maintains, “tend to be democratic and participatory.”

Since their election in 1995, AFL-CIO president John Sweeney and his “New Voices” colleagues have been shaking up the labor union bureaucracy, says Levi. “Redefining its program through action,” the AFL-CIO has gotten involved in campaigns against sweatshops and for “global

justice” and a “living wage.” About 80 cities and counties around the country have enacted “living wage” ordinances, obliging contractors to pay wages that are usually above the federal minimum.

Levi believes that the “fresh vitality” she detects in American unions has come none too soon. Unions “offer collective influence to those who lack individual clout in important political and economic domains,” and, for that reason, they’re “essential to a vigorous American democracy.” If unions “mobilize as a social movement,” she says, they’ll be better able to get that message across.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Germany and Japan—and Iraq

“Occupational Hazards” by Douglas Porch, in *The National Interest* (Summer 2003), 1615 L St., N.W., Ste. 1230, Washington, D.C. 20036.

Some proponents of preventive war in Iraq suggested that postwar nation-building after the war would be a snap. Look at how

the United States turned Germany and Japan into model democracies after World War II. But the task, in fact, wasn’t so easy



No cheering: Japanese officials oversee an American-backed election during the 1950s.

then, and it will be even harder in Iraq, argues Porch, a professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.

“The truth is that a full decade after World War II’s finale, many U.S. ‘nation-builders’ considered their efforts a *nearly complete failure*—and for good reason,” he writes. In surveys taken at the time, a majority of Germans said that their country’s “best time in recent history had been during the first years of the Nazis.” Instead of gratitude and an enthusiastic embrace of democracy, U.S. reformers in Germany and Japan “encountered torpor, resentment, and resistance,” says Porch.

During the 1950s and 1960s, both the Germans and the Japanese overcame their resentment, and the two nations evolved into flourishing, peace-loving democracies. But that resulted less from Allied occupation policies, Porch says, than from various other factors, including “enlightened political leadership, ‘economic miracles’ spurred by the Marshall Plan in Europe and the Korean War in Japan, and the precedent, however frail, of functioning democratic government in both countries.” The Germans and the Japanese were talented, technologically advanced peoples, eager to put the devastating war behind them. “Above all, though, fear of the Soviets caused leaders in both countries, supported by their populations, to take shelter under the U.S. military umbrella.”

“Post-Saddam Iraq is a poor candidate to replicate the success of Japan and Germany,” Porch maintains. “Though once a relatively tolerant, pluralist society, Iraq has

become a fractured, impoverished country, its people susceptible to hysteria and fanaticism. They are historically difficult to mobilize behind a common national vision, and no Yoshida Shigeru or Konrad Adenauer can be expected to emerge from a ruling class that inclines toward demagoguery and corruption.” Despite the problem Iraq poses for the U.S., there’s no equivalent of the Soviet Union to induce Iraqis to welcome U.S. protection. And “as for prewar experiences of Iraqi democracy, there are none.”

When most U.S. forces came home after World War II, the task of running Germany and Japan was, in effect, “swiftly turned over to the locals” in each country, says Porch, “with the U.S. military retaining vague supervisory powers.” In Iraq, by contrast, “a large U.S. garrison” is likely to be necessary for “the foreseeable future,” inevitably arousing further resentment.

Learning from the mistakes of the de-nazification effort in Germany, the United States should let the Iraqis “carry out their own ‘de-Baathification lite,’ complete with war crimes trials of Saddam’s top henchmen.” Instead of conducting “an invasive campaign of democratization and cultural engineering,” U.S. nation-builders should aim “to ‘normalize’ Iraq fairly quickly by putting a responsible leadership cadre in place while retaining a supervisory role with enough soldiers to back it up,” thus preventing the country from sliding into chaos.

The U.S.-British reconstruction of Iraq will be “neither brief nor cheap,” Porch says, but, “with any luck,” it will succeed eventually, as reconstruction succeeded eventually in Germany and Japan.

UNdone

“Why the Security Council Failed” by Michael J. Glennon, in *Foreign Affairs* (May-June 2003), 58 E. 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

The dramatic rupture of the United Nations Security Council over Iraq earlier this year made evident that the grand dream of the UN’s founders—subjecting the use of force to the rule of law—had failed. But the fault lay not with the United States or France or other member nations, argues Glennon, a professor of international law at Tufts University’s Fletcher School. Rather,

it lay with underlying geopolitical forces “too strong for a legalist institution to withstand.”

Given the recent evolution of the international system, the Security Council’s failure was “largely inexorable,” Glennon says. Well before the debate over confronting Iraq, world power had shifted toward “a configuration that was simply in-