

ty his policies had prepared for them. His outbursts and tantrums, at least one of them witnessed by Sell, occurred only when his own amour-propre was challenged. Normally I distrust psychoprofiles, but the picture of a psychopathic personality as adumbrated here is convincing, and consistent with all the observable facts.

The self-pity of the majority population (the historic seedbed of fascistic ideas) has been angrily criticized by many previous students of this conflict, from whom Sell distinguishes himself by showing some empathy. The Serbs had historical reasons to fear for their diaspora within the old country, and there were other virulent nationalists on the scene, as well as many self-centered separatists. These points are true and necessary for our understanding. However, Sell slightly understates the way in which Milosevic deliberately sought to condition and encourage the same elements in other parties that he incited in his own. The textbook case is his covert agreement with Franjo Tudjman of Croatia to partition Bosnia between them in a late-blooming version of the Stalin-Hitler pact.

Surveying the Milosevic-Tudjman pact in sanguinary operation in Mostar and Sarajevo in the mid-1990s, I thought that if I could know about it, then so could the noble Lords Carrington and Owen, and maybe even Messrs. Vance and Baker and Christopher. A strikingly useful aspect of this book is the detail it gives, often at first hand, about the shameful vacillations—to put it no higher—of the Western mediators. Milosevic became so arrogant and exorbitant because he could not believe his luck in starting at least three wars and then being hastily invited to be a partner in peace, as he was at Dayton. Banal is hardly the word for the statesmen who could not recognize evil when it stared them in the face.

—CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS

**INTELLECTUALS AND THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY:
*Philosophers, Jesters, or Technicians?***
By Tevi Troy. Rowman & Littlefield.
255 pp. \$27.95

Troy declares himself early and clearly: “As the stories of the past eight administrations

show, the interrelation of intellectuals and presidents has developed into a crucial factor in determining presidential success.” Beginning with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., President John F. Kennedy’s “ambassador” to the intellectual community, Troy attempts to support that premise. It proves, in my view, a bit too heavy a burden.

A former Labor Department official who is now on President George W. Bush’s domestic policy staff, Troy draws on journalism, White House memoirs, and presidential archives for this portrait of how intellectuals and presidents have used, misused, and abused each other. He is especially valuable in underscoring the role of Martin Anderson of Stanford University’s Hoover Institution, one of Ronald Reagan’s earliest, most consistent, and most valuable supporters, who worked to ensure that the White House and federal agencies were staffed with men and women who believed in Reagan’s ideas.

Other tales are engaging if familiar, such as Princeton University historian Eric F. Goldman’s labors as President Lyndon Johnson’s liaison to a wary world of intellectuals. The high—or low—point of Goldman’s tenure was the White House Festival of the Arts in 1965. Declining to attend the festival, poet Robert Lowell denounced the administration’s Vietnam policy. Another 20 writers, organized by Robert Silvers of *The New York Review of Books*, publicly endorsed Lowell’s position. Plunged into the kind of public controversy any White House abhors, the festival underscored the steady souring of relations between Johnson and the intellectual community.

The book’s virtues, alas, do not compensate for its shortcomings. Troy ignores Henry Kissinger because, unlike Schlesinger under JFK and Daniel Patrick Moynihan under President Richard M. Nixon, he was chosen “exclusively as his foreign-policy adviser, not as a broad-based intellectual adviser.” In overlooking Kissinger, the author brushes aside some of the most intriguing questions about the interplay between intellectual thought and public policy: Did Kissinger’s worldview help shape Nixon’s strategic vision? How much did it persuade Nixon to open the door to China, or shape his conduct in Vietnam? A look at Kissinger might also demonstrate, as Richard

Reeves does in his masterly book *President Nixon: Alone in the White House* (2001), that intellectuals yield to no class of political insiders in their empire building, paranoia, and duplicity. All those tenure fights must pay off.

The most serious flaw in this work is the premise itself: that the relationship between presidents and intellectuals is “crucial.” Indeed, Troy himself provides some of the best refutations of that notion. He argues that the first President Bush was doomed because he lacked the sort of “single, unifying vision” that an intellectual adviser might have supplied. Yet, as Troy also notes, Bush proclaimed that “I’m not much for the airy and abstract—I like what works.” No intellectual ambassador could

have made a difference. Bush, by personality and character, was the kind of custodial president destined to be reelected in good times and defeated in gloomy times. Similarly, the mutual contempt between Johnson and the intellectual community had nowhere near the political import of a divisive war in Vietnam and racial and generational upheaval at home.

Troy’s book ends with a crisp, two-page “guidebook” on how to deal with intellectuals. Some samples: “Don’t ignore intellectuals.” “Don’t be an intellectual.” I commend this section to time-pressed presidents. They can probably skim the rest of the book while awaiting the latest poll data from Illinois.

—JEFF GREENFIELD

CONTEMPORARY AFFAIRS

LEADERSHIP ON THE LINE: Staying Alive through the Dangers of Leading.

By Ronald A. Heifetz and Marty Linsky.
Harvard Business School Press. 252 pp.
\$27.50

“A man who wishes to make a profession of goodness in everything must necessarily come to grief among so many who are not good.” So said Niccolò Machiavelli in his incomparable guide to leadership, *The Prince* (1513). He felt compelled to add that in order to survive, a prince must “learn how not to be good, and to use this knowledge and not use it, according to the necessity of the case.”

Machiavelli is long dead, but the challenges of leadership live on, even in a time and place that idealizes a very different model of authority. Thus we have *Leadership on the Line*, an earnest guide to leadership in the therapeutic age. Heifetz and Linsky are thoughtful and widely experienced authors who teach at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, but they come across at times as Alan Alda with an MBA.

There is a certain aptness in this. Their audience is not, after all, securing a hostile Italian city-state but trying to get something done in the land of computers and cubicles. And as business books go, this one is a

model of clarity. Much of what the authors say is obviously right, and their combined experience and reading give real depth to their advice, even if it is occasionally couched in some awful dialect of consultant-speak, as in “Hennie Both and Ruud Koedijk maintained high energy within the holding environment of the task force structure.”

What’s more, they’ve tackled the right subject. It’s clear from the torrent of management books published every year, to say nothing of the fortune spent on “organizational development” and other such consulting, that people in business have a deep hunger for help in this arena. Heifetz and Linsky obligingly flesh out their work with a great many anecdotes about famous leaders, including corporate chieftains, presidents, and other luminaries.

But in doing so, the authors beg a big question: Why are people in business reading books like this one when they could simply read Machiavelli? Every corporate chieftain lives by at least some of his rules. It was Machiavelli who said that “in taking a state, the conqueror must arrange to commit all his cruelties at once,” after which he can dole out soothing kindnesses. And who can dispute that “there is nothing more difficult to carry out, nor more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to handle,