

**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**

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territories or the status of Jerusalem, in hopes of deterring further movement toward a settlement imposed by Washington, Bruzonsky says. But Israel is militarily and economically more dependent than ever on the United States, and there has been massive erosion of past U.S. support, both in Congress and in the American Jewish community. Israel faces possible diplomatic isolation, and perhaps greater dependence on the nuclear option.

*Coöperative War*

"Coalition Warfare" by Robert W. Komer, in *Army* (Sept. 1976), 1529 18th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Following "the trauma of the Vietnam War," the U.S. Army is today concentrating on the defense of Western Europe. But Komer, a Rand Corporation analyst and former White House staffer under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, thinks the Army is neglecting the most crucial part of the NATO mission—the special needs of "coalition warfare." To wage war coöperatively, U.S. forces and their NATO counterparts must harmonize "doctrine, tactics, and procedures," and use standardized or interchangeable equipment. If land war broke out in Europe today, U.S. troops would be hard put to provide artillery support for allied forces, read their allies' maps, or even communicate with them by radio. In past wars, we improvised and got by. But today, "there will be no time to *ad hoc* it again after war starts"—the Warsaw Pact powers would attack too swiftly and NATO forces would be heavily outnumbered.

Preparing for coalition war offers financial advantages as well. Military budgets could be stretched further if NATO members shared the costs of developing expensive weapons systems. "At a conservative estimate, it could take 20 years to create an ideal coalition structure from the present mess," Komer argues, but the process must begin soon, with Washington in the lead.

*Arms Control in  
A Nuclear World*

"Who Will Have the Bomb" by Thomas C. Schelling, in *International Security* (Summer 1976), 9 Divinity Ave., Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

By the 1990s, few if any countries will lack the technology and trained personnel to make nuclear weapons out of indigenously produced fissionable material, predicts Schelling, professor of political economy at Harvard. Prior possession or tests of a nuclear explosive will not be the decisive factor—rather, it will be the speed with which a nation can assemble an arsenal of nuclear weapons, in the right place, with the right delivery system.

The fact of proliferation will not make any less important, or even less effective, the kinds of institutional commitments, safeguards, and precedents that constitute present-day arms control. However, the

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U.S. policy emphasis must shift from "physical denial and technological secrecy" to strategies that curb the incentives to use and/or possess nuclear weapons of terrorist organizations as well as nation states. Possession itself can be "mischievous," but the most decisive inhibitions are those on the actual use of nuclear weapons (e.g., fear of retaliation and a variety of sanctions that may be directed at countries that violate treaties or abandon non-nuclear status).

In this context, Schelling believes that most countries—China and the U.S.S.R. included—will accept international arrangements to guard against diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to weapons. But two risks will remain: the theft of explosive nuclear materials and the more serious problem posed by military revolts and internal disorder within a nuclear-armed country.

One dilemma is the extent to which our own sophisticated safeguards against accidental or unauthorized detonation should be shared with countries not bound by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. While the United States may not wish to reward these nations by offering them advanced technology to guard against misuse, some of the most effective American safeguards involve electronic locking devices and other design features which render a bomb inoperative if tampered with.

### *The Legalties of Economic Coercion*

"The Arab Oil Weapon: A Reply and Reaffirmation of Illegality" by Jordan J. Paust and Albert P. Blaustein, in *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* (vol. 15, no. 1, 1976), Box 8, School of Law, Columbia University, New York, N.Y. 10027.

The only published legal argument that defends the Arab "oil weapon" and the blacklisting of foreign firms as legitimate weapons of political action is a 1974 article (*American Journal of International Law*) by Ibrahim Shihata, legal advisor to the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development. Shihata describes the withholding of oil from certain states as an "instrument of flexible persuasion" complementing other Arab military and diplomatic measures in the struggle to achieve a favorable resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

No Arab government which employs the "oil weapon" and blacklisting has produced a "white paper" or any other legal justification for its action, say Paust and Blaustein, law professors at the University of Houston and at Rutgers, respectively.

Rebutting Shihata's principal argument, the authors cite the United Nations Charter and the customary law of reprisal as requiring "that any strategy of coercion, economic or otherwise, be proportionate to the 'necessity' of the situation." They likewise reject Shihata's contention that U.N. Charter provisions designed to regulate international coercion are inapplicable in time of war. Shihata's claim that oil contracts and other trade agreements are "political favors" extended by