

points.” The great 19th-century writer Walter Bagehot compared the review-essay to a sandwich for its ease of consumption and the satisfaction it provided. Reviews were in many ways an antidote to pedantry, and they were not simply watered-down academic pieces. Rather, they enabled a certain worldly engagement on the part of readers. The “true reader,” as Virginia Woolf put it, was “a man of intense curiosity; of ideas; open-minded and communicative, to whom reading is more of the

nature of brisk exercise in the open air than of sheltered study.”

Founded during the last wave of literary journals, *The Times Literary Supplement* slowly grew to prominence in the early 20th century. By the 1930s, however, most British men and women of letters had taken up residence in academia. Paraphrasing Woolf, Schwarz writes that the *TLS* increasingly became the province of “those who loved learning rather than those who loved reading.”

## OTHER NATIONS

### *Le Nouveau Anti-Semitism*

“Liberté, Égalité, Judeophobie” and “Allah Mode” by Christopher Caldwell, in *The Weekly Standard* (May 6, 2002, and July 15, 2002), 1150 17th St., N.W., Ste. 505, Washington, D.C. 20036-4617.

Jean-Marie Le Pen, the leader of France’s xenophobic National Front, set off worldwide alarms when he gained a place in a runoff election last May with conservative president Jacques Chirac. One reason: Le Pen’s rise has coincided with an unprecedented upsurge of anti-Semitism in France. What is “surprising and confusing,” writes Caldwell, a senior editor at *The Weekly Standard*, is that Le Pen “has practically nothing to do” with the new anti-Semitism. His vote totals were swelled by popular outrage at rising crime rates—higher, by one measure, than in the United States. Today’s anti-Semitism is a product of radical Muslims in France and, more ominously, the French Left. “In fact,” writes Caldwell, “its most dangerous practitioners are to be found among the very crowds thronging the streets to protest” Le Pen.

Between September 2000 (shortly after Palestinians launched the “second intifada” against Israel) and the start of this year, there were, by one count, more than 400 violent anti-Jewish incidents in

France, including firebombings of synagogues and stonings of worshipers. Few of those responsible were followers of Le Pen.



*The aftermath of arson at a Marseille synagogue earlier this year.*

The country's six to eight million Muslims, mostly of North African descent, include a significant underclass, as well as an unknown number of radicalized young people. The French themselves speak of *la banladenisation des banlieues*, a reference to the outer suburbs where many poor Muslims live.

Yet the French political class has resolutely averted its gaze—Chirac going so far as to say there are “no anti-Semites in France”—and treated anti-Jewish violence as the work of juvenile delinquents.

One reason for this reluctance to face facts, according to Caldwell, is that it would mean facing the truth that the French themselves (especially the French Left) are “in danger of embracing” what French academic Pierre-André Taffiuff calls “the new Judeophobia.” Its twin pillars are Holocaust-denial and radical anti-Zionism—not just opposition to Jewish statehood, says Caldwell, but “‘mythic anti-Zionism,’ which treats Zionism as *absolute evil*, against which only absolute warfare can be raised.”

This Manichean view has broad appeal in France, with its long romance with

Third World revolution, and especially among antiglobalization activists. Indifferent to Muslim struggles in Chechnya and elsewhere, they are obsessive about the Middle East. Why? Because the Palestinians confront in “evil” Israel what the antiglobalists see as “the ‘capitalist’ world of the West,” Caldwell writes. José Bové, who became a national hero and leader of the antiglobalist cause after vandalizing a McDonald's in France, has gone so far as to charge that the Israelis sponsored the attacks on French synagogues “in order to distract attention from what they are doing” in the West Bank. Yet Bové is also a leading critic of Le Pen.

There lies the ultimate irony and danger, according to Caldwell: “The most dangerous thing about Jean-Marie Le Pen, who loathes the global economy, distrusts the Jews, and practices gesture politics, is . . . that he'll serve as the hate object who unites anti-Western Islamists and anti-Western antiglobalists, who march against him night after night over ideological differences that grow harder and harder to discern.”

## *Bulgaria's Special Path*

“Bulgaria's Royal Elections” by Zoltan Barany, in *Journal of Democracy* (Apr. 2002), 1101 15th St., N.W., Ste. 800, Washington, D.C. 20005.

Although Bulgaria remained a hardline communist state almost until the end, its ready embrace of parliamentary democracy and its relative tranquility since make it unique among the postcommunist Balkan states. It also stands out for a less admirable reason: its long resistance to fundamental economic reforms.

“Bulgaria's basic difficulty over the last decade,” writes Barany, a political scientist at the University of Texas at Austin, “has been a problem not of *too little* democracy but of *ineffective* democracy: One freely elected government after another has let the economy slide because ministers feared the political consequences of pushing through necessary but exceedingly unpopular economic policies.”

“The first false start came in 1990,” after the communist regime fell, with an assist from Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, in “a sort of polite palace coup.” The Communists changed nominally into socialists, proclaimed

their devotion to pluralism and the rule of law, and won a landslide victory in free elections that June. But the Bulgarian Socialist Party government failed to deliver on its promise of a gradual transition to a market economy.

In late 1991, the center-right Union of Democratic Forces (UDF) won a narrow plurality in the National Assembly. As the ex-Communists “worked busily at turning political clout into economic power,” writes Barany, corruption became rampant. The UDF, however, was chiefly concerned with “wreaking retribution on the communists.” Two more changes of government brought economic reform no nearer. By late 1996, with triple-digit inflation and major banks going bust, “the economy was falling apart.”

Yet Bulgaria's young democratic political system held. A big victory in the 1997 elections by the UDF and its coalition partners resulted in a government that “turned the