

self-made Prince of the Holy Roman Empire, who served Ferdinand II as generalissimo until the Emperor deposed him, is an impressive scholarly achievement. It is also a good read. Showing us 17th-century court life and the battlefields of the Thirty Years' War as they would appear to a contemporary, Mann enables us to appreciate the sheer outlandishness of Wallenstein. In his inevitable isolation as he fought and connived for political stability, he seems a complex and uncannily modern figure.

THE OUTSIDERS: The Western Experience in India and China

by Rhoads Murphey
Univ. of Mich., 1977
299 pp., \$16.50
L of C 76-27279
ISBN 0-472-08679-0

In the 18th and 19th centuries, British, French, and Dutch imperialist enterprise established a string of uniform, hospitable "treaty ports" from India to Japan. In this bold interpretive account of the years 1850-1950, historian Murphey analyzes the impact of this system on the Asians. Reactions varied markedly with the local setting. In the smaller and insular states, the imperialist "capitals" (Singapore, Djakarta) generated new economic structures and national identification with the foreign enclaves. India, commercially underdeveloped, linguistically divided, and long torn by warfare under the alien Mughal regimes, succumbed to sweeping "Westernization." Only the Chinese, with a large, thriving, autonomous rural economy and a strong cultural identity, reacted vigorously against, rather than adapted to, the ways of the outsiders in the treaty ports.

THE UNMAKING OF A PRESIDENT: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam

by Herbert Y. Schandler
Princeton, 1977
419 pp., \$16.50
L of C 76-24297
ISBN 0-691-07586-7

Schandler, now a Library of Congress senior researcher, wrote the brief section of the original "Pentagon Papers" covering the 1968 U.S. policy crisis that followed Hanoi's surprise Tet attacks against South Vietnam's cities. Using fresh documentation, he has drawn a calm revisionist portrait of Lyndon Johnson and the administration "hawks" and "doves," who variously sought to exploit the shock of Tet to force changes in U.S. war strategy. Schandler shows that, contrary to most accounts, no sudden LBJ turnaround

ensued. The President's climactic March 31, 1968, speech, announcing a partial halt of U.S. bombing, was largely an effort to buy more time at home for existing policy. But Hanoi surprised LBJ by accepting his public offer to talk peace; thereafter, new Defense Secretary Clark Clifford, a disillusioned ex-hawk, adroitly moved in to limit U.S. commitments to the war.

**MODERN ECONOMIC
THOUGHT**

edited by Sidney Weintraub
Univ. of Pa., 1977
584 pp. \$25
L of C 76-20140
ISBN 0-8122-7712-0

Up-to-date coverage of the historical development and principal theoretical positions of "modern" economics, edited by an economist known for his broad erudition. Thirty contributors discuss the ideas put forth by nearly everyone of significance in the field, beginning with the "neoclassical synthesis" of Britain's Alfred Marshall (who reigned from Victoria's day to the end of World War I). The inventive theorists who followed were numerous and lively but overshadowed by John Maynard Keynes, the Englishman whose thinking helped shape Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal policies. The concluding chapter on radical economists covers Marxist analyses of capitalism, done by Europeans and by Americans Victor Perlo, Paul Sweezy, Paul Baran, Eugene Genovese, Samuel Bowles, and others. This hefty textbook can serve interested laymen as well as students; only occasionally does it demand special background.

**SECRETS, SPIES, AND
SCHOLARS: Blueprint of
the Essential CIA**

by Ray S. Cline
Acropolis, 1976, 294 pp. \$10
L of C 76-39650
ISBN 0-87491-046-3

A former deputy director of the CIA tells how the United States developed what was in his view "during the 1950s and 1960s the best intelligence system in the world." Accepting the need for "small-scale, selective, covert political action," Cline proposes separating clandestine operations from research and analysis. He would make all segments of the intelligence community accountable to the President and to the appropriate congressional committees. This didactic memoir adds a useful perspective on many of the recent intelligence exposés.