ist found Salieri still enthusiastic about Mozart's work. (Salieri also taught Mozart's son, not to mention Beethoven, Schubert, and Liszt.)

Mozart's untimely death at age 35 aroused suspicions of foul play. But "in the light of contemporary evidence, one can only be amazed that Mozart survived as long as he did," Selby observes. He had suffered everything from smallpox to rheumatic fever, and colds with "repeated renal complications." Indeed, modern medical investigators believe it was kidney failure occasioned by Henoch-Schönlein purpura, not a dose of poison, that killed the great composer.

OTHER NATIONS

A Democratic China?

A Survey of Recent Articles

Ten years from now, will there still be a state that calls itself the People's Republic of China and that is governed by the Chinese Communist Party?"

No, answers Arthur Waldron, one of 10 specialists taking part in a *Journal of Democracy* (Jan. 1998) symposium on the prospects for democracy in China.

"China's current system is simply inadequate to the challenges it is creating for itself," argues Waldron, a professor of international relations at the University of Pennsylvania. "China's prosperity already depends on the workings of a free market, but without the rule of law such an economy cannot function beyond a very low level. The communist regime is already too weak to impose its will by force alone, but it has no other tool to sway the people. . . . China requires a new government, for reasons that are not only moral but practical." He expects change to come in fits and starts, first from above, then from below, with foreign reaction tilting the process in a democratic direction.

Though Yizi Chen, president of the Center for Modern China in Princeton, New Jersey, agrees, foreseeing the likely "emergence of an electoral democracy in the next decade," the other *Journal of Democracy* contributors, notes Andrew J. Nathan, a political scientist at Columbia University, "generally acknowledge the staying power of what most of them see as essentially the same regime." Yet most also expect democracy to arrive—not soon, but eventually.

None deny that a good deal of liberalization has taken place since the early 1980s, almost wholly under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping (1904–97). One specialist—Harry Harding, dean of the Elliot School of International Affairs at George Washington University, goes so far as to assert that China has been fundamentally transformed and is no longer a totalitarian country. "The role of both the party and official communist ideology within the political system has been substantially reduced," he points out. "An increasing range of activity is outside the scope of central economic planning, ideological constraint, or political control." In his view, China today can best be described as hard authoritarian.

Robert A. Scalapino, a political scientist at the University of California, Berkeley, notes that China has made impressive economic gains in recent years—including annual productivity increases of more than 10 percent, low inflation, rising exports, and substantial new foreign investment—but that it also has some daunting economic problems. "Banking and financial institutions are in serious disarray due to uncollectible loans," he observes. "State-owned enterprises account for two-fifths of China's industrial output, yet fully half of these enterprises are operating at a loss." There is a "huge misallocation of workers," adds the *Economist* (Feb. 14, 1998). "Perhaps 20 million workers, out of some 110 million once employed by state firms, have been sacked or indefinitely sent home." As a result of the economic problems, foreign investors have been growing cool toward China. "That matters," the *Economist* observes, "because it is the money provided by foreigners that is largely responsible for China's export success. And most recent growth in the economy appears to have come from exports, which rose by over 20

percent last year." Despite the problems, Scalapino expects the economic pluses to be strong enough "to propel China into the ranks of major powers" in the coming century.

"China currently enjoys more stability—with less coercion—than it has had in most periods of its past," he writes. "Today's leaders are better educated, more technologically inclined, and more experienced as administrators than their predecessors. No single individual, however, has the kind of power that Mao and Deng had at their respective zeniths." Since Deng's death in February 1997, President Jiang Zemin has functioned as first among equals.

Jiang "is relatively weak in terms of personal connections and credibility, has no cohesive social class or set of interests behind him, and enjoys only a rather limited degree of power and legitimacy," writes symposium contributor Juntao Wang, a graduate student at Columbia University who spent five years in a Chinese jail after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. A return to a full-blown dictatorship, he believes, is possible but not likely. "Twenty years of reform, corruption, and power struggles have destroyed the supremacy of communism as an ideology and weakened the party's political machine," he notes, and China "is not the closed society it once was."

From "a totalitarian state seeking morally to purify the inner lives of its citizens," observes Thomas A. Metzger, a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution in Stanford, California, China has been shifting to "a kind of authoritarianism to which the Chinese people have long been accustomed. It existed in Taiwan before the democratization of the last decade and in China during many centuries of the imperial era."

However, a 1995 opinion survey in Beijing found most respondents in favor of competitive elections, equal rights for all citizens regardless of their political views, and freer and more independent news media, report political scientists Jie Chen, of Old Dominion University, and Yang Zhong, of the University of Tennessee-Knoxville, writing in *Problems of Post-Communism* (Jan.–Feb. 1998). But these findings, they caution, may not be represen-

The Sour Taste of Affluence

Vacationing in Moscow last summer, Russian-born novelist Vassily Aksyonov, who has lived in the United States since 1980, found himself continually surprised by the cornucopia of Western goods available, and, he writes in the *Washington Quarterly* (Spring 1998), by the Russians' reaction to their good fortune.

[It] is hard for Russians to recognize their newfound bliss and thank fate for such striking changes. The opinion is now widespread that the insidious West hauls into Russia products of a lower quality. Even a friend of mine who many times traveled abroad was starting to believe it. Our gullible public, he said, takes everything in a bright wrapping without question. Listen, I told him, the first priority for the big Western corporations is to keep their standards high; it rarely occurs to them to rely on deception in their business. This logic, however, doesn't get through, and the anti-Western nonsense about the "bad things in bright wrapping" keeps spreading around.

More than once I saw in the food stores some ladies putting on airs before the French sour cream. How do you like that—we do not have our own Russian sour cream anymore, they exclaim. No doubt, these exclamations convey a certain patriotic message. Once I dared to take issue: It's better to have a French sour cream than none, I said. We used to have plenty of our own sour cream, a lady said haughtily who had already packed her bag with "low quality" Western products. May I suggest, ma'am, I asked innocently, that to make such a claim you must have had access to a distribution center not available to the general public. She flared up with indignation: I bet you used to be afraid to poke out your nose, she cried, and now you sling mud at our past!

tative of China as a whole, which is 70 percent rural. The "vast majority" of Chinese, Metzger maintains, have no interest in free political activity.

Stability, notes Scalapino, "has a strong appeal" to the many Chinese worried that a change in regime might bring chaos. "Chinese authorities will continue to defend their regime by insisting that the most meaningful freedoms for their people lie in the economic and social realms—a better livelihood, better education, and more social services. This will not be acceptable to exponents of democracy, but it will have considerable appeal nonetheless." For China, he and many other scholars believe, democracy remains "a distant prospect."

Israel's Ebbing Martial Spirit

"Israel's Revolution in Security Affairs" by Eliot A. Cohen, Michael J. Eisenstadt, and Andrew J. Bacevich, in *Survival* (Spring 1998), International Institute for Strategic Studies, 23 Tavistock St., London WC2E 7NQ England.

Fifty years after its founding, Israel is more secure than ever against conventional military attack. But the spread of ballistic missile technology in the Arab world and changing attitudes in Israeli society are undermining the "nation in arms" approach to national security that has defined the Jewish state's character.

Egypt and Israel's other immediate Arab neighbors may still be worrisome at times, but the gravest threat (besides terrorism), contend Cohen and Bacevich, both of the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, and Eisenstadt, of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, comes from Iran, Iraq, and Libya. They "do not share a border with Israel but . . . appear bent on acquiring a capability to strike Israel directly," the authors observe. "Cruise or ballistic missiles tipped with chemical, biological or nuclear warheads are the likely weapons of choice." For Israel to maintain a technological edge will require a "small, élite, and professional" military establishment, not a costly, cumbersome mass army. "Indeed, without an unlimited defense budget," they write, "high technology and large numbers of people and equipment appear to be mutually exclusive."

To opt openly for a "slimmer and smarter" force would be to challenge the cherished Israeli belief that virtually every youth, male and female, should serve in the army. "Actual practice, however, has begun to differ from this ideal," Cohen and his colleagues observe. "Without fanfare—indeed without acknowledging that it is departing from past practice—the army is adopting a system of *de facto* selective service," raising the mental and physical requirements for active duty. Currently, some 17 percent of eligible males are exempted from service, and an additional 15 percent get early discharges for various reasons. (The surplus in the conscript pool is at least partly due to the influx of Russian immigrants since 1990.) The term of service for female draftees has been reduced from 24 months to 21, and even at that, only 50 percent of eligible women serve.

With Israel's economy booming (gross national product has grown an average of six percent per year since 1990), and with the nation's survival not appearing in immediate jeopardy, many young Israelis, including some of the "brightest and best," now have their eyes on private enterprise, not the Israel Defense Forces, and on self-realization, not self-sacrifice. The authors discern "a growing tendency among draft-eligible Israelis to contrive physical or psychological excuses to avoid military service." Among reservists, a 1996 report found absenteeism at 20 percent in some combat units and twice that in some noncombat ones. In a survey that same year, half of Israeli men said they would not do the demanding reserve duty (obligatory service until age 54, with active training typically amounting to a month each year) if it were not compulsory.

Cohen and his colleagues do not expect Israel to create an all-volunteer force or to cease relying on seasoned reservists. But over time, they think, a system will emerge that provides different "tracks" for different folks. The average soldier, for instance, might undergo basic training followed by reserve duty, while volunteers (perhaps encouraged by monetary incentives) would