

self-made Prince of the Holy Roman Empire, who served Ferdinand II as generalissimo until the Emperor deposed him, is an impressive scholarly achievement. It is also a good read. Showing us 17th-century court life and the battlefields of the Thirty Years' War as they would appear to a contemporary, Mann enables us to appreciate the sheer outlandishness of Wallenstein. In his inevitable isolation as he fought and connived for political stability, he seems a complex and uncannily modern figure.

**THE OUTSIDERS: The Western Experience in India and China**

by Rhoads Murphey  
Univ. of Mich., 1977  
299 pp., \$16.50  
L of C 76-27279  
ISBN 0-472-08679-0

In the 18th and 19th centuries, British, French, and Dutch imperialist enterprise established a string of uniform, hospitable "treaty ports" from India to Japan. In this bold interpretive account of the years 1850-1950, historian Murphey analyzes the impact of this system on the Asians. Reactions varied markedly with the local setting. In the smaller and insular states, the imperialist "capitals" (Singapore, Djakarta) generated new economic structures and national identification with the foreign enclaves. India, commercially underdeveloped, linguistically divided, and long torn by warfare under the alien Mughal regimes, succumbed to sweeping "Westernization." Only the Chinese, with a large, thriving, autonomous rural economy and a strong cultural identity, reacted vigorously against, rather than adapted to, the ways of the outsiders in the treaty ports.

**THE UNMAKING OF A PRESIDENT: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam**

by Herbert Y. Schandler  
Princeton, 1977  
419 pp., \$16.50  
L of C 76-24297  
ISBN 0-691-07586-7

Schandler, now a Library of Congress senior researcher, wrote the brief section of the original "Pentagon Papers" covering the 1968 U.S. policy crisis that followed Hanoi's surprise Tet attacks against South Vietnam's cities. Using fresh documentation, he has drawn a calm revisionist portrait of Lyndon Johnson and the administration "hawks" and "doves," who variously sought to exploit the shock of Tet to force changes in U.S. war strategy. Schandler shows that, contrary to most accounts, no sudden LBJ turnaround