ics that the West erected “almost insuperable barriers” to their emigration while “there was still time,” Rubinstein says, is belied by the facts: 72 percent of Germany’s Jews, and an even higher percentage of Jewish children, “managed to flee before this became impossible [in late 1940], one of the greatest rescues of any beleaguered group in history.” After Kristallnacht in November 1938 made it obvious that Jews had no future in Adolf Hitler’s Germany, no new Western barriers to Jewish immigration were raised, he notes. “On the contrary, more Jews left Germany in 1939 than in any other year.” Britain radically liberalized its immigration policies for their benefit.

The Jewish refugees who escaped Hitler before the war came exclusively from Germany and its satellites, Rubinstein points out. While continental Europe then had a Jewish population of about 10 million, Germany in 1933, when Hitler came to power, was home to only about 500,000 Jews and Austria, 190,000. The Jewish population of the Sudetenland and other parts of Czechoslovakia that Hitler annexed during 1938–39 after the Munich accord was 115,000. The vast majority of the six million Jews who perished in the Holocaust lived elsewhere—in eastern Europe, particularly Poland, the Soviet Union, and Hungary—and, before the war, were not under Nazi domination and were not refugees.

The situation changed drastically, Rubinstein notes, with Hitler’s rapid conquest of most of continental Europe between 1939 and 1941. “From late 1940, Jews were specifically forbidden to emigrate from Nazi-occupied territory.” Now, the Jews became prisoners, the barriers to their emigration “raised by the Nazis themselves, not by the western allies.” And now, “only the military liberation of Nazi-occupied Europe could rescue any significant number of Jews.”

Wyman and others have indicted the Allies for failing to bomb the gas chambers and crematoriums at Auschwitz. That possibility was widely discussed by Jewish leaders and British and American officials in the summer of 1944, notes Levy, a retired aeronautical engineer, in an extensive analysis of the controversy. Only the heavy bombers of the U.S. 15th Air Force, based in Italy, were capable of striking at Auschwitz, and the targets, including underground gas chambers, would have required very heavy bombing. The raids could well have failed to destroy all the gas chambers, would have impinged on the war effort, and probably would have killed or wounded thousands of the Jewish inmates. That would have given the Germans a pretext for blaming the deaths at Auschwitz on Allied bombing. For these reasons, Leon Kubowitzki of the World Jewish Congress in New York and David Ben-Gurion of the Israeli “government-in-embryo” in Palestine opposed the idea at the time. Writes Rubinstein: “Only by winning the war as quickly as possible, and destroying the Nazi scourge, could the surviving Jews of Europe be liberated.”

The New Diplomacy

“Globalization and Diplomacy: A Practitioner’s Perspective” by Strobe Talbott, in Foreign Policy (Fall 1997), 2400 N St. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20037–1153.

Growing global interdependence is making “the very word foreign . . . obsolete” in some realms of diplomacy, writes Deputy Secretary of State Talbott. “From the floor of the stock exchange in Singapore to the roof of the world over Patagonia where there is a hole in the ozone layer, what happens there matters here—and vice versa.”

With trade and international investment now more economically important to the United States, the State Department has been collaborating more closely with the Commerce Department and other government agencies, not only to help “write the rules and build the institutions that govern the global economy” but to help American firms win contracts overseas, Talbott notes.

The new cooperative diplomacy—which also involves joint efforts with U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies to fight international organized crime and drug trafficking—has changed the look of the 249 American embassies and consulates overseas. “In fact, 65 percent of those now under the authority of U.S. ambassadors and other chiefs of mission are not State Department
A little more than two decades ago, an economist named Tibor Scitovsky challenged a basic assumption of modern economics: “that the consumer is rational... that whatever he does must be the best thing for him to do, given his tastes, market opportunities, and circumstances, since otherwise he would not have done it.” It was “unscientific” to make this assumption, Scitovsky argued, and sustained observation of human behavior showed that it was frequently unjustified: people often fail to choose what is best for them. They watch too much television, for instance, rather than reading great literature.

Scitovsky’s book, The Joyless Economy (1976), received scant recognition when it first appeared, but some now are hailing it as a prophetic masterpiece. It is among “The Hundred Most Influential Books Since World War II,” according to a survey of prominent scholars by the Times Literary Supplement (Oct. 6, 1995). More recently, in Critical Review (Fall 1996), seven sympathetic critics and Scitovsky himself revisited the book’s critique of consumer capitalism.

“Drawing on research in physiological psychology,” Scitovsky began with the human inclination to avoid discomfort and seek plea-