
RED STAR ON THE NILE: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship Since the June War
by Alvin Z. Rubinstein
Princeton, 1977, 383 pp.
\$25 cloth, \$9.95 paper
L of C 76-3021
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University of Pennsylvania political scientist Alvin Z. Rubinstein dissects Russian-Egyptian relations from the 1967 June war to the 1973 October war. He compares joint communiqués to the original Russian and Egyptian drafts and probes such diplomatic nuances as delegation exchange (envoys greeted on arrival or bade farewell by a lower-ranking official to indicate the host country's displeasure). His conclusion: Despite their advisory role, the Russians rarely enjoyed significant influence on Egyptian policy-making. Their superpower status in the region after their re-arming of Egypt (1968) came as a result of the invitation to bilateral talks on the Middle East extended to Moscow by Washington. Rubinstein's case study strongly implies that a Big Power, lacking direct military presence, cannot hope to control Third World "client" regimes.

THE RIGHTS OF YOUTH: American Colleges and Student Revolt, 1798-1815
by Steven J. Novak
Harvard, 1977, 218 pp. \$10
L of C 76-43109
ISBN 0-674-77016-1

When the "Sons of the Founders" entered Harvard, Yale, and other colleges serving the Republic at the turn of the 18th century, they brought with them strong nationalist feelings and a tendency to dissent learned at the knees of their Revolutionary fathers. Their broad support (except at William and Mary) of a strong federal government disappointed some of their elders, especially Thomas Jefferson. Their questioning of campus authority led college administrators, in the formative years 1798-1815, to turn away from the "free-thinking" disciplines (sciences, the study of politics) and to restore emphasis on traditional, "illiberal" education (Latin, Greek, theology).

WALLENSTEIN
by Golo Mann
Holt, 1976, 909 pp. \$22.50
L of C 76-4721
ISBN 0-03-091884-7

Despite Golo Mann's thorough illumination of every shred of evidence, much remains of the enigma that shrouded Albrecht Wenzel von Wallenstein in his lifetime (1583-1634). What does emerge vividly is an image of Europe torn by religious wars. This mammoth biography of the religious skeptic and

self-made Prince of the Holy Roman Empire, who served Ferdinand II as generalissimo until the Emperor deposed him, is an impressive scholarly achievement. It is also a good read. Showing us 17th-century court life and the battlefields of the Thirty Years' War as they would appear to a contemporary, Mann enables us to appreciate the sheer outlandishness of Wallenstein. In his inevitable isolation as he fought and connived for political stability, he seems a complex and uncannily modern figure.

THE OUTSIDERS: The Western Experience in India and China

by Rhoads Murphey
Univ. of Mich., 1977
299 pp., \$16.50
L of C 76-27279
ISBN 0-472-08679-0

In the 18th and 19th centuries, British, French, and Dutch imperialist enterprise established a string of uniform, hospitable "treaty ports" from India to Japan. In this bold interpretive account of the years 1850-1950, historian Murphey analyzes the impact of this system on the Asians. Reactions varied markedly with the local setting. In the smaller and insular states, the imperialist "capitals" (Singapore, Djakarta) generated new economic structures and national identification with the foreign enclaves. India, commercially underdeveloped, linguistically divided, and long torn by warfare under the alien Mughal regimes, succumbed to sweeping "Westernization." Only the Chinese, with a large, thriving, autonomous rural economy and a strong cultural identity, reacted vigorously against, rather than adapted to, the ways of the outsiders in the treaty ports.

THE UNMAKING OF A PRESIDENT: Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam

by Herbert Y. Schandler
Princeton, 1977
419 pp., \$16.50
L of C 76-24297
ISBN 0-691-07586-7

Schandler, now a Library of Congress senior researcher, wrote the brief section of the original "Pentagon Papers" covering the 1968 U.S. policy crisis that followed Hanoi's surprise Tet attacks against South Vietnam's cities. Using fresh documentation, he has drawn a calm revisionist portrait of Lyndon Johnson and the administration "hawks" and "doves," who variously sought to exploit the shock of Tet to force changes in U.S. war strategy. Schandler shows that, contrary to most accounts, no sudden LBJ turnaround