

head to rehearse the scene in which Salome holds aloft the head of John the Baptist. Novelist Willa Cather called her “a great tragic actress.”

Alas, the highly paid singer was every bit the prima donna, refusing, for example, to rehearse the day before or after a perfor-

mance. In 1914, Met director Giulio Gatti-Casazza finally ousted her. She was 43 and “at the height of her powers,” notes Davis, but nothing was the same after that. In 1920, she begged to return to the Met, but Gatti refused. Olive Fremstad never sang in public again.

OTHER NATIONS

Tibet at a Turning Point

“The Dalai Lama’s Dilemma” by Melvyn C. Goldstein, in *Foreign Affairs* (Jan.–Feb. 1998), 58 E. 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

With the recent appearance of the film *Kundun*, dramatizing his early life, the Dalai Lama appears to have won over Hollywood. But that may be of scant help to the 63-year-old spiritual leader of Tibetan Buddhists as he deals with a growing dilemma. Committed to nonviolence, he is being forced to choose between making concessions to China and giving at least tacit sanction to a campaign of organized violence against Chinese rule in Tibet. Some militant Tibetans already favor such a campaign; in 1996, there were three bombings in the capital, Lhasa. The Dalai Lama’s only other choice, contends Goldstein, director of the Center for Research on Tibet, at Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, is to sit back as his Himalayan homeland is changed beyond recognition.

Beijing, which has rebuffed the Dalai Lama’s recent efforts to arrange talks, is pouring economic development funds into Tibet and flooding it with thousands of Chinese entrepreneurs and laborers. Of the “several hundred thousand” residents of Lhasa, at least half, Goldstein says, now are non-Tibetan. Although the newcomers are expected eventually to return home, Tibetans fear that the character of their sparsely populated land is being altered forever.

The roots of the conflict run deep. Formally part of the Manchu-ruled Chinese Empire during the 18th and 19th centuries, Tibet functioned as a quasi-independent

theocracy under a Dalai Lama after the overthrow of the Qing dynasty in 1912. But that changed once the Communists came to power in China in 1949. China invaded Tibet in 1950, forcing the current Dalai Lama to recognize Chinese sovereignty. After an independence uprising was crushed in 1959, he fled to India, followed by 80,000 Tibetans. Secret talks with Beijing in 1982 and 1984 proved fruitless. The exiles



This Chinese guard is not the only outsider in Tibet today, as thousands of Chinese entrepreneurs and laborers have flooded in.

demanding a Western-style democracy for Tibet, while the Chinese insisted that the Communist Party remain in control. "Complicating matters," notes Goldstein, "was the exiles' demand for the creation of a Greater Tibet that would include . . . ethnic Tibetan areas in western China, most of which Tibet had lost in the 18th century."

After the Dalai Lama launched his campaign for international support in 1987, Beijing was put on the defensive, Goldstein notes. There were protests in Lhasa, and some led to riots. In the belief that events were going his way, the Tibetan leader reject-

ed an overture from Beijing in 1989; then, after another riot broke out in Lhasa, Beijing imposed martial law, adopted a new hard-line policy, and accelerated a program of rapid economic development.

Now it is the Dalai Lama who is on the defensive. His past successes at attracting support in the West "look more and more like Pyrrhic victories," Goldstein says. The temptation will be strong for him to give a tacit nod to organized violence by Tibetan militants. But, in Goldstein's view, the exiled leader should opt instead for concessions and compromise.

Why France Ended Its Draft

"Towards the Army of the Future: Domestic Politics and the End of Conscription in France"
by J. Justin McKenna, in *West European Politics* (Oct. 1997), Frank Cass and Co. Ltd.,
Newbury House, 900 Eastern Ave., London IG2 7HH, England.

France is the country that invented the idea of a "people's army" (during the French Revolution), and military conscription has been in use there since 1905. Yet now, France is phasing out the draft and shifting to an all-volunteer force, writes McKenna, a political scientist at George Washington University.

For decades, the so-called "Gaullist consensus" on French defense policy has been in effect, he notes. In 1964, in the belief that Americans—their assurances to the contrary notwithstanding—might well prefer to fight a conventional war in Europe rather than respond with nuclear weapons to a Soviet attack, President Charles de Gaulle opted for an independent nuclear force (*force de frappe*). As a result, McKenna notes, the French army came to be viewed as, in effect, merely "a 'trip wire' for the use of tactical nuclear weapons."

During the Cold War, the French derived "tremendous political power" on the international scene from their limited nuclear force, McKenna writes. At home, conscription and national military service became "an easy way to involve the citizen in national defense, without really investing conventional forces with strategic or political importance."

But the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany sharply reduced the military role of nuclear weapons, shifting the emphasis to conventional arms, McKenna observes. The 1991 Persian Gulf

War made that point clear to Jacques Chirac and other French leaders. Out of a supposedly "combat-ready" army of 280,000, as well as the 47,000 troops of the Force d'Action Rapide, the French were able to muster only 12,000 troops for service in the gulf. Britain, by contrast, was able to raise three times that number from its professional force of only 160,000. The problem: French law prevented the government from sending conscripts overseas unless they volunteered, and then-president François Mitterrand refused to ask Parliament to lift the restriction.

Chirac's plan for the professionalization of the armed forces, unveiled after his election to the presidency in 1995, aroused no strong opposition. Although service in the military was traditionally a French rite of passage, many now saw it as "a waste of time"—and avoided actual military service. Highly educated conscripts, often from the upper crust, increasingly were sent on nonmilitary duty (*service civil*), serving overseas as *coopérants* (junior executives) for French corporations, and getting paid far more than the average draftee.

The transition to a leaner, all-volunteer military force is due to be completed in 2002. But the French tradition of mandatory service to the nation will not be entirely dead. Starting that year, McKenna says, young men and women will be obliged to attend an annual "citizen's rendezvous," lasting no more than a week, to imbibe "basic republican values."