

ward, and black leadership is nurtured. So they enlist and re-enlist in large numbers: in 1995, African Americans made up 27.2 percent of the army's total enlisted and officer personnel, their presence contributing greatly to the service's current health and effectiveness.

How was this accomplished? Not, as the opponents of affirmative action might wish, through the simple issuing of equal-opportunity edicts. As the authors insist, "The army is not race-blind; it is race-savvy." Given the racial climate outside the military, a level playing field alone would not suffice. So the army developed a comprehensive system of incentives and sanctions—the former generously underwritten, the latter strenuously enforced. For example, the army's "efficiency reports" (personnel evaluation reports) rate individuals on whether they support equal opportunity. Most get a positive rating; a negative one will stop a career in its tracks.

So far, so good. Yet in considering how to transfer this wisdom to the rest of society, the authors stumble. Applauding the army's blending of white and black folkways into a "multicultural uniculture," they propose a national embrace of "our common Afro-Anglo heritage." However stirring it sounds, this formulation leaves out the Navajos, recent arrivals from Mexico, and the second-generation Chinese Americans (to name but a few). Absent military-style discipline, such a narrow version of multiculturalism seems unlikely to command wide assent.

Such ruminations apart, the authors' chief concern is to promote national service. Indeed, this is their true agenda. Accepting (with reluctance) that the draft is unlikely to be reinstated soon, Moskos and Butler propose national service as a way to mobilize young Americans in pursuit of common goals while teaching them valuable skills and easing racial tensions.

Yet there are problems with this proposed cure for racism. The army would likely oppose national service, on the grounds that it would hurt military recruiting. More important, national service would not entail the forced intimacy and shared hardship of military life—conditions that are essential to breaking down barriers and forging bonds of mutual respect. Cleaning up national parks or tutoring schoolchildren is hardly comparable to basic training, let alone combat.

—A. J. Bacevich

### *A GRAND ILLUSION?*

#### *An Essay on Europe.*

By Tony Judt. Hill & Wang. 150 pp. \$20.

Discussions of the European Union often work better than a lullaby: two minutes on exchange rates, and even the most seasoned Euro-wonk begins to nod. Less soporific, even bracing, is this short book by Judt, a professor of European studies at New York University. Judt avoids the drone by focusing on the big question: can the EU bring about an ever closer union and still accept new members on the same terms? Judt's answer, in a word (though with many qualifications), is no. The EU, he argues, was designed to accommodate the prosperous Europe of the Cold War—an entity that no longer exists.

Until recently, the European community worked well. Political leadership was shared by France and Germany. The economy expanded without a trace of the inflation and unemployment that plagued the continent before World War II. Prosperity blessed all social classes, and welfare was generous. But beginning in the 1970s, some of the old demons began to resurface. The resurgent influence of Germany magnified the relative decline of France. The 1974 oil crisis halted economic growth, giving rise to an urban underclass. And today, with the baby boom generation nearing retirement, the once robust European welfare states look sickly indeed.

Under these straitened circumstances, Judt notes, "it would be an act of charity" for the EU to accept its eastern neighbors as full members. Realizing this, Eastern Europe has been making its case in strategic terms: better for the West to give the East alms than leave it prey to a resurgent Russia. Yet Judt speculates that an eastern "buffer zone" would, by appearing to threaten Moscow, actually undermine Western security. At any rate, he says, the addition of any new members would only further paralyze decision making in Brussels.

Located in the prosperous, politically stable, culturally Franco-British Benelux countries, the EU's administration strikes Judt as seriously out of touch. Indeed, he maintains that, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany has emerged as the de facto leader of Europe—a situation complicated by that nation's deep ambivalence toward its own power. With a characteristically apt turn of

phrase, Judt describes post-1989 Germany as “a muscle-bound state with no sense of national purpose.”

Recent upheavals make this leadership vacuum all the more troubling. With the crisis of the welfare state and the continuing influx of immigrants—many of them Muslims who do not assimilate easily into modern Europe—neofascism is rearing its ugly head. Likewise, the collapse of communism has allowed Europe’s trademark nationalism to revive, reaching tragic

extremes in the former Yugoslavia. Regrettably, Europe’s leaders and intellectuals remain wedded to the notion of union as a cure-all.

Does Judt consider himself a skeptic on European unity? Not really. While he argues that local problems need local solutions, he holds no illusions about the “embattled, mutually antagonistic circle of suspicious and introverted nations” that once made up Europe. He would like to split the difference. “Europe,” he writes, “is more than a geographical notion but less than an answer.” Union may be desirable in some respects, but it’s not the Holy Grail. “We must remind ourselves not just that real gains have been made, but that the European community which helped to make them was a means, not an end.”

—Michael Brus

### *ORIGINS OF A CATASTROPHE: Yugoslavia and Its Destroyers.*

By Warren Zimmerman. Times Books.  
256 pp. \$35

Ever since Yugoslavia fell apart in 1991, there has been much hand-wringing about how the United States and the European Community could have prevented the breakup—or, failing that, stopped the brutal war that led to the “ethnic cleansing” of Bosnian Muslims by a Bosnian Serb military backed by the “Yugoslav” (in name only) government of Slobodan Milosevic. In this fluently written memoir of his four years as U.S. ambassador to Yugoslavia (1989–92), Zimmerman argues that the breakup was inevitable but that the West could have contained the slaughter by the timely application of limited military force. “The failure of the Bush administration to commit

American power early in the Bosnia war,” he writes, “was our greatest mistake of the entire Yugoslav crisis.”

Ending in May 1992, when Zimmerman was recalled by the Bush administration to protest against Serbian aggression in Bosnia, the memoir describes the ambassador’s efforts to persuade Milosevic and the Croatian leader Franjo Tudjman to abandon their expansionist policies. He got nowhere. Milosevic, with “habitual mendacity,” denied that he was backing the Bosnian Serbs. Tudjman bragged that Serbia and Croatia had every right to carve up Bosnia. And the Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic (whom Zimmerman likens to Heinrich Himmler) painted the Bosnian Muslims as fundamentalist fanatics crazed with enmity toward the West. Zimmerman recounts the many quarrels between the United States and the European Community over diplomatic policy, judging them finally a waste. “Short of a credible threat of force,” he reiterates, “the United States and its allies lacked decisive leverage.”

On the question of how Milosevic and Tudjman—two former Communists—could stir up such a witches’ brew of ultranationalism, Zimmerman spurns the myth of Yugoslavia as a land of ancient hatreds. There has been no strong evidence of anti-Muslim feeling for several centuries. And though Serbs and Croats massacred each other during World War II, postwar Yugoslavia saw an intermarriage rate—among all groups—of roughly 20 percent. Embers of ultranationalism had long smoldered in Serbia, but to fan them into conflagration took the bellows of state-controlled television. Once Milosevic made the “rational calculation” that ultranationalism was the path to power, the next step was to fill the airwaves with images of mutilated corpses and other horrors, all neatly blamed on the Croats or Bosnian Muslims. (The same bloody fare was offered on Croatian TV.) As one Yugoslav journalist remarked, “You Americans would become nationalists and racists too if your media were totally in the hands of the Ku Klux Klan.”

In Zimmerman’s view, Marshal Tito was partly responsible for the rise of ultranationalism, because his long-lived communist regime forbade any democratic venting of ethnic concerns. Yet Zimmerman is also soft on Tito’s regime, playing up its economic

