The New Missile Debate


Should the United States build a limited national missile defense system to protect itself against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) launched by “rogue” states such as North Korea? With a decision due this year from the Clinton administration, critics such as Lewis and his colleagues, from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Security Studies Program, warn that such a system could put U.S. security at greater risk. They have valid concerns, argues O’Hanlon, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, but, on balance, deployment makes sense.

In contrast with former President Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative, which would have created a space-based shield against a massive Soviet nuclear attack, a new system would defend the nation against direct attack by using ground-based interceptors to destroy incoming warheads. While such a system is “technically feasible” in theory, say Lewis, Gronlund, and Wright, associate director and research fellows, respectively, at the MIT program, “adversaries would be able to take straightforward steps to defeat” it by using decoy or disguised warheads.

“Worse still,” they claim, deployment—which would be at odds with the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty—would unravel “decades of efforts to reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear stockpiles and to limit proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles worldwide.” Alarming both Russia and China, deployment could lead to “a world with more ICBMs and weapons of mass destruction.”

Theater defense missiles, such as the high-altitude THAAD launched in a test last June, have successfully intercepted other missiles, but a national missile defense system remains controversial.
Yet the threat to the United States is real, O’Hanlon notes. The bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission reported in 1998 that North Korea, Iran, or Iraq might soon develop a missile that could threaten U.S. territory. Later that year, North Korea launched a test multistage missile over Japan, and Pyongyang is reportedly working on another missile which might be able to strike the United States with a nuclear-weapon-size payload.

Potential enemy countermeasures need not be decisive, O’Hanlon says. The United States also “could develop interceptors to hit long-range enemy missiles right after they are launched,” destroying them “before they ever left the atmosphere and got a chance to dispense warheads and decoys. The interceptors could be deployed near the Korean Peninsula, the Middle East, or other trouble spots”—and probably wouldn’t bother Moscow much, “since the defense would not work against missiles launched at North America from the interior of Asia.” Even so, this “light” defense itself could provide some protection against “rogue” states.

But the critics are right to worry about Moscow’s reaction to national missile defense, O’Hanlon says. “Only with a broader arms control and Russia policy in place,” he concludes, “can the United States get serious about [it] without jeopardizing nuclear security.”

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

Doing Better, Not Just Good


Seeking to improve education, but limited by its small size, the Philanthropic Ventures Foundation (PVF), of Oakland, California, gives thousands of schoolteachers in its region modest ($500) grants every year for badly needed classroom materials. And it doesn’t burden them with paperwork: teachers simply fax their requests, and get an answer within an hour, and a check within 24. Though the foundation is tempted to try to do good in many other ways, it resolutely sticks to its self-defined mission.

That makes PVF “a perfect example,” assert Porter, a Harvard Business School professor, and Kramer, president of a capital management firm and a founder of the recently formed Center for Effective Philanthropy, of what a charitable foundation can do when it sets clear goals and strategies. Sound obvious? Most of America’s 44,000 foundations don’t do it, the authors say, instead contenting themselves with giving out grants for assorted worthy purposes, spreading their resources too thin, and, worst of all, failing to try seriously to measure how much social bang for the buck they are getting. Nor, despite much rhetoric, Porter and Kramer contend, do foundations give much support to potentially high-impact research. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Ford and Rockefeller foundations jointly sponsored research that led to development of new strains of wheat and rice—and millions of the world’s poor benefited. The Pew Charitable Trusts recently created a center to study global warming. But less than nine percent of foundation grants go for research, and most are in basic science and medicine.

Foundations have seen their assets mushroom in recent decades, to more than $330 billion, but they annually give, on average, only 5.5 percent to charity—just half a percentage point above the legal minimum. They invest the rest for financial returns—and, presumably, future benefit to society.

Because foundations are largely free of the political pressures at work on government, and have the time and expertise that private individuals usually lack, the authors argue, they could produce more social benefit. But the foundations “fall far short of their potential,” say Porter and Kramer.