tions, increasing numbers of voters in 100 of America's richest communities have been leaving their "natural" Republican home behind and voting Democratic.

From 25 percent of the vote in these mostly suburban communities in 1980, writes Starobin, a staff correspondent for *National Journal*, the Democratic share steadily climbed, reaching 41 percent in 1996. Nationwide, in contrast, the Democratic vote over the same period went up by only eight points (to 49 percent). The new Democratic rich are a diverse lot, he says, taking in not only aging yuppies who work in "creative" fields such as advertising but also corporate executives, wealthy "pro-choicers," affluent Asian Americans, and others.

"The towns where Democrats have improved their performance range from Los Altos Hills in northern California, a new-money haven for the tycoons of Silicon Valley, to Fox Chapel on the outskirts of Pittsburgh, an old-money enclave for the titans of the steel industry and their progeny," Starobin writes. Many of these towns are filled with doctors, lawyers, and other professionals.

The voting analysis was done by the National Committee for an Effective Congress, a 50-year-old Democratic consulting firm founded by Eleanor Roosevelt and other liberals. The 100 communities were randomly chosen from a list of the 261 in the 1990 census that had a per capita income above $30,000 (which is more than twice the national average).

In some towns, such as Amberly, Ohio, an exclusive suburb of Cincinnati, Starobin notes, "recent Democratic inroads undoubtedly reflect the return to the party's fold of Jews who in 1980 deserted Jimmy Carter for Ronald Reagan. . . . But Democrats also made strides in towns long known as preserves of polo-shirt Protestantism—such as Darien and New Canaan in southern Connecticut." In Darien, which has a large Episcopalian population, the Democratic vote increased from 18 percent in 1980 to 31 percent in 1996.

"These days, the most reliable GOP voter is a Southern white male" whose drink of choice is beer, not Bordeaux, Starobin points out. Indeed, the party's cultural shift in its "center of gravity . . . from the country club to the stock-car track" has driven some of the rich away. Many wealthy Protestants, especially in the North, "just don't identify with the new, lower-middle-class, culturally conservative Republicans and the kind of leadership that they want to provide," observes James Davison Hunter, a professor of sociology and religious studies at the University of Virginia. The same may also increasingly be true for wealthy Catholics, adds Starobin. In Wilton, Connecticut, with a large Catholic population, the Democratic presidential vote went from only 22 percent in 1980 to 39 percent 16 years later.

Not all Democrats are heartened by their party's inroads among the wealthy. Jeff Faux, president of the liberal Economic Policy Institute in Washington, views it as a reflection of Democrats' neglect of their "natural base": the working class.

Maybe so. But Starobin concludes that the "historic bond" between the GOP and America's upper crust has been severed. "The rich," he says, "are up for grabs."

A Man's Game?

"Knowing and Caring about Politics: Gender and Political Engagement" by Sidney Verba, Nancy Burns, and Kay Lehman Schlozman, in *The Journal of Politics* (Nov. 1997), Journals Dept., Univ. of Texas Press, 2100 Comal, Austin, Texas 78722.

Is national politics more or less a "guy thing"? Could be. Political scientists Verba, Burns, and Schlozman, of Harvard University, the University of Michigan, and Boston College, respectively, report—with some obvious discomfort—that their research shows that women tend to be less interested than men in national politics, and to know less about it.

In personal interviews conducted in 1990 with 2,517 people, 38 percent of the men, but only 29 percent of the women, said they were "very interested" in national politics. Some 36 percent of the males said they enjoyed political discussion, but only 26 percent of the women did. Of the 59 percent of men and the 55 percent of women who read a daily newspaper, 40 percent of the men, but only 24 percent of the women, said they paid "a great deal of attention" to national politics.

Not surprisingly, given that disparity in interest, the men were better informed about politics—though they hardly qualified as political savants. Out of 10 political questions asked, they got an average of only 5.1 correct,

but the women got only 4.2. More than two-thirds of the men could name one of their U.S. senators, while only slightly more than half of the women could. Asked whether the federal government spends more on the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or on Social Security, two in five men knew the correct answer (Social Security), but fewer than one in five women did. In all, men did better on nine of the 10 questions. The lone exception: naming the head of the local school system, which 30 percent of the women could do, compared with 27 percent of the men.

When candidates like these U.S. senators are on the ballot, does women's interest in politics grow? The authors' data say: maybe.

Indeed, when it came to *local* politics, the sexes seemed about equally engrossed: 22 percent of the men and 21 percent of the women were "very interested." Of those who read a daily newspaper, 36 percent of each sex reported paying "a great deal of attention" to local politics.

Does it matter that women take less of an interest than men in national politics? The authors say that aside from voting, it makes women slightly less inclined than men to work in political campaigns or get actively involved in politics in other ways—and that, they fear, may mean that public officials pay less heed to "their concerns, preferences, and needs."

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

Too Proud to Listen

"An Inner Circle of One: Woodrow Wilson and His Advisers" by Robert W. Tucker, in *The National Interest* (Spring 1998), 1112 16th St. N.W., Ste. 540, Washington, D.C. 20036.

The presidency's lonely burden of decision has been portrayed so often that it's almost a cliché. "The buck stops here," as Harry Truman said. But never was a president more isolated than Woodrow Wilson was during the fateful years of U.S. neutrality in World War I, writes Tucker, a professor of political science emeritus at Johns Hopkins University.

"Wilson's neutrality policy enjoyed widespread support," Tucker writes, "because his own waverings and uncertainties reflected those of the American people." But had he made greater use of his advisers to clarify his own thinking, he might have led the country sooner to decisive action, whether to stay out of the war or to intervene. "Wilson's unwillingness to seek advice, his disinclination to hear what was unwelcome to him, and, even more, his penchant for taking an immediate dislike of those who told him what he did not wish to hear, were traits recognized by all who served him," Tucker observes. He did not allow much "give and take" over policy.

Wilson's inner circle of foreign policy advisers was small, seldom more than three or four people. They included Colonel Edward House, who held no official position, William Jennings Bryan, the secretary of state, and Robert Lansing, the counselor to the State Department.

Wilson considered Bryan, the great populist orator and former presidential candidate, whom he had appointed for political reasons, an unsatisfactory secretary of state. Tucker agrees that Bryan was inept, but points out that he advocated positions—U.S. mediation of the conflict, and the idea of a peace without victory—that Wilson himself would later take. Moreover, Bryan, alone among Wilson's advisers, "saw almost from the start" that the administration's continued insistence on neutral rights would likely lead to war with Germany.

Like the pacifist Bryan, Wilson "wanted above all else to remain out of the war," Tucker