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Thousands of sterilizations have been performed and contraceptives have been provided for those who want them. The United States alone has given Bangladesh over 50 million cycles of oral contraceptives since 1972. During one week in 1975, volunteers distributed birth control pills and condoms in two-thirds of the nation's 65,000 villages.

However, argues correspondent Iain Guest, the intensity of the drive has not been matched by its results. Bangladesh has yet to recover from a civil war and two coups in five years. Bureaucratic fragmentation has crippled distribution services; funds are held up by administrative rivalry; allegations of fraud and incompetence are widespread. Lacking instruction, most women haven't used the birth control pills that they received. Those who are using them are misusing them. And because women become more fertile immediately after ceasing to take estrogen, those unable to get pills every month are likely to conceive in the interim.

Worse yet, the government has ignored the connection between family planning and health care. Thirty percent of Bangladeshi children die before the age of five, notes Guest; since working children are economically vital to rural families, parents who undergo sterilization, as urged by officials, in effect "act against their own best interests." Moreover, if the children of a sterilized woman die, her husband may simply take a new, fertile wife. According to Guest, Bangladeshi officials now fear that the birth control program may actually have *increased* the country's annual population growth rate by half a percent since 1974.

Three Reports on the New Vietnam

"Vietnam Since Reunification" by William S. Turley, in *Problems of Communism* (Mar.-Apr. 1977), Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402; "Gulag Vietnam?" by Allen E. Goodman, in *Freedom at Issue* (Mar.-Apr. 1977), 20 W. 40th St., New York, N.Y. 10018; "They Are Us, Were We Vietnamese" by Theodore Jacqueney, in *Worldview* (Apr. 1977), 170 E. 64th St., New York, N.Y. 10021.

Two years after Hanoi's tanks rolled into Saigon, its durable Politburo is still wrestling with the grave problems of postwar recovery and the "social transformation" of the conquered South.

Roughly \$1 billion in foreign aid, half of it from the Soviet Union, buttressed the thin \$2.6 billion national budget of the unified Socialist Republic of Vietnam last year; with 43 million inhabitants, Vietnam is now the world's third largest Communist nation. Turley, Southern Illinois political scientist, cites official plans: a "redistribution" of 4 million people out of urban areas by 1980; use of army technicians on economic projects; a stress on light industry in the North and farming

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in the South. To help cover its foreign trade deficit, Hanoi tapped the International Monetary Fund last January for the first time.

Goodman, a former Clark University professor and now a senior CIA researcher, echoes Turley's finding that Hanoi profoundly distrusts the "bourgeois" Southerners; Northern cadres run the South's cities and provinces; Northern-style "collectivization" of Delta agriculture and Saigon commerce has yet to occur. Roughly one-third of the South's working-age population, by virtue of prior ties, however modest, to the old regime, appears slated for "re-education" and subsequent "parole" under continued surveillance.

Some 200,000 people, says Goodman, are already in re-education camps, with sentences ranging from 3 to 30 years. All in all, "the people of Southern Vietnam face a disruption as profound as that caused by the war itself."

Jacqueney, a former U.S. aid official turned antiwar protester, reports that there is now clear evidence (notably from new refugees) that the 1975-76 consolidation of the South was accompanied by "massive detentions" and grim "Gulag-like conditions" in re-education camps, even as favored Western visitors were shown "selected camps" near Saigon. Among those imprisoned since 1975 are some of the old Saigon regime's chief noncommunist foes, notably Tran Ngoc Chau, Bui Tung Huan, Tran Van Tuyen. Others have died of maltreatment. Thich Tri Quang, famed wartime leader of a pacifist Buddhist faction, is under house surveillance; his followers have protested Communist persecution with a dozen self-immolations.

France's Quiet Shift in Foreign Policy

"French Foreign Policy: The Domestic Debate" by Marie Claude Smouts, in *International Affairs* (Jan. 1977), Oxford Univ. Press, Press Road, Neasden, London NW10 0DD.

Since taking office in 1971, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing has quietly shifted away from the foreign policy of his immediate predecessors. French business has been encouraged to establish closer ties with the United States; France has moved closer to NATO in deed if not in word; and development of a costly nuclear deterrent—supreme Gaullist symbol of French independence—has been slowed.

Oddly, this shift has elicited no great debate, says Smouts, a researcher at Paris's Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques. Why? The French press and public are inclined to regard foreign affairs as "the king's secret"; they are also currently preoccupied with domestic economic problems. But the President himself, elected by a bare 50.1 percent of the voters, has been reluctant to publicize foreign policy initiatives lest he provoke internal dispute that would fragment his fragile center-right alliance in parliament and give the Socialist-Communist left a political advantage. Though uneasy at several of Giscard's moves, the Gaullist UDR, the largest single bloc in the gov-