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But Ullman, professor of international affairs at Princeton and director of a Council on Foreign Relations "1980s Project," asks whether there is enough continuity and mutuality of interest among the "trilateral" nations to make the idea work. They use very different decision-making processes; trilateral matters evoke varying degrees of interest and approval among their citizens. And as countries like Mexico, Brazil, India, and Iran join the "advanced nation club," the shared economic characteristics which now distinguish the West and Japan from the rest of the world will become less distinct.

Moreover, the top-priority relationship between Washington and Moscow inevitably means that consultations in NATO are overshadowed by bilateral discussions between the two superpowers. Similarly, U.S. relations with Peking are too heavily influenced by the American-Soviet relationship to be conducted in close harmony with Tokyo. While more effective inter-allied consultations and coordination are clearly possible, says Ullman, "there is, and will continue to be, less to trilateralism than meets the ear."

Agonizing Reappraisals

"U.S.-Israeli Policies: Reading the Signs for '77" by Mark A. Bruzonsky, in *Worldview* (Sept. 1976), 170 E. 64th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

In the spring of 1975, the United States completed a much-publicized "reassessment" of its Middle East policy that was begun in the days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Bruzonsky, a Washington writer and consultant on international affairs, asserts that the results of that study are "nicely camouflaged" but nevertheless clear in a Brookings Institution report of December, 1975, entitled "Toward Peace in the Middle East."

The report was prepared by a study group headed by Roger W. Heyns, former chancellor of the University of California at Berkeley, and signed by such influential American Jewish community leaders as Philip Klutznick and Rita Hauser. It proposed: an Israeli pullback to its 1967 borders; Israeli recognition of the principle of Palestinian self-determination; resolution of all outstanding issues (probably at Geneva), including the status of Jerusalem; step-by-step implementation, with multilateral and bilateral (U.S.-Israeli) security guarantees.

It is within this framework that the United States is likely to press for a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1977, Bruzonsky says, making diplomatic confrontation between Washington and Tel Aviv almost inevitable. Pressure on Israel was momentarily eased by the Lebanese civil war and the American elections. But Israeli and U.S. goals are now firmly set on a collision course, says Bruzonsky, who predicts that the Jewish state "will sooner or later be forced to alter basic political positions."

Ultra-nationalist factions within the Israeli government are still determined to force a confrontation with Washington over the occupied

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territories or the status of Jerusalem, in hopes of deterring further movement toward a settlement imposed by Washington, Bruzonsky says. But Israel is militarily and economically more dependent than ever on the United States, and there has been massive erosion of past U.S. support, both in Congress and in the American Jewish community. Israel faces possible diplomatic isolation, and perhaps greater dependence on the nuclear option.

Coöperative War

"Coalition Warfare" by Robert W. Komer, in *Army* (Sept. 1976), 1529 18th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Following "the trauma of the Vietnam War," the U.S. Army is today concentrating on the defense of Western Europe. But Komer, a Rand Corporation analyst and former White House staffer under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, thinks the Army is neglecting the most crucial part of the NATO mission—the special needs of "coalition warfare." To wage war coöperatively, U.S. forces and their NATO counterparts must harmonize "doctrine, tactics, and procedures," and use standardized or interchangeable equipment. If land war broke out in Europe today, U.S. troops would be hard put to provide artillery support for allied forces, read their allies' maps, or even communicate with them by radio. In past wars, we improvised and got by. But today, "there will be no time to *ad hoc* it again after war starts"—the Warsaw Pact powers would attack too swiftly and NATO forces would be heavily outnumbered.

Preparing for coalition war offers financial advantages as well. Military budgets could be stretched further if NATO members shared the costs of developing expensive weapons systems. "At a conservative estimate, it could take 20 years to create an ideal coalition structure from the present mess," Komer argues, but the process must begin soon, with Washington in the lead.

Arms Control in A Nuclear World

"Who Will Have the Bomb" by Thomas C. Schelling, in *International Security* (Summer 1976), 9 Divinity Ave., Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

By the 1990s, few if any countries will lack the technology and trained personnel to make nuclear weapons out of indigenously produced fissionable material, predicts Schelling, professor of political economy at Harvard. Prior possession or tests of a nuclear explosive will not be the decisive factor—rather, it will be the speed with which a nation can assemble an arsenal of nuclear weapons, in the right place, with the right delivery system.

The fact of proliferation will not make any less important, or even less effective, the kinds of institutional commitments, safeguards, and precedents that constitute present-day arms control. However, the