



British ships under heavy fire in Robert Smith's The Battle of Jutland (1916).

In the end, the German fleet was able to slip away, leaving the British in control but badly bloodied. They lost 115,000 tons of ships and more than 6,000 men, as opposed to 61,000 tons and just over 2,500 men on the German side.

Rubin places much of the blame for this unachieved victory on Jellicoe, whose over-meticulous rules of engagement filled 200 pages. In striving for “centralized control,” Jellicoe produced subordinates unwilling to think for themselves, a weakness exposed by poor communications during the battle. But in a larger sense, the real culprit may have been the culture of the British navy. According to Andrew Gordon’s *Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command* (2000), ever since the great victory by Horatio Nelson at Trafalgar in 1805, the navy had been suffused by what Gordon calls “the

social religion of deference.” It had always been the realm of gentlemen, but peacetime and the Victorian emphasis on structuring and ordering behavior made it even more inflexible. At the same time, technological change—steam power, iron and steel ships, and long-range guns—made the need for innovation in naval thinking much greater.

After Jutland, Jellicoe gave way to a more innovative successor who encouraged the kind of initiative that would allow the British to sink the *Bismarck* in 1941. But it was too late. After World War I, Britain ceded its primacy over the waves to the United States. And the Kaiser’s navy? Although he claimed victory at Jutland, Wilhelm became convinced that Germany’s surface fleet would never alter the course of the war and turned instead to unrestricted submarine warfare.

China’s Rap Sheet

“China’s Use of Force, 1950–1996, and Taiwan” by Allen S. Whiting, in *International Security* (Fall 2001), MIT Press Journals, 5 Cambridge Center, 4th Flr., Cambridge, Mass. 02142–1493,

Before September 11, the conflict between China and Taiwan stood near the top of U.S. foreign policy concerns. Whiting’s essay suggests it should be there still.

He looked at eight cases in which China resorted to military force for deterrence or coercion, including the 1950–53 Korean War, the conflicts over small Taiwanese

islands in the 1950s, the 1962 border war with India, and the 1969 border clashes with the Soviet Union. Whiting, who is a professor emeritus at the University of Arizona, sees five common elements in China's behavior. Its leaders 1) had an exaggerated perception of the threat to China, 2) were willing to take on a superior enemy, 3) carefully managed risks, 4) gave advanced "deterrence warning" to their foes, and 5) always sought to seize the initiative and be preemptive. By Whiting's reckoning, Beijing chalked up four clear victories and no serious defeats by using this method.

This historical experience does not augur well for peaceful relations between China and Taiwan, and Whiting's vision is darkened by several new factors. In the past, for example, China almost always gave early warning of its intent to use force — partly because that gave it the opportunity to amass needed forces. But a conventional attack across the treacherous 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait is unlikely. China would likely use missiles, and that would give it an incentive to strike suddenly

and decisively. The Chinese penchant for seizing the initiative further increases the likelihood of such a strike.

Whiting also worries about the dangers of miscalculation. Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping often underestimated their foes' response, and unlike them, China's new generation of leaders "lack any military experience." What they do share with their predecessors is a belief in the primacy of political goals over military considerations, and that could lead to hasty action. Not only has there been growing talk of unification with Taiwan, but "rising instability" in China might make it more tempting for the leadership to launch a unifying war effort. At the same time, Whiting says (writing before September 11), China's leaders regard the United States as a paper tiger.

Whiting does not go so far as to predict war. He sees several encouraging developments, such as the growing traffic in people and goods between China and Taiwan. But "China's past pattern in the use of force casts a worrisome shadow over the next decade."

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

Another Path

"Social Policy and Mortality Decline in East Asia and Latin America" by James W. McGuire, in *World Development* (No. 10, 2001), American Univ., 4400 Massachusetts Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20016-8151.

Everybody knows that South Korea, Taiwan, and the other Asian "tigers" provide the model that other developing nations ought to follow, right? Only if you assume that rising incomes are the key to well-being, writes McGuire, a political scientist at Wesleyan University. Things change if you substitute other goals that make at least as much sense, such as improved life expectancy and infant mortality.

By those measures, two of Latin America's

best performers, Chile and Costa Rica, have done as well as South Korea and Taiwan. [See chart.] Between 1960 and 1995, for example, the two Latin nations reduced infant mortality by 91 and 86 percent, respectively, while South Korea cut the infant death rate by 93 percent and Taiwan by 80 percent. Interested in living a long life? By 1997, Chileans and Costa Ricans both enjoyed somewhat longer life expectancy than their Asian counterparts.

| | Life expec. at birth, 1960 | Life expec. at birth, 1997 | Infant mortality, 1960 (per 1,000 children) | Infant mortality, 1995 (per 1,000 children) | Total fertility rate, 1960 (births per woman) | Total fertility rate, 1997 (births per woman) |
|------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---|---|---|---|
| Chile | 57.1 | 74.9 | 118 | 11 | 5.3 | 2.4 |
| Costa Rica | 61.6 | 76.0 | 87 | 12 | 7.0 | 2.8 |
| S. Korea | 53.9 | 72.4 | 90 | 6 | 5.7 | 1.7 |
| Taiwan | 64.3 | 74.6 | 54 | 11 | 5.8 | 1.8 |