

POLITICS & GOVERNMENT

quality management information, and increased involvement of personnel "at the activity level" in the state's budgeting process. The major disadvantage is the added time and effort required for budget preparation.

Lifetime Legislators

"The Essential Reform" by David Lebedoff, in *Harper's* (Oct. 1976), 2 Park Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016.

Our present system of congressional reapportionment is a disaster, says Lebedoff, a Minneapolis lawyer and treasurer of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota. By leaving reapportionment to be determined by state legislatures, single-party rule in every district is virtually assured.

"The result is a Congress in which nearly every seat is permanently safe," Lebedoff argues. (In 1972, despite the biggest presidential landslide in recent history, only three per cent of incumbent seats in the House were lost.) With little real chance for partisan contest, political parties atrophy. One-party dominance of congressional districts has put the House of Representatives out of touch with the people and eager to avoid tough decisions that can be ducked with impunity. The controversial issues (abortion, busing) have gone to the federal courts by default.

Thanks to this system, "we are burdened with lifetime legislators, whose tenure is threatened only by senility, death, or scandal," writes Lebedoff. "They can fudge and avoid and delay all they want, and not be held accountable."

His solution? Take congressional reapportionment away from the state legislators and give it to a federal reapportionment board with a general mandate to avoid single-party dominance.

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

*Triangular
Asymmetry*

"Trilateralism: 'Partnership for What?'" by Richard H. Ullman, in *Foreign Affairs* (Oct. 1976), 428 East Preston Ct., Baltimore, Md. 21202.

"Trilateralism" is the fashionable word among those American specialists (e.g., Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Columbia professor and former director of the Trilateral Commission) who believe that closer coordination among the United States, Japan, and Western Europe in dealings with the communists and the Third World can help resolve many of America's foreign-policy problems in the 1970s.

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But Ullman, professor of international affairs at Princeton and director of a Council on Foreign Relations "1980s Project," asks whether there is enough continuity and mutuality of interest among the "trilateral" nations to make the idea work. They use very different decision-making processes; trilateral matters evoke varying degrees of interest and approval among their citizens. And as countries like Mexico, Brazil, India, and Iran join the "advanced nation club," the shared economic characteristics which now distinguish the West and Japan from the rest of the world will become less distinct.

Moreover, the top-priority relationship between Washington and Moscow inevitably means that consultations in NATO are overshadowed by bilateral discussions between the two superpowers. Similarly, U.S. relations with Peking are too heavily influenced by the American-Soviet relationship to be conducted in close harmony with Tokyo. While more effective inter-allied consultations and coordination are clearly possible, says Ullman, "there is, and will continue to be, less to trilateralism than meets the ear."

Agonizing Reappraisals

"U.S.-Israeli Policies: Reading the Signs for '77" by Mark A. Bruzonsky, in *Worldview* (Sept. 1976), 170 E. 64th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

In the spring of 1975, the United States completed a much-publicized "reassessment" of its Middle East policy that was begun in the days of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Bruzonsky, a Washington writer and consultant on international affairs, asserts that the results of that study are "nicely camouflaged" but nevertheless clear in a Brookings Institution report of December, 1975, entitled "Toward Peace in the Middle East."

The report was prepared by a study group headed by Roger W. Heyns, former chancellor of the University of California at Berkeley, and signed by such influential American Jewish community leaders as Philip Klutznick and Rita Hauser. It proposed: an Israeli pullback to its 1967 borders; Israeli recognition of the principle of Palestinian self-determination; resolution of all outstanding issues (probably at Geneva), including the status of Jerusalem; step-by-step implementation, with multilateral and bilateral (U.S.-Israeli) security guarantees.

It is within this framework that the United States is likely to press for a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1977, Bruzonsky says, making diplomatic confrontation between Washington and Tel Aviv almost inevitable. Pressure on Israel was momentarily eased by the Lebanese civil war and the American elections. But Israeli and U.S. goals are now firmly set on a collision course, says Bruzonsky, who predicts that the Jewish state "will sooner or later be forced to alter basic political positions."

Ultra-nationalist factions within the Israeli government are still determined to force a confrontation with Washington over the occupied