The Presidency

The coming of a new President often spurs scholarly reëxamination of the presidency as an institution. Intellectual fashions change; most recently, for example, Vietnam and Watergate have brought a sharp reaction against earlier academic enthusiasm for the "strong presidency" with Franklin D. Roosevelt as model. Analysts now write of curbing presidential powers, not expanding them. Other researchers focus on less-publicized issues, such as White House organization and the process of governing. Here, Stephen Hess, scholar and former presidential aide, portrays the modern presidency as it appears to the man who occupies the Oval Office. And, in what they call a "cautionary tale," political scientists Jack Knott and Aaron Wildavsky discuss what good government seems to mean to our 39th President, Jimmy Carter.

PORTRAIT OF A PRESIDENT

by Stephen Hess

Twice I have served on White House staffs—at the end of one administration (1959–61) and at the beginning of another (1969). All presidencies, of course, are different. But one could hardly fail to observe differences that were exclusively a product of time. *Beginnings* and *endings* are different. There are differences of pace, attitude, objectives, and response, not only between administrations but also within each one.

What follows is a composite portrait of a President over the course of his years in office. (Exceptions to generalities are noted.)

I attempt to see the presidency as it appears to a President, in the "presidential context." Much of the current literature focuses on the powerfulness of the office. My conclusion is not that the office is unpowerful. Rather, the accent is on presidential constraints. Often in the following pages the President will seem a hapless giant, surrounded by enemies, hemmed in by competing power centers, responding to events that he did not create and cannot control. This is how the presidency increasingly looks to the man who occupies the White House. The vantage point may help to explain why Presidents act the way they do.

Every fourth even-numbered year, on a Tuesday between the second and eighth of November, a President is elected. If he is not the incumbent, he has a period of grace until January 20 during which he can organize his administration without having to assume the responsibilities of office. He brings to this task certain knowledge and experience, obligations and commitments.

The odds, however, are great that he has not held an executive position in the federal government.* He may, in fact, never have been an executive. Some of his experiences will be of considerable value; for example, Lyndon Johnson's understanding of the workings of Congress and Dwight Eisenhower's understanding of the workings of the Pentagon. By the act of running for the presidency, all elected Presidents should have gained some useful understanding of public opinion. But no matter how much he may have thought and read about the presidency, the most startling fact about a new President is the depth of his ignorance about the *job* to which he has just been elected. At least two recent Presidents have commented on this phenomenon. The

* Of the modern Presidents, Franklin Roosevelt through Gerald Ford, only FDR had ever served as a political executive in Washington, having been Assistant Secretary of the Navy during World War I.

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learning period for a new President has been estimated by one scholar as taking about 18 months. One consequence is that a new President makes some of his most important decisions at a time when he is least capable of deciding wisely.

The White House staff will be largely filled by those who have surrounded the candidate during the campaign and who have his trust. They bring to their jobs an understanding of the President, loyalty, and in some cases a set of skills that are transferable from the campaign, such as press relations and scheduling. Their primary interests, however, usually have been in the art of politics, not governance. While they are apt to begin their White House duties in a personal-services relationship with the President, they will eventually acquire more and more governmental responsibilities; Presidents have a habit of giving the jobs at hand to the persons at hand. Some of these former campaign workers may be qualified to assume operational assignments, but not because they were campaign workers. One need only look at why they were in the campaign. Often their chief qualifications—and an important one in a campaign—was availability; their chief motivations may have been the expectation of excitement, an excess of zeal, or hero worship.

The policy commitments of a new President are found in his campaign speeches, in the party platform, and to a lesser degree in the promises of other members of his party. These commitments are usually vague, given the tendencies of elective politics. In no sense can they be considered a presidential program. A program has a price tag and relates to available funds. One consequence is that at the time Congress is inclined to be most responsive to the wishes of a President, he is least able to make his wishes known in concrete terms.

People Problems

On the morning after his victory, a President-elect is consumed with thoughts of Cabinet-making and other matters of personnel selection. No shadow Cabinet waits in the wings. A new President suddenly discovers how few people he knows who are qualified to assume major posts in government. "People, people, people!" John Kennedy exclaimed three weeks after his election, "I don't know any people. I only know voters."

A President-elect has obligations and political debts, but they are not necessarily to those with the backgrounds he now needs. Sometimes he picks incompetents for his Cabinet. Often he turns

to strangers. With each appointment, a President makes a contract to share his responsibilities. If it turns out that the appointee and the President disagree, the appointee can quit or the President can fire him. Either action is a tacit admission of failure on the part of the President. More often, the President and the appointee split their differences and the President loses some part of the direction of his administration.

The Danger of "Afterglow" Disasters

The problems of presidential transition may be exacerbated by animosities between the incoming and outgoing Presidents and/or by tensions between the incoming President and the civil service.* If the newly elected President is from the party out of power, he probably campaigned against "bureaucracy," "red tape," and the "failures" of government programs. Almost all Presidents-to-be ascribe an alien political coloration to the permanent government. Franklin Roosevelt considered it too conservative; Richard Nixon considered it too liberal. The new President is not necessarily paranoid. He is committed to change and perhaps even to reductions in programs and personnel. As a result, the permanent government may well see its interests as threatened.

On taking office, the new President finds he is confronted with a backlog of decisions that need to be made. Government has a way of treading water during presidential campaigns as it waits to see who will be its next leader. And decisions postponed build pressure for resolution. Thus the President at first is presented with great opportunities and great dangers.

The dangers are compounded by the arrogance of the incoming administration. For two years or more the candidate and his closest advisors have been working toward a single goal. The goal has been incredibly difficult and complex to achieve. Gaining it has been a rare achievement that comes to few. They have a right to believe that they succeeded because of their skill, intelligence, political understanding, and hard work. It is not surprising that some of the greatest presidential disasters—even to second-term Presidents—have come in the immediate afterglow of election victories.†

* The problems are naturally greatest when the President-elect has defeated the incumbent President (FDR and Hoover in 1932) and least when both are of the same party, although problems can still exist in the latter case (Theodore Roosevelt and Taft in 1908), but they are apt to be caused by bruised egos rather than lack of coöperation.

† Among the disasters that followed election victories have been the Roosevelt court-packing plan (1937), Kennedy's Bay of Pigs (1961), and Johnson's decision to escalate the Vietnam war (1965).

The new President also finds he has inherited a variety of organizational arrangements that were created to deal with his predecessor's problems. Each administration over time invents a variety of offices that reflect the special talents or deficiencies of appointees, rivalries between advisers, pet projects of the President, and constituent pressures. Sometimes new Presidents will overreact to this legacy, as when Kennedy quickly jettisoned the National Security Council machinery of the Eisenhower administration so that he was left without an appropriate evaluative capacity at the White House when an early foreign policy crisis arose.

Each President soon comes to agree with Woodrow Wilson: "Governments grow piecemeal, both in their tasks and in the means by which those tasks are to be performed, and very few governments are organized as wise and experienced men would organize them if they had a clean sheet of paper to write upon." Yet no matter how inefficiently or illogically the government is organized, there are those who like it that way. Congress, special-interest groups, and bureaucrats have grown comfortable with existing arrangements and have a vested interest in their continuation. The public is not usually much concerned and hence is hard to mobilize for such bloodless matters as structural change. Presidents fret a lot about the ill-fitting shape of government, but generally they conclude that serious attempts at restructuring are no-win propositions. Neither the voters nor the annals of history reward them for such efforts. So (with the exception of Roosevelt and Nixon) they propose only marginal reforms.

Responses to the Past

Much of the tone of the new administration is a response or reaction to the outgoing administration. Eisenhower felt strongly the necessity of establishing a sense of calm after what he considered the divisiveness of Harry Truman's government. In the wake of Kennedy's assassination, Johnson stressed the need for continuity. Gerald Ford's open behavior was meant as an antidote to the dark side of the Nixon presidency.

Other elements of a President's inheritance start to come into focus. He finds that it will not be until his third year in office that he will be able to operate under a budget that his own appointees have initiated. Even then much federal spending will be in "uncontrollables" (e.g., veterans' benefits, Medicare) and not subject to his influence. His power to appoint only extends to some 3,000 people out of a government civilian work force of over 2 million.

Some officials have term appointments and cannot be removed before their time is up. The new President must abide by laws and treaties that were not of his making. There are traditions that he cannot ignore except at great risk. He begins to realize that government is like a continuously moving conveyor belt. He jumps on while it is in motion. It cannot be stopped in order for him to engineer change.

His ability to act, he finds, is also limited by external considerations: whether the nation is in the midst of war or peace, whether the gross national product is rising or falling, the rate of inflation, the balance of payments, the composition of the Supreme Court and Congress, and the size of his electoral mandate. Once in office, President Kennedy was fond of quoting Thomas Jefferson's dictum, "Great innovations should not be forced on slender majorities."

Yet the new administration begins in a state of euphoria. Reporters are inclined to be kind. Congress is quiescent. There is not yet a record to defend. The President, for the only time, takes a broad-gauged look at existing policies. His popularity ratings in the polls will never again be as high.

An adviser to Presidents summed up the importance of an administration's early months:

> Everything depends on what you do in program formulation during the first six or seven months. I have watched three presidencies and I am increasingly convinced of that. Time goes by so fast. During the first six months or so, the White House staff is not hated by the cabinet, there is a period of friendship and coöperation and excitement. There is some animal energy going for you in those first six to eight months, especially if people perceive things in the same light. If that exists and so long as that exists you can get a lot done. You only have a year at the most for new initiatives, a time when you can establish some programs as your own, in contrast to what has gone on before.

Then the administration has its first foreign crisis and its first domestic scandal. Weaknesses in personnel begin to appear. The novelty of new personalities wears off for the press. The President introduces his legislative program. The process known as "the coalition-of-minorities" takes hold. Every presidential action will alienate someone. The longer he is in office, the more actions he must take, and, collectively, the more sizable the body of those in opposition will be. Groups that would not attack him when his

popularity was high now become vocal. His poll ratings start to drop at a rate of some six percentage points a year.*

By the end of his first year the President should have learned two important lessons: first, that the unexpected is likely to happen; second, that his plans are unlikely to work out as he had hoped. The Soviet Union launches Sputnik. A U-2 is shot down. There is an uprising in Hungary, a riot in Watts, a demonstration at Berkeley, U.S. missiles that he thought had been removed from Turkey were not removed. The Chinese explode a nuclear device earlier than his intelligence forecasts had predicted. The President finds that much of his time is spent reacting to events over which he has no control or trying to correct the errors of others.

Presidents start to turn inward, some sooner than others, the rate depending on personality factors and the ratio of successes to failures. Reading the morning newspapers becomes less satisfying. They bring bad news. They never seem to get their stories straight. Editorials and columns note only the things that go wrong. The President holds fewer news conferences. He looks for ways to go over the heads of the press corps, such as televised speeches. He grants exclusive interviews to friendly reporters.

Do It Yourself

Some members of his Cabinet, he feels, have "gone native." They badger him on behalf of their departments' clients. Others he finds long-winded or not very bright. There are now longer intervals between Cabinet meetings. He tells his appointments secretary to make it difficult for certain department heads to get in to see him alone.

Time is running out on his first term. Things are not getting done, or are not done fast enough. He begins to feel that if he wants action he will have to initiate it himself—meaning through his own staff. The White House staff grows bigger, despite his early promises to reduce its size. Decisions that used to be made in the departments now need White House clearance. Bottlenecks develop as too many agencies are funneled through too few presidential assistants. Programs that the President wishes to give high priority are placed directly within the Executive Office.

The midterm congressional elections approach, and the President tries to restore his luster at the polls. He always fails.† His

* The only exception is Eisenhower, whose popularity *increased* by some two and one-half percentage points a year in his first term.

† The only modern President to have his party gain seats in both houses of Congress in a midterm election was Franklin Roosevelt in 1934.

party loses seats. The new Congress is less receptive to the President's wishes. This process was described by Lyndon Johnson late in his administration:

> You've got to give it all you can that first year. Doesn't matter what kind of majority you come in with. You've got just one year when they treat you right, and before they start worrying about themselves. The third year, you lose votes. . . . The fourth year's all politics. You can't put anything through when half of the Congress is thinking how to beat you. So you've got one year. That's why I tried. Well, we gave it a hell of a lick, didn't we?

The President now devotes a larger part of his time to foreign policy, perhaps as much as two-thirds. This is true even if his pre-presidential interests had been mainly in the domestic area. He takes trips abroad, attends summit meetings, greets heads of state at the White House. Like Kennedy, he believes that "the big difference" between domestic and foreign policy "is that between a bill being defeated and the country [being] wiped out." But he also turns to foreign policy because it is the area in which he has the most authority to act and, until recently, the least public and congressional restraint on his actions. Moreover, history usually rewards the foreign-policy President, and the longer a President stays in office, the larger in his mind looms his "place in history."

The Third-Year Exodus

During the third year, the exodus from government begins. Many of those who were attracted to the glitter of a new administration find that they cannot spare any more time away from their "real" careers, especially if they come from the highly competitive corporate world; others find that their government experience has created nongovernment offers they cannot refuse; some realize they made a mistake in coming to Washington, or their families are urging them to return home. "Fatigue becomes a factor," Henry Kissinger noted in 1972. "I always thought my mind would develop in a high position." But he found that the "mind is always working so hard that you learn little. Instead, you tend to work with what you learned in previous years." The lure of a waning administration is not great and so the President often turns to careerists, promoting from within.

Personal alliances and rivalries by now have had full opportunity to develop within the administration. Remembering his experiences on the Truman staff, Clark Clifford recalled how "you

develop areas of resistance. You come up with an idea, and you could guarantee in advance those men in government who would take the opposite position, just because you favored something."

The President may have taken office with only the most limited notions of what he wanted to do, but by the second half of his term he has accumulated a long list of his positions, which must be promoted and defended and which will determine whether he is reëlected or not. He now has strong feelings about what is in the national interest and what must be done—regardless of the popularity of his actions. He has come to see the national interest as uniquely his to uphold. When announcing the decision to send troops into Cambodia in the spring of 1970, President Nixon told the American people, "I would rather be a one-term President and do what I believe is right than to be a two-term President at the cost of seeing America become a second-rate power and to see this Nation accept the first defeat in its proud 190-year history." There may have been some posturing in his statement, yet his is a posture that is eventually assumed by all Presidents. The lines harden.

The Fourth Year

As the administration enters its fourth year, the President's attention snaps back to domestic considerations. The political quotient that enters into each presidential act becomes more determining. Appointments are made with an eye to mending fences in his party. Programmatic decisions of high risk may be deferred. "Wait until next year, Henry," Roosevelt told Treasury Secretary Morganthau in May 1936, "I am going to be really radical." Some members of the administration join the campaign staff, others continue to perform their duties with an eye to the election payoff of actions taken. The President finds excuses to make "nonpolitical" speeches around the country. By summer he is nominated for a second term and begins active campaigning.

If the President is reëlected, it is largely on the basis of the past—the state of the nation during his incumbency—rather than his promises for the future. What is unspoken is that his next four years will be less productive than the previous four years. There are some exceptions. Wilson in 1917 and Roosevelt in 1941 had opportunities to preside over "just" wars. Generally, however, at least since Jefferson, the second term is downhill.*

* See John Pierson, "Is a Second Term Always Downhill?" *Wall Street Journal*, January 4, 1973. He claimed that Theodore Roosevelt's second term was "uphill" and that the second terms of Coolidge and Eisenhower were no worse than their first terms.

But first the newly reëlected President will make an effort to recast his administration by bringing in new people or by giving new assignments, as Nixon did in 1973. He will take advantage of his renewed popularity by pushing his legislative program, as Johnson did in 1965. He will unveil pet schemes that he had previously kept to himself, as Roosevelt did in 1937. In the President's fifth and sixth years—as in his third—there is considerable maneuvering room to shape events. (Although deaths and a resignation have meant that some Presidents did not get their full allotment of years in office.)

A Losing Game

Then, as Harold Laski noted as far back as 1940, the two-term tradition (now the two-term limitation) "operates decisively to weaken his influence in the last two years on his reign. Few Presidents have had substantial results to show during that period." The President's party again loses seats in the midterm election—a signal for potential presidential candidates to start increasing their visibility. One way to make news is to attack the incumbent. The attention of the press gradually shifts to these new men. Some of the President's executives resign to enter the embryonic campaigns. The personnel pattern of the first term repeats itself, only it is now even more difficult to recruit from outside government. The President will continue to hold the nation's attention if there is a serious international crisis; otherwise, he must try to manufacture interest through summit meetings, foreign travel (the more exotic the better), and by attaching himself to major events, such as space exploits, disaster relief. Foreign powers may prefer to stall various negotiations until a new President is installed. The last year of his administration is also an election year for the House of Representatives and a third of the Senate, with predictable consequences for the President's legislative program.

In the final July or August, the national conventions nominate two men to run for President. The President will campaign for the nominee of his party, but fairly casually; he does not see it as his battle.

After the new man is elected, there is no longer any vital force in the administration. On January 20, the President watches his successor being sworn in. He is now an instant elder statesman.

This account stresses the institutional forces that press in upon a President. But, of course, being President need not be a grim experience. Depending on his personality, a President may

have a very good time.

And being President need not be an unproductive experience. Each President does realize some of his legislative goals and prevents by veto the enactment of other laws that he feels are not in the nation's best interests. His authority in the conduct of war and peace is substantial. He uses his unique position to preach doctrines that have a better chance of entering the public consciousness than the competing ideas of other politicians. His power and influence may be limited, but they are also greater than those of any other individual.

Essentially a Caretaker

Still, the experience of being President was different from what he thought it would be or from what he learned in his civics textbooks. Four years or eight years seemed like a very long time from the outside, a very short time when he was in office. Never long enough to do any real planning—to think about where the country ought to be even in the next decade and to design programs to get from here to there. His time was largely consumed by crises and the demands of others, bargaining with congressmen, feuds, small symbolic acts, worrying about getting reëlected, finding people for jobs and getting rid of them (usually by "kicking them upstairs"), approving budgets that he could only change around the edges. He never really "ran" the government as he had expected. Rather, the President found that he was essentially a caretaker: his job was to keep the social fabric intact; to keep the peace if possible; to defend the nation from aggressors; to maintain the nation's place in the world, even by force; to attempt to balance economic growth and stability; to deal with those concerns that were identified through the elective process, and at best to make some new initiatives that the history books would record as his.

JIMMY CARTER'S THEORY OF GOVERNING

by Jack Knott and Aaron Wildavsky

"Seek simplicity and distrust it."
ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD

If President Carter didn't believe what he says or act on his beliefs, there would be little reason to study his words as predictors of his deeds. Yet, as we shall show, he does care about his beliefs and he does act on them. Why, then, if Carter is a believer, has it been so difficult for observers to determine what he believes or what he will try to do in office? Because we have all been looking in the wrong place. President Carter does change his views on substantive policies, such as tax reform, medical care, and busing. He is not an ideologue of policy, but changes his mind, like most of us, as the times and conditions change.

Our hypothesis is that Carter's basic beliefs are about procedures for making policy—procedures about which he speaks with passion, determination, and consistency. His concern is less with particular goals than with the need for goals, less with the content of policies than with their ideal form—simplicity, uniformity, predictability, hierarchy, and comprehensiveness.

Therefore, if there is a danger for President Carter, it is not that he will support unpopular *policies*, but that he will persevere with inappropriate *procedures*. The question is whether he views his procedural criteria merely as rough guidelines for formulating public policy or as immutable principles of good government. If they are hypotheses about governing—subject to refinement or abandonment in the face of contrary evidence—there is no reason for alarm; but if he does not allow his theories of governing to be refuted by experience, we are all in for hard times.

Of all the Democratic presidential candidates in the primaries, Jimmy Carter was criticized most for his alleged vagueness on

policy. Some people saw him as a fiscal conservative who would cut government spending; others wondered about his plans for costly social programs. Actually, his campaign staff put out numerous papers outlining his proposals on issues ranging from busing to abortion to welfare.[1] The problem was not so much that he did not say specific things about issues but that he placed greater emphasis on methods, procedures and instruments for making policy than on the content of policy itself.

The response of Stuart Eizenstat, Carter's chief "issues" advisor, to a question last summer about what issues would dominate the campaign will serve as an illustration. Eizenstat grouped the issues into three types: one centered on the present lack of long-range federal planning; a second emphasized openness; a third dealt with government reorganization.[2] With all three, the emphasis was not on policy outcomes but on administrative instruments. (Long-range planning, like openness and reorganization, is not a policy but an instrument used to produce policies.)

Carter on Procedures

In contrast to the other candidates, Jimmy Carter made numerous statements during the campaign and during his term as Governor of Georgia (1971–75) in which he explicitly emphasized principles of procedure for making public policy. Although we are aware of the possibility that these statements are in part rhetoric, his ideas do comprise a coherent philosophy, with recurrent and

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identifiable themes about how government ought to work; and we shall show that he put them into practice as Governor of Georgia.

In his own words, a major purpose of reorganizing the federal government is to "make it simple." He favors "drastic simplification of the tax structure";[3] "simple, workable, housing policies";[4] "simplification of the laws and regulations to substitute education for paper shuffling grantsmanship";[5] "simplification of the purposes of the military" and a "fighting force that is simply organized."[6] Rather than the "bewildering complexity" we now have, he intends to create a "simplified system of welfare."[7] His praise goes out to the state and local governments that have devised "simple organizational structures."[8]

How does he intend to simplify? When Carter became Governor of Georgia, he reduced the number of agencies from 300 down to 22. He has proposed a similar nine-tenths reduction in the number of units at the federal level—from the present 1,900 down to around 200.[9] His rationale seems to be a general one: the fewer the agencies, the better.

Another way to simplify administrative structure, according to Eizenstat, is "to make sure that duplicating functions are not performed by one agency and that, in fact, we don't have a situation whereby duplicating programs are being administered by more than one agency."[10] Carter has repeatedly stated that one of the purposes of his proposal to introduce "zero-base budgeting" (as he did in Georgia) is "eliminating duplication and overlapping of functions."[11] In restructuring the defense establishment, Carter would like to "remove the overlapping functions and singly address the Defense Department toward the capability to fight."[12]

The Uniform Approach to Policy

A third way President Carter intends to simplify policy is through uniformity. He plans to reform the welfare system by providing a uniform national cash payment varying only according to cost of living.[13] He intends to standardize the tax structure by eliminating loopholes, thus treating all income the same.[14] To create uniformity, Carter would grant a direct subsidy for new housing.[15] He would also standardize medical treatment—"We now have a wide disparity of length of stay in hospitals, a wide disparity of charges for the same services, a wide difference in the chances of one undergoing an operation"—and make criminal justice uniform by "eliminat[ing] much of the discretion that is

now exercised by judges and probation officers in determining the length of sentences."[16]

"There's just no predictability now about government policy," Carter has complained, "no way to tell what we're going to do next in the area of housing, transportation, environmental quality, or energy."[17] He believes in "long-range planning so that government, business, labor, and other entities in our society can work together if they agree with the goals established. But at least it would be predictable."[18] And: "The major hamstring of housing development is the unpredictability of the Federal policies. . . ."[19] In agriculture, the greatest need is a "coherent, predictable and stable government policy relating to farming and the production of food and fiber."[20] In foreign affairs, other nations are "hungry for a more predictable and mutually advantageous relationship with our country."[21] Unpredictability led Carter to condemn Henry Kissinger's policy of no permanent friends and no permanent enemies with these words: "I would . . . let our own positions be predictable."[22]

Shared Goals Make Predictable Policies

If only we agree on long-range goals, according to Carter, then we can work together and make our policies predictable. The format of his thinking follows: long-range planning entails the explicit delineation of goals; once goals are known (and agreed upon), policies become predictable. This predictability reduces conflict and increases coöperation.

His theory of conflict explains how Carter would expect to deal with a recalcitrant Cabinet: "The best mechanism to minimize this problem is the establishment of long-range goals or purposes of the government and a mutual commitment to these goals by different Cabinet members. . . ." By getting early agreement, "I can't imagine a basic strategic difference developing between myself and one of my Cabinet members if the understanding were that we worked toward the long-range goals."[23] When asked how he would resolve differences with the Congress on foreign policy, his response was: "I hope that my normal, careful, methodical, scientific or planning approach to longer-range policies . . . would serve to remove those disharmonies long before they reach the stage of actual implementation."[24]

A major Carter campaign criticism of President Ford was that he "allowed the nation to drift without a goal or purpose."[25] By contrast, when Carter became Governor of Georgia, his administration attempted to identify long-range goals: ". . . during

the first months of my term, we had 51 public meetings around the state, attended by thousands of Georgians, to formulate specific long-range goals in every realm of public life. We spelled out in writing what we hoped to accomplish at the end of two, five, or even 20 years. . . ."[26] Only if government has clearly defined goals, Carter believes, will people be prepared to "make personal sacrifices." One of his favorite quotes from the New Testament is: "If the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself for the battle?"[27] But suppose others prefer to march to their own music? How would Carter contend with conflict?

If openness is not a form of godliness for President Carter, it must come close. He has proposed an "all-inclusive 'sunshine law' . . . [whereby] meetings of federal boards, commissions, and regulatory agencies must be opened to the public, along with those of congressional committees."[28]

Carter's espousal of openness is connected in his own mind with direct access to the people. Just as he favors giving the people open access to governmental decision-making, he plans, as President, to speak directly to them. He values openness "to let the public know what we are doing and to restore the concept in the Congress that their constituents are also my constituents. I have just as much right and responsibility to reach the people for support as a member of Congress does." He has also said that he plans to restore Franklin D. Roosevelt's "fireside chat,"[29] accept "special responsibility to by-pass the big shots," and to act, as it were, as the people's lobbyist.[30] Should his policies be thwarted by special interests, Carter says he will go to the people. At times, Carter identifies himself *as* the people. In reviewing his experience with consumer legislation in Georgia, he said: "The special interest groups prevailed on about half of it. I prevailed—rather the Georgia people prevailed—on the other half."[31]

What is consistent in these proposals is Carter's opposition to the intermediate groups—lobbyists who stand between government and citizen or a palace guard that stands between a President and Cabinet. They fracture his conception of comprehensive policy-making.

President Carter prefers to make changes comprehensively rather than "timidly or incrementally." As he has put it:

> Most of the controversial issues that are not routinely well-addressed can only respond to a comprehensive approach. Incremental efforts to make basic changes are often foredoomed to failure because the special interest groups can benefit from the status quo, can focus their

> attention on the increments that most affect themselves, and the general public can't be made either interested or aware.[32]

The same theory guides his efforts on government reorganization:

> The most difficult thing is to reorganize incrementally. If you do it one tiny little phase at a time, then all those who see their influence threatened will combine their efforts in a sort of secretive way. They come out of the rat holes and they'll concentrate on undoing what you're trying to do. But if you can have a bold enough, comprehensive enough proposal to rally the interest and support of the general electorate, then you can overcome that special interest type lobbying pressure.[33]

In a word, "the comprehensive approach is inherently necessary to make controversial decisions."[34]

Changing everything at once, then, is part of Carter's political theory: comprehensive change enables one both to identify the public interest by considering the merits of opposing claims and to serve that interest by requiring opponents to fight on every front simultaneously, thus diluting their forces while concentrating one's own. The bigger the change, the greater the public attention—and the more likely it becomes that the public interest will prevail over private interests.

A central ingredient in Carter's comprehensive reforms is their inclusiveness. A characteristic Carter phrase is "a complete assessment of tax reform in a comprehensive way." He wants to "establish comprehensive proposals on transportation and energy and agriculture."[35] He favors a "comprehensive nation-wide mandatory health-insurance program" and a "drastic reorganization of the health care services in the U.S."[36] Although we could go on, one more example from foreign affairs must serve: since "the old international institutions no longer suffice," Carter feels that "the time has come for a new architectural effort."[37]

Since special interests—"those who prefer to work in the dark, or those whose private fiefdoms are threatened"—care only about themselves, they prevent inclusive decision-making.[38] To avoid this pitfall, Carter wants to restructure the federal bureaucracy, the health system, the welfare system, the tax system, the criminal-justice system, and international institutions.

According to Carter, the comprehensive approach offers a final, decisive solution to problems. On the basis of his experience with government reorganization in Georgia, he has become a lead-

ing advocate of what is called the one-step process.[39] In the Middle East, he wants to devise an "overall settlement rather than resuming Mr. Kissinger's step-by-step approach."[40] He contends that with Soviet coöperation we can achieve "the ultimate solution" there.[41] He aims at achieving an "ultimate and final and complete resolution of New York City's problems, fiscally."[42]

Predictable, Uniform, Simple

Who can object to making governmental policy predictable so that people know what to expect?

Predictability is preferable, but is it possible? To be more precise, is predictability for one agency (and its clients) compatible with predictability for others?

Is predictability consistent with uniformity, another managerial quality that President Carter seeks? One could get broad agreement, for instance, on the desirability of smoothing out the economic cycle by maintaining a steady low level of unemployment. A major instrument used to accomplish this objective is varying the level of government spending. Immediately it becomes evident that predictability in employment (assuming that it could be achieved) is mutually exclusive with predictability in expenditure policy. Similarly, predictability for recipients of governmental subsidies means that all who meet the qualifying conditions receive the guaranteed sum. However, predictability for governmental expenditures (and, quite possibly, for taxpayers) requires fixed dollar limits, not open-ended entitlements. Yet if there are limits, potential beneficiaries cannot know in advance how much they will receive. Since all policy results cannot be predictable, decisions about whose life will be predictable and whose won't are political as well as administrative.

The same is true for uniformity and simplicity. Uniformity on one criterion—say, population—means diversity on other criteria, such as wealth or race or geography. Imagine that President Carter wishes to make good his promise to subsidize the arts, an intention we would like to see realized. Will money be allocated by population (which favors urban density), by area (which favors rural folk), by need (which favors those who are doing the least), or by past performance (which means that those who have will get more)? A uniform policy means that all these differences cannot simultaneously be taken into account.

Comprehensiveness, in the sense of fundamental and inclusive change, often contradicts predictability and simplicity. Fundamental changes, precisely because they are far-reaching, are un-

likely to be predictable. That is how the cost of the food-stamp program grew from an expected few hundred million dollars to more than $8 billion; it is also how indexing Social Security against inflation had the unanticipated consequence of (among other things) threatening to bankrupt the system. Thus, acting inclusively, so as to consider all (or almost all) factors impinging on a particular problem at a specific time, is, by its very nature, opposed to predictability, which requires that programs established in the past not be undone in the near future. But zero-base budgeting, the epitome of comprehensiveness, requires reëxamination of all major programs every year, the very opposite of predictability.

With Slices for All, How Large a Pie?

Uniformity also lives uneasily with comprehensiveness. Programs that are both uniform and comprehensive may be too expensive. For example, if public housing must be provided everywhere on the same basis or not at all, there may be no public housing. Similarly, a desire to have a uniform level of benefits across all welfare programs for all eligible citizens might lead to a choice between much higher taxes or much lower benefits. "Cashing out" all benefits from food stamps to Medicaid and Medicare might add up to so large a sum that it would not be voted by Congress. Hence, the choice might be between a variety of disparate programs or much lower levels of benefits. Upgrading all eligibles to the highest level of benefits will increase costs, and downgrading all to the lowest level will increase anger. Thus uniformity may come at too high a price in suffering or in opposition.

A word should be said about the relationship between uniformity and individuality. We do not always equate fairness with being treated like everybody else; we would, on occasion, like to be treated as individuals. To be uniform, regulations must place people into large and homogeneous categories. Every effort to take account of special characteristics in the population leads to its further sub-division and to additional provisions in the regulations. It is this effort to treat people in terms of their individual characteristics that leads to the proliferation of rules and regulations.

President Carter's desire for uniformity has led him to advocate a single principle of organization whereby administrative agencies are formed on the basis of function or purpose.[43] He would have all activities involving education or health or welfare

or crime, to mention but a few, in the same large organization. As a general rule, one can confidently say that no single principle or criterion is good for every purpose. Suppose that reducing dependency on welfare is a major purpose of the Carter administration. Would this mean that education for employment, rehabilitation in prisons, improvement of health, mitigation of alcoholism, and Lord knows what else should go under welfare?

The New Look: Top-Light and Bottom-Heavy

Carter's strain toward simplicity has led him to advocate reorganization of the federal government. Leaving aside campaign rhetoric about 1,900 federal agencies (a sum that equates the tiny and trivial with the huge and important), reducing the number of agencies at the top of the hierarchy necessarily increases the number at the bottom. If there were only 10 big departments, each could have 190 sub-units, and if there were 10 at each level, an issue would have to go through 19 bureaus before it was decided. The President might find this simpler because fewer people would be reporting directly to him. But he also might discover that finding out what is going on is more difficult. The existence of gigantic departments makes it difficult for anyone—Congress, secretaries, interest groups, citizens—to see inside. Conflicts between different departments about overlapping responsibilities and conflicts revealing important differences are submerged under a single departmental view.

One of the few things that can be said about organization in general is the very thing President Carter denies—namely, that a considerable quantity of redundancy (yes, overlap and duplication) must be built into any enterprise.[44] When we want to make sure an activity is accomplished, as in our lunar missions, we build in alternative mechanisms for doing the same thing so that one can take over when the other (or others) fail. Efficiency, the principle of least effort, must be coupled with reliability, the probability that a given act will be performed. A naive notion of efficiency, for example, would suggest that the elderly and the infirm be provided with either a visiting service or an office to which they can come or call. The more one wishes to assure that services to the elderly are actually delivered, however, the more one will invest in multiple methods. Of course, there must be a limit to redundancy; but if we ever actually succeeded in eliminating all overlap and duplication, most things would work only once and some things not at all. It is ironic that in the public sector, administrative reforms often aim at monopoly or concen-

tration of power, while reforms in the private sector often aim at competition or dispersion of power.[45] Our constitutional mechanisms for coping with abuse of power, the separation of powers, and checks and balances are, after all, forms of redundancy. The House and Senate and Presidency overlap in jurisdiction and duplicate functions. That is why they quarrel and why we have been safe.

Carter's criteria cannot guide choice. Their proverbial character—look before you leap, but he who hesitates is lost—becomes apparent when they are paired with equally desirable criteria: the elimination of overlap and duplication detracts from reliability; predictability must go with adaptability; uniformity is worthy but so is recognition of individual differences. President Carter's criteria for decision-making, we conclude, are individually contradictory and mutually incompatible.

Zero-Base Budgeting

The practical embodiment of Jimmy Carter's administrative theory is zero-base budgeting. Here, if anywhere, we can learn what it would mean for him to practice what he preaches. Imagine one of us deciding whether to buy a tie or kerchief. A simple task, one might think. Suppose, however, that organizational rules mandate comprehensiveness; we are required to alter our entire wardrobe as a unit. If *everything* must be rearranged when *one item* is altered, the probability is low that we will do anything. Being caught between revolution (change in everything) and resignation (change in nothing) has little to recommend it. Yet this is what a zero-base, start-from-scratch, comprehensive approach requires. If one could actually start from scratch each year, the only zero part of the budget would be its predictability, for zero-base budgeting is a-historical. The past, as reflected in the budgetary base (common expectations as to amounts and types of funding), is explicitly rejected. Everything at every period is subject to searching scrutiny. As a result, calculations become unmanageable. Figuring out how everything relates to everything else or, worse still, how other things would look if most things were changed, defeats every best effort. Consequently, attempts to apply intelligence to programs about which something can and needs to be done are defeated by mounds of paper. The trivial drowns out the important because if everything must be examined, nothing can receive special attention. What did Carter do?

According to the originator of zero-base budgeting, the Governor concentrated his time on "reviewing policy questions, major

increases and decreases in existing programs, new programs and capital expenditure, and a few specific packages and rankings where there appeared to be problems." In other words, he devoted his time and talent to increases and decreases from the previous year and a few problem areas, just as his predecessors had done.[46]

How Well Did It Work in Georgia?

Interviews with participants in zero-base budgeting in Georgia (aside from showing that 85 per cent thought no shifts in spending had been made and the other 15 per cent thought shifts had occurred but were unable to recall any) reveal that, when fiscal conditions changed in 1974 and 1975, Carter asked for entirely new budget submissions.[47] Why? The departmental budget analysts in Georgia explained that their priority rankings changed under different funding levels. But the point is that a budgetary process must be able to accommodate change; if it has to be altered every time funding levels change, then zero-base budgeting is really a cover term for unknown and unspecified future procedures.

The main product of zero-base budgeting is, literally, a list of objectives. Rarely, however, do resources remain beyond the first few. The experience of the various federal commissions on national priorities, for instance, is that there is no point in listing 846 or even 79 national objectives because almost all the money is gone after the first few are taken care of. If you allow us one or two national budget priorities—say social security supported entirely from general revenues—you can skip the others because there won't be anything left to support them. Carter knows this. But he would argue that zero-base budgeting requires agencies to supply alternatives. Unless agencies are rewarded for reducing the size of their programs, however, they will manipulate their priorities, placing politically sensitive and otherwise essential items at the bottom, so as to force superiors to increase their income. This might explain why Carter did not lower the zero-base cutoff point to include lower priority items when there was an increase in funds or raise this point when there was a decrease in funds.[48]

On balance, the people who conducted the interviews feel that the zero-base system has benefited Georgia's administration because it increased information about, and participation in, the budgetary process. However, these increases might just as well have resulted from the introduction of *any* novel procedure which

centers attention on the budget. The investigators also believe that as the participants gain more experience, shortcomings will be overcome. Perhaps; it is always possible to believe that more of the same will lead to improvement.

Measuring "Success" in the Carter Era

The overwhelming emphasis that President Carter places on procedural instruments could leave his administration vulnerable to massive displacement of goals; that is, it could result in having success defined, at least within his administration, by degree of governmental effort rather than by degree of social accomplishment. To use prisons as an example: the amount agencies spend, the number of new programs they initiate, and the uniformity of their procedures could replace increase in rehabilitation or reduction in crime as measures of success. That is how agencies succeed in making the variables they can control—i.e., their own efforts and procedures—the criteria against which they are measured.

By putting the emphasis on agreement about objectives, as Carter does, critical problems of how to relate people and activities so that citizens get good results tend to be subsumed under generalities about the desirability of having objectives. If public agencies must have objectives, they prefer a greater rather than a lesser number, so that the consequences of their activities are likely to fit under one of them. Moreover, the objectives of public agencies tend to be multiple and conflicting because different people want different things. Consequently, the objective of limiting the costs of medical care can (and does) coexist with the opposing objective of increasing the quantity and quality of such care. Reconciling these differences is not made easier by telling bureaucrats that their strategic behavior—staking out multiple objectives so they can always claim they have achieved something—has become sanctified as a virtue.

Why, if our views have any credence, has Carter come to hold untenable beliefs about procedures for making policy? Perhaps they were inculcated at Annapolis; but one could just as well argue that he chose to go there because he wanted an instrumental approach to decision-making.[49] No doubt his father's influence was important ("My daddy . . . was a meticulous planner like me."),[50] but this could have become mere compulsiveness instead of a well-developed pattern of thought and work. No candidate since Herbert Hoover, the Great Engineer,[51] would have thought it important to talk to the public about so arcane

a subject as zero-base budgeting, going so far as to include it in his five-minute television spots last year. Perhaps these views make sense to Carter under the circumstances within which he has operated in the years since he has become a public figure.

Let us remove the burden from Carter and place it where it belongs, on ourselves, by asking why a highly intelligent political executive might interpret his experiences so as to reinforce his belief in an instrumental-cum-technological view of public policy-making. Why, to us, does Carter seem to know worse rather than to know better?

At the outset we can dispose of the cynical view that Carter's ideas on procedures are purely political—that favoring efficiency, opposing the "bureaucratic mess" in Washington, promising more service at less cost[52] are simply non-controversial positions that project a useful image of a candidate as an effective manager. Reorganization not only suggests rationality, it is also a useful cover for gaining control over positions and agencies that would increase the proposer's power (*viz.*, Carter's proposal that the President appoint the chairman of the Federal Reserve Board).[53] Coördination is often a synonym for coercion. To all this we reply, "Yes, but." Yes, politicians are (and ought to be) political, but Carter pursues his procedural proposals above and beyond the call of duty or interest—and he acts on them. No one who has read his gubernatorial messages or observed the consistency and tenacity with which he personally pursued zero-base budgeting, reorganization, and all the rest can doubt his commitment.[54] Carter cares and Carter acts. Why, then, does he persevere with unsuitable procedures for public policy-making?

Why Is Carter a Good Executive?

Carter knows himself well enough to believe that he would avoid many pitfalls of his procedures by applying himself to Washington's problems with energy, intelligence, and a demand for excellence.[55] We agree. In fact, we think it is these attributes—and not his procedural principles—that have brought him whatever success he has enjoyed as an executive. (Other life-forms experience a phenomenon called "adverse selection," in which general success is mistakenly attributed to specific attributes that are then wrongly selected as worthy of propagation.)

Yet if Carter is mistaken in his procedural approach, as we think he is, he may be on solid ground in an area that we have not covered—the area of public confidence. He recognizes (and has emphasized) that citizens have a right to understand their

government if they are being asked to support it; simplicity and predictability of governmental activity could help in achieving that support. If citizens are to regard government as fair and equitable, their perception that services uniformly treat like people alike might well give them that impression. Carter's concern for how government looks to the people might motivate him to prefer procedures to improve that appearance.

A concern for appearances as a prerequisite for obtaining support to undertake action apparently animates Carter's behavior in other areas as well. His three election campaigns (for the state legislature, for governor, and for president) may be fairly characterized, we believe, as socially conservative, whereas his actions in office have thus far been politically progressive. He takes care to identify himself with the social stance of the electorate so that citizens will feel he is one of them—even if all of them will not be able to agree with programs to distribute income or services in favor of the disadvantaged. As governor of Georgia, his need to keep close to the electorate limited his financial aspirations for state spending; but he did spend new monies for the rural poor, for the mentally handicapped, for prisoners, for those who had the least. After Watergate, no one should look down upon efforts to improve the appearance as well as the performance of government.

But what happens if appearance goes one way and performance the other? Suppose, in other words, that the demands of public policy-making are at odds with the appearance of order and neatness. Objectives are often multiple and conflicting; varied interest groups formulate and reformulate their goals and alliances; there is no single organizing principle good for all times and purposes, nor a single locus of authority in a federal political system. Symmetry, simplicity, uniformity—hence understandability and predictability—may not be achievable if we also want a welfare state and pluralistic politics. How much confusion and complexity is *built in* the things we want government to do and the ways a democratic society insists on doing them? The Carter administration will enable us to put this hypothesis to the test.

We are concerned that President Carter will pursue procedures regardless of their efficacy, and that he will regard opposition to his procedural prescriptions as, if not exactly the work of the devil, at least irrational, a product of ignorance and special interests, not subject to the usual rules of evidence. The comprehensive, scientific approach, which is supposed to work to promote harmony, has as a basic assumption the lack of conflict. If agreement does not result from openness, if seeming support for

long-range goals breaks down under short-range pressures, will President Carter be able to tolerate the frustration?

His own recipe for controlling conflict is to make it boil over; comprehensive change, in his view, forces opposing interests into public debate where Presidents can confront and overcome them. But how often can this be done? Agitating some of the interests some of the time is not the same as upsetting most of them most of the time. Interests are people, lots of people who depend on government, the very same people to whom Carter must appeal for support. If he can space his appeals out so that he is not fighting on every front at once, he may have a chance; but if he has to fight simultaneously on many fronts, he (and the nation with him) may be in for a difficult time.

"He-The-People"

If he does not get his way, President Carter has promised to go directly to the people. He wishes both to incorporate and transcend group interests. Incorporation works by including virtually all groups in the initial stages of policy formation. Through coöptation, he hopes to commit them to support his programs (or at least not to oppose them vigorously). Transcendence works by investing hierarchy with morality. In order to reflect the people's will, the best way to organize government is to make it democratic at the bottom and centralized at the top.[56] The President, then, as chief hierarch and ultimate definer of the public interest, leaps over group interests through direct contact with the populace. President Carter would rather interpret the inchoate desires of the mass of people than bargain over who gets what the government offers. Nor will he content himself with being the mediator of contending interests, merely keeping the score and announcing the winners. Group interests breed divisiveness, while the public interest breeds unity. Instead, "he-the-people" will interpret their victory.

President Carter's theory of governing suggests opportunities for leadership but also obstacles to success. To reorganize the executive branch, he will have to overcome the clienteles it serves and the representatives they elect. To put through major reforms, he will need financial support from a Congress accustomed to making its own budget. Should his initiatives falter, private interests may appear to have triumphed over the public interest. According to his own philosophy, he will be compelled to appeal to the people to protect his programs. But in the end, even the people may prove ungrateful; for if they fail the President, it will

appear that they have given in to their private interests instead of standing up for their public duties.

The most worrisome aspect of Jimmy Carter's theory of public policy-making is his assumption that discussion will lead to agreement on long-term objectives, which will assure support for present programs. Carter's views on conflict could survive only if past objectives determined future administration. This view of policy politics is untenable because the price of agreement is likely to be vagueness and because administration involves altering ends by changing means. When specific acts require a choice between how much inflation versus how much employment, or how much preservation of natural resources versus how much consumption, it becomes evident that agreement in general need not mean (and has often not meant) agreement in particular. Since conditions change, the agreements that Carter negotiates in time of plenty may have to be renegotiated in times of austerity. Administration of programs would be of little interest if it did not involve continuous redefinition of objectives.

Jimmy Carter as President

What, then, is Jimmy Carter likely to do as President? Contingency may overwhelm concern. Another huge oil price increase, a resurgence of inflation, or a military involvement may do more to shape what a President will do than his own initial ideas worked out under much different circumstances. Personality may prevail over policy. From listening to his policy pronouncements, who would have predicted Franklin D. Roosevelt's eagerness to abandon the deflationary, low-spending policies he advocated during his first presidential campaign? Confronted with crises, policies frequently pass away, but long-learned modes of problem-solving often remain. FDR's administration was characterized by eclecticism. He had a willingness to try and a readiness to abandon programs, an incorrigible optimism as well as a love of conflict, even when (or precisely because) it led to contradictions that gave him room to maneuver. These operative administrative theories proved more permanent indicators of his behavior than his past policies. So too, we think, Jimmy Carter's theory of governing will better indicate his behavior in office than what he says about substantive issues.

Like most Americans, we voted for Carter and worried about him at the same time. Contrary to our fears, there is evidence that Carter can (and does) learn from experience. On busing, for example (we are not passing judgment on the correctness of

his stand but rather on his way of thinking about the problem), Carter realized that wealthy parents often avoid the policy by sending their children to private schools or by moving their family out of the area. Despite good intentions, it is mostly the black children who get bused and pay the price. The policy did not achieve the immediate objective of school integration or the more distant objective of better school performance. Carter's proposal has been to substitute a voluntary program for the mandatory one. He places emphasis upon changing the school system from within by getting black persons in administrative and teaching jobs.[57]

Another area in which his policy indicates a positive response to past unsuccessful attempts is his handling of racial and civil disturbances. As Governor of Georgia, he discovered that the normal, massive presence of state troopers during civil disorders not only served to aggravate the situation but used up enormous police resources. So he set up biracial community civil-disorder units composed of three persons dressed in civilian clothes. After the disorder, the units were replaced by permanent local committees.[58] When Carter tried to influence the choice of legislative leaders in Georgia, he learned this caused more trouble than it was worth. He vowed not to do it with Congress. Many more examples exist. The question is whether Carter will apply the same standards to procedures, including procedures for handling conflict, as he does to policies.

Read this as a cautionary tale for President Carter and his supporters. There is, after all, no reason to believe that former President Ford followed better procedures or even that he paid much attention to procedures at all. Because Carter is explicit about his own philosophy, because he cares about procedures, we have been able to be critical. But people who care are also likely to perform. If they care too much, however, they might substitute rigidity for right action. Having been forewarned, perhaps Carter will be forearmed to search for weaknesses in his strengths.

NOTES

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3. "Head-to-Head on the Issues," *U.S. News and World Report*, September 13, 1976, p. 21.
4. "Issues Reference Book," p. 20.
5. "Issues Reference Book," p. 13.
6. "Interview on the Issues—What Carter Believes," *U.S. News and World Report*, May 24, 1976, p. 19; and "Issues Reference Book," p. 30.
7. "Issues Reference Book," p. 13.
8. Jimmy Carter, *Why Not the Best?*, Broadman Press, 1975, p. 147.
9. "Jimmy Carter: Not Just Peanuts," *Time*, March 8, 1976, p. 19.
10. Stated by Stuart Eisenstat, Carter's policy advisor, in *National Journal Reports*, July 24, 1976, p. 1029.
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16. *U.S. News and World Report*, May 24, 1976, p. 23; and July 26, 1976, p. 18.
17. *U.S. News and World Report*, May 24, 1976, p. 18.
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20. "Issues Reference Book," p. 15.
21. "Carter: Seeking Clearer Goals," *Time*, May 10, 1976, p. 24.
22. *U.S. News and World Report*, May 24, 1976, p. 19.
23. *National Journal Reports*, July 17, 1976, p. 997.
24. "Excerpts from the Interview with Carter on his Concepts in Foreign Policy," *New York Times*, July 7, 1976, p. 12.
25. "Carter Says Ford Fails to Check Nation's 'Drift,' " *New York Times*, August 18, 1976, p. 1.
26. Carter, *Why Not the Best?*, p. 114.
27. Jimmy Carter, National Press Club, Announcement Speech for Democratic Presidential Nomination, December 12, 1974.
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29. *U.S. News and World Report*, September 13, 1976, p. 20.
30. "Carter Tells Film Stars about Poverty in the South," *New York Times*, August 24, 1976, p. 17.
31. *National Journal Reports*, July 17, 1976, p. 998.
32. *National Journal Reports*, July 17, 1976, p. 999.
33. "State Structural Reforms," *National Journal Reports*, April 5, 1975, p. 506.
34. *National Journal Reports*, July 17, 1976, p. 999.
35. *U.S. News and World Report*, September 13, 1976, p. 21.
36. *Wall Street Journal*, April 2, 1976, p. 23.
37. Eleanor Randolf, "Carter Hits 'Lone Ranger' Foreign Policy of Kissinger," *Chicago Tribune*, June 24, 1976, p. 5.
38. Carter, Announcement Speech, December 12, 1974.
39. *National Journal Reports*, April 5, 1975, p. 506.
40. *U.S. News and World Report*, July 26, 1976, p. 18.
41. "Where Jimmy Carter Stands on Foreign Policy," *Chicago Tribune*, May 8, 1976, p. 10.
42. "Excerpts from an Interview with Jimmy Carter," *New York Times*, March 31, 1976, p. 20.
43. This principle has had a long history, having been proposed in 1911 by the President's

Commission on Economy and Efficiency: "Only by grouping services according to their character can substantial progress be made in eliminating duplication." Quoted in Peri E. Arnold, "Executive Reorganization and Administrative Theory: the Origin of the Managerial Presidency," paper presented at 1976 Annual Meeting of American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 1976, p. 6.

44. Martin Landau, "Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap," *Public Administration Review*, vol. XXIX, no. 4, July/August 1969, pp. 346-358.

45. Lewis Dexter has emphasized that modern Western society has followed the route of competition not monopoly as a means to clarify issues and procedures. He cites the example that U.S. anti-trust laws are "deliberately designed to impose redundancy and duplication on industry." See Lewis Anthony Dexter, "The Advantages of Some Duplication and Ambiguity in Senate Committee Jurisdictions," p. 174. First staff report, Temporary Select Committee of United States Senate on Committee Jurisdiction, chairman Adlai Stevenson, issued September, 1976.

46. Peter Phyrr, *Zero-Base Budgeting: A Practical Management Tool for Evaluating Expenses*, New York, John Wiley and Sons, 1973, p. 97. Quoted in Aaron Wildavsky, *Budgeting: A Comparative Theory of Budgetary Processes*, Little, Brown and Co., 1975, p. 295.

47. George S. Nimier and Roger H. Hermanson, "A Look at Zero-Base Budgeting—The Georgia Experience," *Atlanta Economic Review*, July-August, 1976, pp. 5-12. In 1974 there was an increase in available funds, and in 1975 a decrease.

48. Nimier and Hermanson, pp. 5-12.

49. See, for example, Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover's speech delivered in Brooklyn on April 9, 1958, p. 5, in which he complains about inefficiency in bureaucracy: "If over-organization lengthens our lead time we must heed Thoreau's cry of 'simplify, simplify.' "

50. Quoted in Bruce Mazlish and Edwin Diamond, "Thrice Born: A Psycho-history of Jimmy Carter's Rebirth," *New York*, no. 9, no. 35, August 30, 1976, p. 32.

51. Hoover was an unrelenting champion of organization by "major purpose under single-headed responsibility" as a means for making agencies easier to manage and more efficient. See Peri E. Arnold, "Executive Reorganization," pp. 13-14, 20. Securing broad reorganization authority subject to Congressional veto is also the approach Carter took in Georgia and hopes to repeat in Washington. See *U.S. News and World Report*, July 26, 1976, p. 17.

52. Although Carter, like any good engineer, knows it is not possible to maximize simultaneously on more than one dimension, his language sometimes suggests the opposite: ". . . I assure you that my primary concern will be providing the maximum amount of services for the least cost." State of Georgia, *Governor's Reorganization Message*, March 1, 1971, p. 18.

53. The Reorganization Act in Georgia, for instance, removed an entire administrative level, leaving those positions open to appointment by the Governor. See T. McN. Simpson, III, "Georgia State Administration: Jimmy Carter's Contribution," paper delivered at 1973 Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, November 1-3, p. 10.

54. For a discussion of Carter's contribution to Georgia administration, see Simpson, p. 10.

55. Carter's qualities as an executive are evoked in the instructions he gave to members of the study group involved in making recommendations for reorganization in Georgia: "Studies of this nature are a full-time job. You cannot drop by to chat with a department head for a few minutes and then go back and write a report. If that were all that is required, I would do the study myself during the next two months. Somebody has to get out in the field and find out what is really happening and why. That is not a part-time job; it means spending eight hours a day working with the state employees and another four or five hours that night analyzing what was learned. It means writing and rewriting the report so that each point is clearly and concisely stated, backed by adequate detail, able to stand up to any question and practical for implementation." State of Georgia, *Governor's Reorganization Message*, p. 18.

56. In New York City, John Lindsay "rationalized" the city administration by consolidating and eliminating all intermediate structures, thus forming the "Office of Collective Bargaining." It soon became the sole target of public-employee union demands, thereby greatly strengthening the union's position. In Jack Douglas's apt description, the rationalization "swept away all the hedgerows behind which he [Lindsay] could have hidden." See Jack D. Douglas, "Urban Politics and Public Employee Unions," in *Public Employee Unions: A Study of the Crisis in Public Sector Labor Relations*, Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco, California, 1976, p. 103.

57. "Issues Reference Book," p. 21.

58. "Issues Reference Book," p. 21.

BACKGROUND BOOKS

THE PRESIDENCY

To understand the institution of the presidency as it has evolved in the United States, it helps to read as many books as one can about individual Presidents. Much in the American experience has depended on the character and talents of that man in the White House.

Books about the 38 men who have variously diminished, enhanced, and, in some cases, abused the power of the presidency range from the superb to the mediocre. Many Presidents—Theodore Roosevelt among them—have yet to receive first-class scholarly treatment.

In chronological order, after the collected letters and biographies of the Virginia dynasty and the Adamses,* we have such major studies of Presidents and their times as Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s **Age of Jackson** (Little, Brown, 1945, cloth, 1963, paper).

Andrew Jackson made the presidency, in the Roman phrase, "the tribune of the people." Schlesinger gives us a life-size portrait of "Old Hickory," an analysis of his frontier-style presidency, and a class interpretation of the tumultuous politics of the Jacksonian Age.

Charles Grier Sellers, in **James K. Polk, Jacksonian, 1795–1843** and **James K. Polk, Continentalist, 1843–1846** (Princeton, 1957 & 1966), chronicles most of the life of Jackson's successor, the controversial former congressman and governor of Tennessee, who led the United States into its first foreign military adventure, the war with Mexico.

Historical treatments of Abraham Lincoln, the nation's closest approximation to a secular saint, have ranged widely in tone, from hero-worship to the debunking of what Richard Hofstadter described as Lincoln's "self-made myth."

Carl Sandburg's massive **Abraham Lincoln: The Prairie Years and The War Years** (Harcourt, Brace, 1939, 6 vol., cloth; 1954, abr. ed. 1 vol., cloth; 1974, paper; Dell, 1959–75, 3 vol., paper) evokes the man, his humor, and the deep sorrows of the Civil War with a wealth of anecdotal detail and quoted letters.

But for World War I, Woodrow Wilson might have gone down in history as a domestic reformer. Instead, his dramatic postwar efforts on behalf of the League of Nations have eclipsed his productive first "New Democracy" administration. Perhaps the best portrait is drawn in Alexander and Juliette George's **Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study** (John Day, 1956; Dover, 1964, reprint). Their analysis of the impact on the future President of a strict Calvinistic creed and a demanding Presbyterian-minister father remains the most successful "psychohistorical" treatment of any President.

The frequent dismissal of the Presidents of the 1920s as barely worthy of notice can be a mistake. Robert K. Murray's scholarly **The Harding Era: Warren G. Harding and His Administration** (Univ. of Minn., 1969), based on the Harding papers, substantially revises the orthodox view of the portly Ohioan. Murray describes him as "an extremely hard-working President" who had "a superb feel for the right political action at the right time." In **A Puritan in Babylon: The Story of Calvin Coolidge** (Macmillan, 1938; Peter Smith, 1973, reprint), William Allen White, journalist-biographer par excellence, relates "this obviously limited but honest, shrewd,

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sentimental, resolute American primitive" to his time, "those gorgeous and sophisticated Roaring Twenties."

In some ways, the most tragic President was Herbert Hoover, elected in the boom year of 1928. His single term ended with the Great Depression. Eugene Lyons's **Herbert Hoover: A Biography** (Doubleday, 1964) covers Hoover's presidency and his later career of distinguished public service.

Countless books have been written about Franklin D. Roosevelt. A good single-volume study is Rexford Guy Tugwell's intimate **The Democratic Roosevelt: A Biography of Franklin D. Roosevelt** (Doubleday, 1957, cloth; Penguin, 1969, paper). The author, a major New Deal figure, concludes that no one ever caught more than a glimpse of FDR's decision-making process, which "went on in his most secret mind."

In **Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox** (Harcourt Brace, 1956, cloth, 1963, paper), James MacGregor Burns discusses FDR's artful domestic policy leadership up to World War II, taking his title from Machiavelli's characterization of the Prince who must be "a fox to recognize traps and a lion to frighten wolves." In a second volume, **Roosevelt: The Soldier of Freedom** (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970, cloth, 1973, paper), Burns finds duality between the "man of principle, of ideals, of faith, crusading for a distant vision" and the "man of *Realpolitik,* of prudence, of narrow, manageable, short-run goals, intent always on protecting his power and authority."

The three volumes of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.'s **Age of Roosevelt** (Houghton Mifflin, 1957–60, cloth, 1976, paper) take FDR only through his first term. In **The Crisis of the Old Order,** the author finds the New Deal's origins in the social and economic chaos after World War I, bringing the story through the elections of 1932. In **The Coming of the New Deal** and **The Politics of Upheaval,** he analyzes the evolution of the presidency as FDR developed his special political style. Two more volumes are in preparation.

We have, as yet, no broad scholarly biographies of the Presidents who have served in the White House since Roosevelt, but there are many excellent treatments of their operating styles, foreign and domestic policies, relations with Congress, and ways of running the White House.

Most retrospective accounts by newsmen and other contemporary observers of the presidency-in-action (down to those by White House dogkeepers and seamstresses) fade quickly. A surprising exception is Irwin H. (Ike) Hoover's **Forty-Two Years in the White House** (Houghton-Mifflin, 1934). This collection of backstage anecdotes and personal observations by a man who joined the White House custodial staff in 1891 provides some legitimate historical footnotes.

Worthwhile "insider" literature for more recent administrations includes **The Ordeal of Power: A Political Memoir of the Eisenhower Years** by Emmet John Hughes (Atheneum, 1963, cloth, 1975, paper) and **Decision-Making in the White House: The Olive Branch or the Arrows** (Columbia, 1963, cloth & paper) by Theodore C. Sorensen. Hughes served as a White House speechwriter. He analyzes the weaknesses as well as the strengths of his sometime employer: Ike's staff system, for example, "essentially left to others the initiative for both information and execution." Sorensen, one of John F. Kennedy's closest advisors, seeks to answer, without complete success, the question "How does a President make up his mind?"

Two other insider books by former aides to Lyndon Baines Johnson deserve

mention. George E. Reedy's **The Twilight of the Presidency** (World, 1970, cloth; New American Library, 1971, paper) is a considered attack on the once-revered concept of the "strong presidency," which took FDR as its model and, as Reedy sees it, led LBJ into serious excesses. He observes that during both the Johnson and early Nixon years, the President was "treated with all of the reverence due a monarch"; somehow, he argues, the office must be brought back to human scale.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.'s study of the office, **A Presidential Nation** (Norton, 1975), is another revisionist interpretation with little of the memoir about it. Califano faults other parts of the federal system for having "lost the will and institutional capability to provide checks and balances to the exercise of presidential power."

The Nixon period dramatically brought home the importance of the President's psychological make-up. Toward the end of Richard Nixon's first term, political scientist James David Barber published **The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House** (Prentice-Hall, 1972, cloth & paper), in which he develops an elaborate personality typology for 20th-century Presidents, beginning with William Howard Taft. His analysis of Nixon (Active-Negative), whose "emotional energy is taken up with resisting the 'temptation' to lash out at his enemies," was written long before Watergate.

A growing literature on special aspects of the presidency, dating back several decades, includes Richard F. Fenno, Jr.'s **The President's Cabinet: An Analysis of the Period from Wilson to Eisenhower** (Harvard, cloth, 1959; Vintage, paper, 1967). This gloomy study of how the bureaucracy weakens the cabinet system suggests why the President's own staff later grew in size and responsibility.

The electoral process dominates Edward Stanwood's **A History of the Presidency,** first published in 1898 and later in several revisions carrying the original narrative to 1928 (Houghton Mifflin, 1898; Kelley, 1975, reprint). Stanwood traces, administration by administration, the rise of parties, the transformation of the electoral college, the emergence of party conventions, and party realignments. An up-to-date supplement is **Presidential Elections: Strategies of American Electoral Politics** by Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky (Scribner's, 1976, 4th ed., cloth & paper). This sophisticated text examines the difficult process of restructuring the presidential nominating system since 1968.

Broader studies of the Chief Executive began to be read in earnest with the appearance of Harold J. Laski's **The American Presidency: An Interpretation** (Harper, 1940; Greenwood, 1972, reprint). Laski, who taught for years at Harvard, saw the presidency through an Englishman's eyes, noting that the British system "makes responsibility for action clear and direct and intelligible," whereas, between the U.S. Congress and the White House, ultimate responsibility often remains ambiguous.

In the wake of Watergate and Vietnam, much recent scholarship calls for limitations on the Office of the President. Erwin C. Hargrove, in **The Power of the Modern Presidency** (Temple Univ., 1974, cloth; Knopf, 1974, paper), examines what he terms "the crisis of the contemporary presidency" in the areas of foreign policy, domestic policy, and the President's relations with the bureaucracy. One check on power that Hargrove urges is "for Congress to open up the White House" by requiring top presidential staffers to seek Senate confirmation and to testify before congressional committees.

Newly issued last year is an update of

AS PRESIDENTS SEE THEMSELVES

Thirteen Presidents have left memoirs of one sort or another, exclusive of diaries and collected letters. According to **The Presidents of the United States 1789–1962,** a bibliography compiled for the Library of Congress by Donald H. Mudge: "John Adams did not get beyond the Revolution, nor Jefferson beyond his return to the United States from France in 1790. Van Buren's is considerably longer and more diffuse, but it was left incomplete before it reached the Presidency. Fillmore's is only a brief sketch of his youth. Lincoln prepared only some brief sketches for the press. Grant's **Personal Memoirs** [Webster, 1885–86; Peter Smith, 1969, reprint] deserve their fame, but death broke in as he struggled toward Appomattox. Theodore Roosevelt's **Autobiography** [Macmillan, 1913; Octagon, 1973, reprint] includes his retrospect of his administration and is an outstanding achievement. Coolidge's of 1929 is bare of political or administrative detail. The full-dress **Memoirs** of Hoover [Macmillan, 1951–52, 3 vols.] and of Truman [Doubleday, 1955–56, 2 vols.] represent a new departure in Presidential writing and must always remain a primary source of the first importance." Eisenhower covered his wartime experiences (1942–45) in **Crusade in Europe** (Doubleday, 1948) and his White House years in **Mandate for Change, 1953–1956** and **Waging Peace, 1956–1961** (Doubleday, 1963–65). Lyndon Johnson's **Vantage Point: Perspective of the Presidency, 1963–1969** (Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1971, cloth; Popular Library, 1972, paper), written in Texas after he retired from public life, largely constitutes a defense of his administration. Nixon's memoirs are now in preparation at San Clemente.

Richard E. Neustadt's **Presidential Power: The Politics of Leadership with Reflections on Johnson and Nixon** (Wiley, 1976, cloth & paper). This classic, first published in 1960 and reportedly studied as a text by John F. Kennedy, puts it all together: the roots of presidential power, factors of personality and style, constitutional powers and limits, political opportunities and constraints.

Finally, we turn back to Edward S. Corwin's rigorous constitutional history of the presidency. The fourth edition of **The President, Office and Powers, 1787–1957** (New York Univ., 1957, cloth & paper) has now been supplemented by a collection of 12 essays by the late Princeton historian Corwin, **Presidential Power and the Constitution** (Cornell, 1976) edited by Richard Loss. These heavily footnoted essays may be hard going for the general reader. But those who stay the course will gain a deeper appreciation of the problems that today complicate the workings of America's greatest political invention: the democratically elected one-man executive who is at once monarch and commoner, premier and head of state.

—*Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr.*

EDITOR'S NOTE. *Mr. Cornwell, professor of political science at Brown University, is the author of* **Presidential Leadership of Public Opinion** *(Indiana Univ., 1965).*