

time diary studies show, reports Bianchi, a sociologist at the University of Maryland.

How can that be? Mainly, she maintains, because mothers today, for the most part, continue to do what they must to ensure their family's well-being, as well as their own.

For one thing, many working mothers cut back on outside work when their children are very young, Bianchi notes. Only one-third of new mothers return to full-time work within six months of their child's birth, or "remain firmly attached to full-time work during their childbearing years."

At the same time, Americans are having fewer children, so mothers are able to give more individual attention to the children they do have. In the past, not only did mothers with larger families have less time for each child, but they often called on older children to mind the younger ones. They also did more cleaning and cooking than today's women. Now, even stay-at-home mothers do less housework than in the past—25 hours a week in 1995, compared with more than 37 hours in 1965. Working mothers, who did nearly 24 hours of housework a week in 1965, have cut that to less than 18 hours.

Working mothers have also cut back on volunteer work, leisure pursuits, and even sleep. In a 1998 study, working moms reported having 12 fewer "free time" hours a week than the stay-at-home mothers

reported, and getting six fewer hours of sleep.

(A recent, much publicized University of Michigan study, based on children's time diaries, kept with parental aid in some cases, found that working mothers with children ages three to 12 in 1997 spent only 48 fewer minutes a day with them than stay-at-home moms did—and about the same amount of time as stay-at-home moms spent in 1981.)

Even stay-at-home mothers aren't with their school-age children much of the day, of course. And in recent decades, moms have increasingly waved goodbye to their younger "preschool" children, too. In the late 1960s, less than 10 percent of children ages three to five were in nursery school or some other form of preschool. But by 1997, the number was several times greater. Fifty-two percent of the children of working mothers were enrolled in preschools (including child care settings with educational programs)—and so were 44 percent of the kids of stay-at-home mothers. With fewer brothers and sisters today, Bianchi observes, children "are often judged to 'need' prekindergarten socialization to launch them on their educational careers."

For children lucky enough to live in intact families, she points out, there has been a bonus. Married fathers spent nearly four hours a day with their kids in 1998, an hour more than they did in 1965.

## *Whom Do You Trust?*

"Producing and Consuming Trust" by Eric M. Uslaner, in *Political Science Quarterly* (Winter 2000–2001), 475 Riverside Dr., Ste. 1274, New York, N.Y. 10115–1274.

What ails the American civic spirit? The leading school of thought today is that as people have cut back their participation in voluntary organizations, their trust in others—so vital to a community's health—has declined. "Joiners become more tolerant, less cynical, and more empathetic to the misfortunes of others," maintains Robert Putnam, the author of *Bowling Alone* (2000) and a seminal 1995 article of the same title. He believes that when individuals take part in civic organizations,

their trust in people they know leads to trust in those they don't know.

Uslaner, a University of Maryland political scientist, is skeptical. Joining with people much like oneself in a bowling league or a fraternal or religious organization, he argues, does not promote trust in strangers. We learn that kind of trust, essential for a civil society, "early in life from our parents, who impart to us a sense of optimism and a belief that we are the masters of our own fate."

People who possess what Uslaner calls “moralistic trust” see little risk in putting their faith in strangers, because they “believe that . . . other people are generally well motivated” and share the same underlying moral values. Such optimists become active in their communities, tackling civic problems large and small, and giving time and money to charity—but not necessarily taking part in social clubs, fraternal organizations, bowling leagues, and the like.

Their kind of trust is waning, writes Uslaner. Surveys indicate that the proportion of Americans who believe that “most people can be trusted” has plummeted in recent decades—from 58 percent in 1960 to 36 percent in 1998. Why? Putnam ultimately points a finger at TV and the dangerous world it presents to viewers. But while television viewing “has leveled off in recent years,” observes Uslaner, there has been no rebound in trust.

He blames the trust deficit on other culprits, including the simultaneous rise in

the numbers of Christian fundamentalists and the “unchurched.” “Religion has been the source of much of American civic life. Half of charitable contributions . . . and almost 40 percent of volunteering are based in religious organizations,” he notes. But fundamentalists “are more likely to put faith only in their own kind.” They are twice as likely as other believers to join only religious groups. The unchurched are almost 20 percent more likely than believers to join no groups at all.

But the main reason for the trust deficit, Uslaner believes, is that Americans have become more pessimistic about the future. The proportion of Americans who told pollsters that their children would have better lives than they themselves did fell from 60 percent or more in the 1960s to around 15 percent in the 1990s. Why? Uslaner blames growing economic inequality. Until that trend is reversed, he says, many Americans will continue to be wary of their fellow countrymen.

## *Resisting Slavery*

“Shipboard Revolts, African Authority, and the Atlantic Slave Trade” by David Richardson, in *The William and Mary Quarterly* (Jan. 2001), Box 8781, Williamsburg, Va. 23187-8781.

It’s now well known that Africans sometimes violently resisted enslavement by Europeans, but historians have focused almost entirely on slave revolts in the Americas. Recently amassed data from European shipping records on more than 27,000 voyages show that many Africans also fought back on the African coast and at sea.

Between about 1650 and 1860 there were at least 485 collective acts of violent rebellion, including 392 shipboard revolts and 93 “attacks from the shore by apparently ‘free’ Africans against ships or longboats,” says Richardson, an economic historian at the University of Hull, in Great Britain. More than 360 ships were involved, some more than once.

Ninety percent of the shipboard revolts occurred in (or shortly before or after) the 18th century. Despite gaps in records and a lack of data on ships other than those of the French, Dutch, and British, Richardson estimates that as many as 10 percent of the

ships in that period may have experienced an insurrection.

The revolts rarely succeeded, he says, but they were common enough to induce traders to take preventive measures, including doubling the number of crew members, which increased the pecuniary costs of the Middle Passage. Had there been no revolts, the number of slaves shipped across the Atlantic—at least 11 million embarked at the African coast, including more than six million between 1700 and 1810—would undoubtedly have been considerably greater. Richardson estimates that the resisters “saved perhaps 600,000 other Africans from being shipped to America in the long 18th century and one million during the whole history of the trade.”

Enslaved Africans from the Senegambia region (the basins of the Senegal and Gambia rivers) appear to have been especially likely to fight back.

America was hardly the only market for