says. Had he listened to his secretary of state, he probably "would have been far more hesitant to take positions from which retreat would later prove so difficult." But in February 1915, when Germany declared a war zone in the waters around Britain and Ireland, Wilson demanded that Germany respect the rights of neutrals. In May, after a German submarine sank the British ocean liner *Lusitania*, killing 128 Americans, the United States demanded that Germany abandon its U-boat attacks. Bryan resigned on principle, believing that Wilson's course would lead to war. (Wilson privately denounced Bryan's position on neutrality as "moral blindness.")

Colonel House (left) complained that Wilson would not devote "sufficient time" to foreign affairs.

By late spring of 1915, Lansing, now the secretary of state, had privately concluded that the United States would have to enter the war if Germany gained the upper hand. By the summer, House had concluded that U.S. involvement was all but inevitable, and fumed at Wilson's wavering policy and failure to improve military readiness. "If we were fully prepared, I am sure Germany would not continue to provoke us," House confided to his diary.

But "never once did Lansing reveal his true position to the President. . . . House was only slightly more direct," Tucker writes. Dissimulation remained necessary even after Germany's January 1917 declaration of unrestricted submarine warfare. "Only Wilson's decision for war in March," the author notes, "would bring that necessity to an end."

The Sex Bomb

"The Sexual Behavior of American GIs during the Early Years of the Occupation of Germany" by John Willoughby, in *The Journal of Military History* (Jan. 1998), Society for Military History, George C. Marshall Library, Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, Va. 24450–1600.

Now that the Soviet Union is a thing of the past, sex often seems to be the U.S. military's chief foe. But it's not the first time top commanders have had to face this enemy. During the first few years of the occupation of Germany after V-E Day, writes Willoughby, an economist at American University, "the apparently unrestrained sexual activity of the American GI" spawned anti-Americanism and threatened U.S. efforts to build a new democratic German nation.

At first, the high command tried to prohibit all fraternization between Americans and Germans. But that proved impractical. On June 8, 1945, General Dwight Eisenhower declared that the ban did not apply to German children. Before long, the GIs had a new greeting for their girlfriends: "Good day, child." The army gave up and permitted relatively unregulated fraternization. In October the Allied Control Council, representing the United States and the three other occupying powers, lifted all but a few restrictions on soldiers' relations with Germans.

Fresh from foxholes and front-line combat, thousands of miles from home (and exercising less self-control than their British counterparts), the American GIs found willing Fräulein without difficulty. "The women of Berlin are hungry, cold, and lonesome," a writer named Walter Slatoff reported in the *Nation* in May 1946. "The GIs have cigarettes, which will buy food and coal. The GIs have food—chocolate, doughnuts (taken in large quantities from the Red Cross Clubs). . . . And the GIs provide a kind of security and meaning in an otherwise meaningless city." But these relationships bred resentment among the Germans, exacerbated by the sometimes crude, drunken, or criminal acts of the occupiers.

The generals took steps to bring their troops under control. They let it be known that crude public behavior would not be tolerated. On the sex front, the army in 1946 let soldiers bring their wives to Germany to live as dependents. Also, the relatively few GIs in serious relationships with German women were allowed to marry. The strong dose of domestic bliss helped to settle things down. Still, many young, unmarried soldiers remained, with no shortage of impoverished Fräulein willing to accommodate them. But the German economy noticeably improved in 1948, and the next year, the relatively independent Federal Republic of Germany emerged. The sex threat to German democracy was over.

A High-Tech Boomerang

"The 'Velvet' Revolution in Military Affairs" by John Arquilla, in *World Policy Journal* (Winter 1997–98), World Policy Institute, New School for Social Research, 65 Fifth Ave., Ste. 413, New York, N.Y. 10003.

Among defense specialists there is much talk of an information age "revolution in military affairs," and many of them urge the United States to rush to accelerate it. Arquilla, a professor of defense analysis at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, argues that a little caution is in order.

The revolution is marrying long-range precision weapons to advanced targeting and information management technology. Detailed information from satellites, ground sensors, and other devices will guide "smart" weapons such as ballistic missiles that drop dozens of guided submunitions, or "bomblets," on the soldiers and tanks below. Sounds easy, but Arquilla warns that the new reality might well prove *less* advantageous to the United States.

Other governments, as well as terrorists, he points out, are likely to be able to replicate whatever innovations the United States devises. Many of the new advanced-information technologies can be purchased off the shelf. If each side has equal information about the other, the edge goes to "the side that can stay put and hide," Arquilla says, rather than the one that "must try to seize territory or insert forces upon some distant shore." Adversaries who can't match U.S. war-fighting technologies can simply avoid conventional warfare and instead opt for guerrilla fighting or tactical nuclear weapons.

The U.S. military today is in much the same position as the British Royal Navy was during the 19th and early 20th centuries, Arquilla contends. "It was clear that naval affairs were being revolutionized by the shift from sail to steam, from shot to shell, and from wood to steel. Yet the faster Britain moved ahead in naval technology, the faster its maritime mastery was eroded." The new fleets of the industrial age required large, complex logistical support facilities, which hindered far-flung operations. Regional powers, such as Japan, were correspondingly strengthened. But by carefully timing "the introduction of innovations," Arquilla says, the British were able to extend the useful life of their existing ships and weapons, and thus slow the inexorable decline of British sea power.

The United States today, with no obvious challengers, and with unmatched military power, should not be "so hell-bent on the immediate pursuit of revolutionary change," Arquilla concludes. While technological advances seem inevitable, the British example shows that "there is often benefit in timing their introduction strategically."

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

Regulation, More or Less?

A Survey of Recent Articles

It was a landmark event of sorts last year when specialists from think tanks on three distinct points on the ideological spectrum found themselves in agreement on the urgent need for regulatory reform, and issued a joint pamphlet making their case.

"The problem is not simply that current expenditures mandated by regulation are