

congressional authorization beforehand, “introduced U.S. troops to Lebanon, invaded Grenada, carried out air strikes against Libya, and maintained naval operations in the Persian Gulf.” President George Bush acted in the same way in invading Panama in 1989, “and only at the last minute did he come to Congress for support in acting offensively against Iraq” in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. President Bill Clinton has repeatedly used, or threatened to use, military force without congressional authority, in Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, as well as recently in Afghanistan and Sudan.

The Constitution vests in Congress “the sole and exclusive authority to initiate mil-

itary hostilities,” Fisher and Adler maintain, and the War Powers Resolution “unconstitutionally delegates the power to make war to the president.” It should be repealed, they assert. They acknowledge that situations are bound to arise, as they have in the past, in which a president considers it necessary to use military force without prior authorization from Congress. “But he cannot be the judge of his own actions,” they maintain. Instead, the president should afterward go to Congress, plead necessity, and seek retroactive authorization. If a presidential “usurpation” should be unwarranted, Fisher and Adler say, impeachment would be “a legitimate response.”

If Women Ran the World

“Women, Biology, and World Politics” by Francis Fukuyama, in *Foreign Affairs* (Sept.–Oct. 1998), 58 E. 68th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

If women ran the world, many feminists say, it would be a very different place, with much less aggression and violence. Fukuyama, author of *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992) and a professor of public policy at George Mason University, not only agrees but believes that “all postindustrial or Western societies are moving” in that direction. But there’s a catch, he says.

The male propensities to compete for power and status and to engage in violence, he writes, are not just the products of a patriarchal culture—they are rooted in biology, according to “virtually all reputable evolutionary biologists today.” That, of course, makes those inclinations harder to change, both in men and in societies. Nevertheless, Fukuyama declares, they must be controlled, in international affairs as well as domestic societies, “through a web of norms, laws, agreements, contracts, and the like.” In addition, women need to become more involved, he says. “Only by participating fully in global politics can women both defend their own interests and shift the underlying male agenda.”

Over the last century, Fukuyama notes, world politics has been gradually becoming

feminized, “with very positive effects. Women have won the right to vote and participate in politics in all developed countries, as well as in many developing countries, and have exercised that right with increasing energy.”

Though he expects men to continue to play “a major, if not dominant, part in the governance” of the United States and other democracies, Fukuyama predicts that as women do get more politically involved, these countries are likely to become less willing “to use power around the world as freely as they have in the past.” American women (like their sisters in other rich countries) have been less disposed than men to favor defense spending and the use of force abroad.

“Will this shift toward a less status- and military-power-oriented world be a good thing?” Fukuyama asks. For relations among advanced democracies, it will be, he thinks, because it will strengthen their tendency to remain at peace with one another. However, in dealing with other nations, “feminized policies could be a liability. . . .

“[E]ven if the democratic, feminized, postindustrial world has evolved into a zone of



Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, indomitable after a failed IRA assassination attempt in 1984

peace where struggles are more economic than military,” he observes, “it will still have to deal with those parts of the world run by young, ambitious, unconstrained men,” such as, say, a future Saddam Hussein armed with nuclear weapons. That doesn’t mean that men must rule the world, Fukuyama adds. “Masculine

policies will still be required, though not necessarily masculine leaders.” Tough female leaders like former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, rather than more stereotypically feminine ones like Gro Harlem Brundtland, the former prime minister of Norway, may be the wave of the future.

ECONOMICS, LABOR & BUSINESS

Virtue in the Marketplace

“Bourgeois Virtue and the History of P and S” by Deirdre N. McCloskey, in *The Journal of Economic History* (June 1998), Dept. of Economics, Northwestern Univ., 2003 Sheridan Rd., Evanston, Ill. 60208–2600.

A Marxist might say that since the mid-19th century, the cultural superstructure of the industrialized West has contradicted the material base. Ever since the rise of capitalism, the businessman has been scorned, held up by novelists, intellectuals, and the enlightened in general as a greedy, manipulative miscreant, a thief, a scoundrel, a Philistine, a fool, a Babbitt.

As a result of all this abuse, the phrase *bourgeois virtue* has come to seem an oxymoron, even to economists. Ever since Jeremy Bentham propounded his theory of utilitarianism in the late 18th century, they have insisted that virtue is beside the point, which is prudent calculation. McCloskey, an economist at the University of Iowa, contends that prudence alone does not suffice to explain economic behavior or history. “We need a discourse of the bourgeois virtues: integrity, honesty, trustworthiness, enterprise, humor, respect, modesty, consideration, responsibility, prudence, thrift, affection, self-possession.”

Some economic behavior depends on such virtues, McCloskey points out. Commercial undertakings, for instance, cannot succeed without trust. “What is remarkable about modern economic life . . . is the extension of such trust to comparative strangers. . . . If foreign trade was to expand in the 18th century it needed a large expansion of what might be

called commercial speech—the trading of reputations and market information, the persuading of Mr. Jones in the far off Chesapeake to undertake a certain novelty in tobacco supplied that would be advantageous to his partner in Glasgow. In other words, commerce depended on virtues of conversation, the keeping of promises, speech acts.” McCloskey calculates that about a fourth of national income in wealthy countries today is earned from “persuasion”—not just advertising, but sales talk, sweet talk, and even veiled threats by lawyers, executives, administrators, teachers, and others.

But if business depends on culture, McCloskey suggests, so, too, does culture depend on business. “Who we are depends on what we do, our ethics depend on our business. Commerce is a teacher of ethics. The growth of the market promotes virtue, sometimes.” The market spreads habits of cooperation. The experience of uncertainty in trade encourages skepticism about dogmatic certitude. The bourgeois standard of reciprocity leads to philanthropy.

“Capitalism,” McCloskey argues, “needs encouragement, being the hope for the poor of the world and being in any case the practice of what we were and who we are. . . . We encourage it by taking seriously the bourgeois virtues.”

How Inflation Whipped Us

“Arthur Burns and Inflation” by Robert L. Hetzel, in *Economic Quarterly* (Winter 1998), Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, P.O. Box 27622, Richmond, Va. 23261.

During the early 1970s, Federal Reserve Board chairman Arthur Burns was the very symbol of opposition to inflation. But the

approach he favored to fight it boomeranged, writes Hetzel, vice president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, and that failure