

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

achieved. But in the interim he has gained greater security, foreign investment, and economic relief.

Israel, Whetten contends, "has probably learned the least" after nearly 30 years of intermittent war. She remains "unable to convert her military strength into diplomatic initiative" and is increasingly dependent on the United States. Her "siege mentality" must change; "living on the margin of Middle Eastern life is too risky" until Israel defines more precisely the nature and terms of accommodation with her surrounding Arab neighbors.

The Target May Be China

"The Soviet Union and Anti-Space Defence" by Lawrence Freedman, in *Survival* (Jan.-Feb. 1977), Research Publications Service, Victoria Hall, East Greenwich, SE10 0RF, England.

Although the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 banned space-based nuclear weaponry, both the United States and the Soviet Union have continued to develop sophisticated military "support" systems for outer space. These systems are used primarily for arms-control verification, early warning, communications, and reconnaissance; they do not involve armaments. However, the prospect of this "strategic nervous system" being paralyzed, or its component satellites "blinded," bothers both Washington and Moscow. Western analysts are worried by periodic Soviet testing of an interceptor satellite apparently designed for use against U.S. satellites.

Although Khrushchev boasted in 1961 that Russian missiles could "hit a fly in outer space," notes Freedman, a Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, only recently has the Kremlin shown real ability to destroy a satellite. Beginning in 1967, Soviet satellites demonstrated the capacity to perform complicated rendezvous and docking maneuvers. In 1968, after being launched into an elliptical orbit, the 2.5-metric-ton Kosmos 249 swooped in on Kosmos 248, then exploded. The experiment was repeated two weeks later and again in 1970. After a five-year hiatus coinciding with the SALT talks, testing of the interceptor program was resumed in 1976.

But Freedman notes some oddities in the Soviet program. Interception would take six hours—more than ample warning for the United States—and the Soviet satellites have not demonstrated the ability to intercept maneuvering targets. Moreover, the Soviet interceptions all took place at a relatively low, 500-kilometer altitude, whereas the U.S. tendency is to place satellites into 36,000-kilometer geosynchronous orbits. There is sufficient duplication in the U.S. satellite system to make its paralysis unlikely.

One possible explanation: The Soviet satellite program is aimed at China, not the United States. China's early efforts to develop a satellite surveillance capability have thus far been primitive, and the system is well within the range of the Russian interceptors.