

and Sindhis have been locked in a long struggle. Radical elements in the Muhajir Quami Movement (MQM), an organization founded by Altaf Hussain (now in exile in London), agitate for an independent state of Karachi. "Since Bhutto's return to power in 1993, the MQM has been waging an urban guerrilla war of increasing ferocity against her government," notes Saeed Shafqat, director of Pakistan studies at the Civil Service Academy, in Lahore, writing in *Asian Survey* (July 1996). Nearly 2,000 people died in 1995 alone. Massive strikes called by Hussain have disrupted the whole country's economy.

The conflict dates back to 1971, when Bhutto's Sindh-born father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, came to power. He and his moderate socialist Pakistan People's Party openly favored the Sindhis, winning, for example, legislation making Sindhi the official language of the Sindh province. This, Hurst notes, infuriated the Muhajirs, touching off large-scale riots. In 1979, Bhutto was overthrown by General Zia ul-Haq, a Muhajir, and later executed. Zia, no more evenhanded than his predecessor, stoked Sindh antagonism. In the mid-1980s, Islamabad quashed a Sindh insurgency, but that only strengthened Sindh nationalism.

In the southwest, meanwhile, Baluch nationalism flourishes, Hurst reports. Secessionist sentiment there has its roots in the 1970s, when the Punjabi-dominated federal government crushed a Baluch insurgency. As a result, public opinion swung heavily toward full-fledged secession. Today, thanks to discrimination and continued repression, the Baluchs are politicized "as

never before." At least one section of Pakistan (besides the Punjab) has largely been spared massive ethnic violence. In the North-West Frontier Province, Pashtun nationalists have been relatively quiet. But "a vigorous Pashtun secessionist movement," Hurst says, "is a distinct possibility."

Bhutto responded to these pressures the same way her predecessors did. "During periods of ethnic upheaval," Hurst observes, "Pakistani governments have often raised the emotional topic of Kashmiri autonomy in order to divert attention away from domestic problems." That is what Bhutto repeatedly did. Since 1947, Pakistan and India have fought three wars over Kashmir, which each partly controls and to which both lay claim. But Hurst and others doubt that Pakistan's basic problems can any longer be evaded this way.

Bold measures are needed, these analysts agree. Bhutto, Radcliffe-educated and well liked by Washington, failed to provide them. "By most accounts," writes Peter Beinart, managing editor of the *New Republic* (Dec. 9, 1996), she "accomplished almost nothing during her two stints as Pakistan's prime minister."

Islamabad's next government must forge a new relationship with the ethnic leaders of the provinces. "Pakistan's survival into the next century depends on a greater devolution of political and economic power from the center to the provinces and cities," Ahmed Rashid writes. Unless that happens, the ethnic conflicts tormenting Pakistan cannot be resolved.

Why the English Love Tea

"Accounting for Taste: British Coffee Consumption in Historical Perspective" by S. D. Smith, in *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* (Autumn 1996), 26 Linnaean St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138-1611.

Tea drinking, like roast beef and cricket, has long seemed an essential part of the British way of life. But it wasn't always so, observes Smith, a lecturer in economic history at the University of York. Until the early 1700s, coffee was king; the English consumed 10 times as much java as tea. By the mid-1780s, however, tea was on top.

Tea had several advantages over coffee. It was easier to prepare, since no special grinding equipment was needed. It lacked coffee's unsavory association with London's "deca-

dent" coffeehouses, where patrons often spiked their drinks with alcohol. Tea, by contrast, was thought to have the "virtues of sobriety and morning alertness." Yet while Britain embraced the honey-colored brew, coffee remained the favorite on the Continent.

Why were British taste buds so different?

They weren't, Smith argues. The hallowed British taste for tea is in reality nothing more than a product of the law of supply and demand.

In the early 18th century, when coffee was

still the British favorite, British duties on coffee and tea were comparable, and, consequently, so were retail prices, Smith explains. But as the century progressed, the powerful British East India Company, which supplied tea from the Orient, pressured London to cut import duties on its product, tea. The private traders who brought coffee from Britain's West Indian colonies did not wield as much political clout. So tea prices dropped, and consumption increased.

Coffee held its own until the War of Jenkins's Ear (1739–45) with Spain disrupted supplies. After the war, another cut in the duty on tea trimmed the ranks of coffee drinkers again. With tariff reform in the early



In London's coffeehouses, the java was sometimes spiked with something stronger.

19th century, coffee briefly regained some customers. But coffee prices in England shot up after 1834, as slaves on coffee plantations in the British West Indies won their freedom. The price of Jamaican coffee, for example, rose by almost 40 percent during the 1830s. Tea's triumph was complete.

Russia on the Couch

"Geotherapy: Russia's Neuroses, and Ours" by Stephen Sestanovich, in *The National Interest* (Fall 1996), 1112 16th St. N.W., Ste. 540, Washington, D.C. 20036.

Pundits such as former secretary of state Henry Kissinger have been sounding the alarm about the dangers of a Russia tormented by its loss of superpower status. Seeking relief from its national pain, these observers fear, Russia will be drawn to an expansionist foreign policy, and they warn against "coddling" the Russian bear. But these "geotherapists" are speaking nonsense, contends Sestanovich, vice president for Russian and Eurasian affairs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

In last year's election, President Boris Yeltsin used foreign policy "as a tool to demonstrate the differences between himself and the Communists, and to remind voters of what they *don't* want to retrieve from their 'glorious' past," Sestanovich writes. When the Russian parliament in March passed two communist-sponsored resolutions annulling the acts under which the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991, Yeltsin, denouncing the action as "scandalous," instructed Russian diplomats to tell foreign governments that it would have no effect. Russian public opinion sided with Yeltsin.

A 1996 report by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, an "establishment" organization in Russia, asked: *Will a Union Be Reborn?* The conclusion: "However humiliated the national consciousness of the Russians may be, today Russian society is absolutely unprepared to pay the price of a lot of blood to make up for geopolitical losses." The council proposed to boost Russia's international standing and influence by increasing its economic strength. Russia should aim to achieve "economic domination" in the other former Soviet republics, the council said, through "the successful development of Russia itself, the continuation of democratic and market reforms, and the beginning of an active policy of economic growth."

Another Western "geotherapist," Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served as U.S. national security adviser under President Carter, frets that today's Russian leaders have "a self-deluding obsession" with their country's international status. Plenty of Russian rhetoric seems to support this view. But Sestanovich says the leadership's loud talk is no more than a "pol-