This misguided foreign policy, he asserts, rests on three shaky pillars: (1) internationalism (i.e. "the belief in the moral, legal, and strategic primacy of international institutions over mere national interests"); (2) legalism (i.e. "the belief that safety and security are achieved through treaties"—international agreements on such matters as chemical weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and anti-ballistic missiles); and (3) humanitarianism (i.e. "the belief that the primary world role of the United States is, to quote [Secretary of State] Madeleine Albright . . . 'to terminate the abominable injustices and conditions that still plague civilization.'")

In reality, Krauthammer maintains, the "international community" is nothing more than a fiction. "The international arena is a state of nature with no enforcer and no universally recognized norms. Anarchy is kept in check, today as always, not by some hollow bureaucracy on the East River, but by the will and power of the Great Powers, and today, in particular, of the one great superpower."

The administration's "penchant for treaties," Krauthammer says, is driven by the desire to transcend power politics and recreate domestic society on the world stage—a "hopelessly utopian" project. The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty no more kept Iraq from clandestinely trying to develop nuclear weapons than the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact held its signatories (including Germany and Japan) to their renunciation of war.

As for the third pillar, humanitarianism, it stems from "an abiding liberal antipathy to any notion of national interest," says Krauthammer. "Indeed, in the new liberal orthodoxy, it is only disinterested intervention . . . that is pristine enough to justify the use of force. Violence undertaken for the purpose of securing interests is not." Hence, "the amazing transmutation of Cold War and Gulf war doves into Haiti and Bosnia and Kosovo hawks."

Concludes Krauthammer: "The greatest power in the world—the most dominant power relative to its rivals that the world has seen since the Roman empire—is led by people who seek to diminish that dominance and level the international arena. It is a vision, all right, an amazing vision of self-denial in the service of self-delusion."

Yet foreign policy "realism" like Krauthammer's does not hold the answer to the Clinton administration's "new Wilsonianism," contends Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The realists, he says, "are in their own way both as utopian and as antinationalistic as the Wilsonians they abhor." They fail to grasp "that the American national interest, its *raison d'état*, [cannot] be divorced from American liberalism," an outlook that is "as much a fact of life as the enduring reality of power and the immutable character of human nature," Kagan says. "It is the messy and inevitably imperfect attempt to reconcile these conflicting realities that provides the great challenge for American statesmanship, now as in the past."

Casualties of Peacekeeping

"Public Support for Peacekeeping in Lebanon and Somalia: Assessing the Casualties Hypothesis" by James Burk, in *Political Science Quarterly* (Spring 1999), 475 Riverside Dr., Ste. 1274, New York, N.Y. 10115-1274.

The notion that the public will not support U.S. peacekeeping operations abroad if they entail loss of American lives has become widespread in recent years. But it is ill-founded, contends Burk, a sociologist at Texas A&M University.

He examines two oft-cited cases, a decade apart, in which the United States withdrew its forces after incurring casualties: Somalia, where 18 soldiers were killed in a battle in the streets of Mogadishu in October 1993, and Lebanon, where 241 marines died when a terrorist truck bomb destroyed their barracks at the Beirut airport in October 1983.

"While public opinion was not insensitive to the deaths of American soldiers," Burk says, "public approval or disapproval of both missions was, in fact, largely determined before casualties occurred."

Public opinion about the U.S. role in

Marines pull the body of a fallen comrade from the rubble after a terrorist truck bomb destroyed a barracks in Beirut, killing 241, in 1983; public support for the mission increased *after the incident.*

Lebanon was divided before the bombing, with most Americans disapproving. Support for the mission *increased* after the October barracks bombing, rising from 40 percent in September to 61 percent in November. By early 1984, however, the public apparently had cooled off or come to see the operation as futile, for its approval retreated to pre-attack levels. In February, President Ronald Reagan pulled the marines out of Beirut, and the next month, formally ended the U.S. peacekeeping role.

In the case of Somalia, public support for the mission did fall (to less than 40 percent approval, by one survey) in reaction to the firefight in Mogadishu that left 18 Rangers dead, Burk says. But support had already declined sharply before the incident—from more than 80 percent approval in January 1993 to less than 50 percent in September. The mission, Burk notes, had changed: what began as a Bush administration humanitarian famine-relief effort became after that January, a Clinton administration attempt to end the civil war in Somalia and build a new nation. The American public did not go along with the change of mission.

Most Americans do consider the risk of casualties "a crucial, perhaps the most important, factor affecting their support of a decision to use armed force," Burk writes. And in past ventures overseas, as political scientist John Mueller showed in *War, Presidents and Public Opinion* (1973), the accumulation of casualties over time did lead to an erosion of public support in the Korean and Vietnam wars. But that is not the same, Burk notes, as saying "that the public will only support what are virtually casualty-free military deployments."

Invite the Bear?

"Rethinking Europe" by Charles A. Kupchan, in *The National Interest* (Summer 1999), 1112 16th St., N.W., Ste. 540, Washington, D.C. 20036.

Enlarging the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) may have been a bad idea, but now that Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic have been admitted, argues Kupchan, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, enlargement