

day, were used.

For Americans in the throes of change—first with the advent of Jacksonian democracy, then with the westward expansion and sectional conflict that led to war—the nostalgic songs of Foster (1826–64) and others were a tonic. But they were “cultivated” as well as popular, Key points out.

“The romantic notion that music could transcend earthly limitations and lead to a better world,” she writes, “was conflated with the sentimental notion that people who bought and sang this ‘better’ class of music could somehow acquire more refinement, taste, and gentility. For one short historical moment, mass appeal was seen as complementary to moral



elevation.” Reformers used the sentimental ballad to advance such causes as abolition and temperance.

Gradually, however, “absolute instrumental music from the European symphonic repertory” came to be most highly valued, Key says. By the end of the century, “music’s aura of idealism and moral improvement was dispensed from above—in the highest achievements of fine-art music—and from abroad, principally Ger-

many.” As an 1891 contributor to the *Atlantic Monthly* lamented, “Song-singing finds it hard to stand its ground against the musical culture which insists upon the highest artistic excellence or nothing at all.”

OTHER NATIONS

Russia and China, Partners Again?

“Russia and the Far East: Working toward a Serious Partnership with China” by Peter Ferdinand, in *Transition* (Sept. 1995), Open Media Research Institute, 1201 Connecticut Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia pursued a pro-Western foreign policy, and its relations with China cooled. Lately, however, there has been a noticeable warming, reports Ferdinand, director of the Centre for Studies in Democratisation at Britain’s Warwick University.

At first, he notes, Chinese leaders scorned Russian president Boris Yeltsin as the “gravedigger” of communism. And Yeltsin “acted as if Japan were Russia’s highest priority in the Far East.” Courting the Japanese and their money, he tried to resolve the Russo-Japanese dispute over the Kuril Islands, which the Soviet Union had seized after World War II.

By 1993, however, Moscow and Beijing were in a new mood, Ferdinand says. The West’s failure to provide Russia with what it considered adequate economic aid prompted it to reconsider its westward tilt. At the same time, “the revival of Russian nationalism among State Duma deputies undermined Yeltsin’s attempts to secure better relations with Japan,” the analyst writes,

because it impeded a resolution of the Kuril Islands dispute.

Beijing, meanwhile, had come to terms with the end of communism in the former Soviet Union. Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders were reassured by the Yeltsin government’s willingness to abide by the Soviet Union’s border agreements. The collapse of the Soviet Union, Ferdinand observes, “shifted the balance of forces across the Sino-Russian frontier to China’s favor, with the People’s Liberation Army nearly twice as big as the Russian army.” Russia no longer can confront China with military pressure “from the north, the south (Vietnam), and the southwest (India), as the Soviet Union attempted to do in the 1970s.”

In 1993, Russia and China signed five-year agreements on military cooperation and technology. Hundreds of Russian scientists have since moved to China to work in the Ministry of Aeronautics. Russian sales of weapons and equipment to China have increased, reaching a reported \$2–\$3 billion in 1994.

As China’s strategic importance to the West

'The Gramophone Mind'

New Statesman & Society (Aug. 18, 1995) recently reprinted a forgotten essay by George Orwell. He wrote it in 1944 as a preface to *Animal Farm* after the novel had been rejected on political grounds by at least two large publishing houses.

The sinister fact about literary censorship is that it is largely voluntary. Unpopular ideas can be silenced, and inconvenient facts kept dark, without the need for any official ban. . . .

At this moment what is demanded by the prevailing orthodoxy is an uncritical admiration of Soviet Russia. Everyone knows this, nearly everyone acts on it. Any serious criticism of the Soviet regime, any disclosure of facts which the Soviet government would prefer to keep hidden, is next door to unprintable. And this nation-wide conspiracy to flatter our ally takes place, curiously enough, against a background of genuine intellectual tolerance. For though you are not allowed to criticize the Soviet government, at least you are reasonably free to criticize our own. Hardly anyone will print an attack on Stalin, but it is quite safe to attack Churchill, at any rate in books and periodicals. . . .

For all I know, by the time this book is published my view of the Soviet regime may be the generally accepted one. But what use would that be in itself? To exchange one orthodoxy for another is not necessarily an advance. The enemy is the gramophone mind, whether or not one agrees with the record that is being played at the moment.

diminished after the Cold War, friction with the West over trade and human rights increased. Russia, too, once felt obliged "to talk frankly with Beijing" about human rights, Ferdinand says. It no longer does.

Russia and China "began to see an interest . . . in building up each other's general international status," Ferdinand says. "In this way, they could weaken the West's hegemony and create more opportunities for themselves." At the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva last March, Russia, to the surprise of the West, voted against a


motion to condemn China for human rights abuses, providing Beijing's margin of victory. Beijing has voiced implicit support for Moscow's military campaign in Chechnya; in return, Moscow has opposed Taiwan's entry into the UN.

But the developing Russian-Chinese "partnership," Ferdinand concludes, is not like the extremely close Sino-Soviet relationship of the 1950s. Moscow today, he says, simply wants "a partnership rather than an alliance, a counterbalance of equal weight to the West, to gain greater room for diplomatic maneuvering."

Europe's Missing Ingredient

"Democracy or Technocracy? European Integration and the Problem of Popular Consent"
by William Wallace and Julie Smith, in *West European Politics* (July 1995), Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 900 Eastern Ave., London IG2 7HH, England.

After World War II, Jean Monnet and the other founding fathers of what is now the European Union took what might be called a *Field of Dreams* approach: "If we build it, they will come." Once new European institutions were established, they believed, popular support for political integration would grow as the public came to appreciate the economic benefits of a united Europe. That shift has yet to hap-



pen—and further enlargement of the European Union will make it even less likely, contend Wallace, a professor of international studies at the Central European University in Prague, and Smith, a lecturer in politics at Oxford University.

The technocratic approach informed both the 1951 Treaty of Paris, which created the European Coal and Steel Community, and the 1957 Treaties of Rome, which gave birth to the