

tolerant of immigrants than their neighbors in Central and Eastern Europe.” For instance, Austria accepted some 100,000 refugees from the 1992–95 war in Bosnia.

Indeed, “even as the EU categorically denounces Haider’s anti-immigration agenda,” writes Wistrich, “its own member nations—and especially the richer ones—have been competing with each other to keep out non-white immigrants. . . . In Denmark, for example, once considered one of the EU’s most tolerant countries, the socialist government has been implementing draconian restrictions on immigrants, asylum-seekers, and refugees—without, naturally, evoking the slightest hint of European sanctions.”

Never before, several analysts note, had the EU intervened in the affairs of a democratic member state. It had lodged no protests in the name of morality and democracy against the inclusion of Communists in the French gov-

ernment or against the inclusion of the far-right National Alliance in the Italian government in 1994. Why, then, Austria in 2000?

The answer, says Mazower, author of *Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century* (1999), seems to be a fear that xenophobic parties may make inroads elsewhere in Europe. “In Italy and France, the established center-right has been challenged by xenophobic parties. . . . In Denmark, Belgium, and Switzerland, too, the new right has recently made electoral gains.” Germany’s scandal-ridden Christian Democratic Union could also face a challenge.

The European Union, in Mazower’s view, ought “to give up interfering in Austrian politics and obsessing about National Socialism.” EU member states should “make good on their own recent lofty rhetoric, supplementing their existing anti-immigration statutes with a genuine commitment to combating xenophobia at home.”

China’s Passé Party

“Membership Has Its Privileges: The Socioeconomic Characteristics of Communist Party Members in Urban China” by Bruce J. Dickson and Maria Rost Rublee, in *Comparative Political Studies* (Feb. 2000), Sage Publications, 2455 Teller Road, Thousand Oaks, Calif. 91320.

It’s long been evident that (to paraphrase George Orwell) though all are equal in communist lands, some are more equal than others. But thanks to the economic reforms in post-Mao China, and the consequent need for professionals and technicians, it appears that membership in the Chinese Communist Party is no longer virtually the only path to “more equal” material rewards.

Party membership, to be sure, continues to provide tangible benefits, especially for cadres, note Dickson and Rublee, a political scientist and graduate student, respectively, at George Washington University. In 1988, when party members made up less than five percent of China’s total population, the average urban party member, a survey the following year showed, earned 191 yuan—40 more than the average urban nonmember did. (And that doesn’t count the income from bribery and other corrupt behavior, widespread among party and government officials.)

Yet, revealingly, party members were not concentrated in all of the most prestigious sorts of jobs. Yes, about 84 percent of the offi-

cially surveyed and 77 percent of the factory managers belonged to the party (in sharp contrast to the seven percent of laborers who belonged)—but 66 percent of the professionals and technicians did *not* belong to the party. Moreover, Dickson and Rublee found, for rank-and-file party members (though not the cadres), a college education provided a bigger wage boost than belonging to the party did.

The post-Mao reforms “created new opportunities for pursuing career goals,” observe the authors. “Individuals could seek advanced degrees from Chinese or foreign universities” and pursue technical careers, or go into business. Many who took those alternative paths “were reluctant to join the party,” because of its restrictions and its demands on members’ time. Despite its diminished appeal, however, party membership remains attractive to aspiring bureaucrats among “China’s best and brightest,” Dickson and Rublee note.

After the 1989 survey, which was conducted by a team of American, British, and Chinese scholars, the Chinese Communist

Party clamped down on such inquiries. As a result, Dickson and Rublee are able only to surmise about the impact of the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989 and the “explosive

growth” of the private sector during the 1990s. In all likelihood, say the authors, the appeal of China’s Communist Party has shrunk even further.

Rwanda’s Tangled Web

“Hate Crimes” by René Lemarchand, in *Transition* (2000: Nos. 81–82), 69 Dunster St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138.


In cases of genocide such as the 1994 bloodbath in Rwanda, in which more than a half-million Tutsi perished at the hands of the Hutu, the division between good and evil comes to seem starkly clear. “In Rwanda today,” says Lemarchand, an emeritus professor of political science at the University of Florida, Gainesville, “guilt and innocence are increasingly becoming ethnicized,” with the minority Tutsi “now beyond reproach.” But while there’s no denying “the evil committed in the name of Hutu power,” it’s not the whole story, he argues.

In the first place, not all Hutu have blood on their hands, he points out. “If it’s true that 10 percent of the Hutu population participated in the killings . . . that leaves 90 percent . . . that did not—5.8 million Hutu.” Moreover, some Hutu, at “considerable risk,”

saved thousands of their Tutsi neighbors from the machete.

At least 600,000 Tutsi were slaughtered between April and July 1994, before Paul Kagame’s Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), made up mainly of Tutsi exiles, defeated the Hutu-dominated government. But the violent interethnic conflict began long before the genocide, Lemarchand avers, when the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Army, with support from the government of Uganda, launched a civil war against the government in 1990.

Nor were Tutsi the only victims of the Hutu rampage in 1994: It also claimed as many as 50,000 Hutu. “For many landless peasants,” Lemarchand explains, “the genocide was . . . an opportunity to grab land from their neighbors, Tutsi and Hutu alike.” Intra-Hutu



These Hutu men were among those convicted of taking part in the genocidal killings in Rwanda in 1994.