sion struggle is imminent. The temptation to play the nationalist card will grow. Many in Beijing detect a new reluctance in international councils such as the World Bank to make allowances for what Beijing calls "Chinese characteristics" in areas such as human rights and economics. They argue that China should take a hard line "and push hard for the world to accept it on its own terms," Lieberthal says.

The United States needs to encourage positive developments within China, he says. It also needs to rally other countries (notably Japan) "to articulate and convey to China's leaders the conduct expected of major powers" and to stand with Washington. The best that can be hoped for from a good policy is modest success, Lieberthal concludes. And in the absence of *any* policy, the worst is not too much to fear.

Kennan and the Cold War

"From World War to Cold War" by George F. Kennan and John Lukacs, in *American Heritage* (Dec. 1995), 60 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10011.

Revisionist historians have portrayed America's decision in 1947 to oppose the Soviet Union with a policy of "containment" as premature and provocative. Kennan contends, in an epistolary interview conducted by noted historian Lukacs, that, on the contrary, it took Americans too long to come to a realistic view of Joseph Stalin's regime.

When Kennan arrived in Moscow in 1944 after a seven-year absence to serve as deputy to U.S. ambassador Averell Harriman, he realized with some shock that the Soviet regime "was still indistinguishable from the one that had opposed in every way our policies of the pre-war period, that had entered into the cynical nonaggression pact with the Germans in 1939, and that had shown itself capable of abominable cruelties, little short of genocide," in areas under its control. Kennan did not dispute the need to keep giving the Soviet forces military support, but he saw no reason for "such elaborate courting of Soviet favor as was then going on, or for encouraging our public to look with such high hopes for successful collaboration with the Soviet regime after the war."

The failure of Stalin's regime to come to the aid of the Poles who rose up against the German occupiers in the 1944 Warsaw Uprising should have prompted the United

See No Evil

Fifty years ago, on March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill delivered his famous "iron curtain" speech in Fulton, Missouri. Spencer Warren, head of a Washington public policy seminar program, recalls in the *National Interest* (Winter 1995–96) the torrent of criticism that greeted Churchill's warning.

In retrospect, it appears that [President Harry] Truman was using Churchill—with the latter's understanding—to crystallize opinion on behalf of a new American policy already taking effect. . . .

But Churchill's harsh and somber tone, and the breadth and detail with which he made his case—the first strong criticisms of Russia by a Western leader since the Nazi invasion of Russia in June 1941—brought down on him a torrent of criticism, thus restoring him temporarily to the position in which he had spent most of his career. . . .

Leading liberal newspapers and magazines . . . attacked Churchill for relying on the old power politics, endangering the UN, and wrongly blaming the Russians. . . .

For their part, conservative critics were more agitated by Churchill's proposal of a peacetime Anglo-American alliance than by his attacks on Soviet policy. Senator Taft (R.-Ohio) agreed with much of Churchill's criticism of Russia, but opposed his proposed solution, maintaining that "it would be very unfortunate for the U.S. to enter into any military alliance with England, Russia, or any other country in time of peace."

States to make "a thoroughgoing exploration of Soviet intentions" in Europe, Kennan says. But President Franklin D. Roosevelt was reluctant to risk undermining Allied wartime unity.

Americans were given a rosy view of their wartime ally

FDR seems to have believed that Stalin would be swayed by his personal charm to collaborate in the creation of a new postwar Europe, Kennan notes. Senior U.S. military commanders also had an unrealistically upbeat view. At the Yalta Conference in February 1945, Roosevelt futilely tried "to assure democratic independence for the Eastern European peoples by accepting, and trying in good faith to meet, what he took to be Stalin's demand for 'friendly governments' in that part of the world." The Americans were still trying to preserve amity at the Potsdam Conference of midsummer 1945. In vain.

Kennan's famous 8,000-word "Long Telegram," sent from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on February 22, 1946, spelled out what he called the "Kremlin's neurotic view of world affairs." Moscow, while deaf to reason, he wrote then, was "highly sensitive to logic of force" and usually withdrew when it encountered "strong resistance . . . at any point." Washington's reaction to his analysis was "nothing less than sensational"; it became the basis of U.S. containment policy. Later, in July 1947, Kennan published his even more famous "X" article in *Foreign Affairs*.

"What happened in 1946," Lukacs comments, "was that finally those in charge of this country's world policy were catching up with [Kennan], and then, by and large, political and public opinion followed in 1947."

A Greening of National Security?

"Is the Environment a National Security Issue?" by Marc A. Levy, in *International Security* (Fall 1995), Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Univ., 79 John F. Kennedy St., Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

It's been argued by some that global environmental problems ought to be considered matters of U.S. national security. Jessica Tuchman Mathews, a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Norman Myers, author of *Ultimate Security* (1993), believe that biodiversity loss, soil erosion, and other such problems ought to be treated with the same seriousness as Bosnia and Saddam Hussein. Levy, an instructor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, is skeptical.

Some global environmental problems have no connection to any vital national interest. Acid rain, for example, "would have to rank very far down on the list of threats to national security because the values threatened—trees, sports fishing, and so on—are far from vital," Levy writes.

Two environmental problems come closest, in Levy's view, to being direct threats to U.S. security: ozone depletion in the stratosphere and the possibility of catastrophic global warming. But even in these cases, he says, applying the "national security" tag may not make sense. It wouldn't change the analysis of the problem, or the remedy. Indeed, the security alarm might draw more public and congressional attention not only to the problem but to the costs of taking action—and so make it harder to deal with the problem. One reason that the U.S. response in the late 1980s to the danger of ozone depletion was so effective, Levy believes, may have been that it was seen not as a "security" threat but as a straightforward "public health and chemical hazard problem."

Why are Mathews, Myers, and others so eager to make environmental degradation a national security matter? Because, Levy suggests, they want "to whip up greater support for global environmental protection." But this strategy could easily backfire, he says. Public perception of the relative seriousness of various environmental risks bears little relation to reality, as a 1987 Environmental Protection Agency study showed. A public convinced "that any problem that is international and ecological" is a matter of national security, Levy warns, would likely force policymakers to gallop off in pursuit of the wrong enemies.