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or price increase. Price hikes could run as high as 50 percent. One result: staggering payment burdens on consumer nations. Another: political leverage, direct or indirect, on the United States and Israel.

The likelihood of such a confrontation will be determined by the energy policies of the world's largest consumer, importer, and waster of energy—the United States. Americans will depend on OPEC for 60 to 70 percent of its imports by the mid-1980s. (OPEC imports rose from 1.4 mb/d in 1973 to 2.6 mb/d in the first half of 1976.) Only an “accelerated policy” (see table) of conservation and development of domestic sources by the United States, says Rustow, can reduce total import needs of consuming nations to a level safely short of critical dependence.

The Lessons of Confrontation

“The Arab-Israeli Dispute—Great Power Behaviour” by Lawrence L. Whetten, in *Adelphi Papers* (No. 128), International Institute for Strategic Studies, 18 Adam St., London WC2N 6AL.

Since the tense 1962 Cuban missile crisis, potentially serious Soviet-American confrontations have occurred only in the Mideast, where American-supported Israelis and Soviet-supported Arabs went to war in 1967 and 1973. The two great powers were repeatedly surprised or manipulated by their respective Mideast allies; since the 1973 Yom Kippur war, Moscow and Washington have become more sophisticated about their real interests in the area.

So writes Whetten, a University of Southern California specialist in Soviet affairs, in a 42-page analysis of shifting post-1956 relationships involving the Big Two, Israel, Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The breakthrough came with Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's 1973-74 overtures to Egypt and the Arabs, resulting in a “triangular” Mideast relationship, long prevented by “Israeli intransigence.” Moreover, Washington seems to have learned that “cosponsorship” in Mideast peacekeeping efforts is a more reliable method of insuring Soviet restraint than “ostracism.”

The Soviets did not seem “excessively embittered” by their declining influence in the Arab world after 1973; they can “afford to wait” for favorable developments, while guaranteeing their Mideast clients' military parity and negotiating equality with Israel. Moscow also seems confident of assuring herself a great-power role in shaping a Mideast settlement.

Egypt under Anwar el-Sadat has been “the quickest to apply the lessons of previous experience”—using both war and diplomacy to push for a favorable settlement. After the 1973 war, Sadat sponsored the new U.S. role (“the Soviet Union could deliver arms but only the Americans could deliver Israel”), shucked off Soviet influence, and negotiated a Sinai disengagement pact with the Israelis. Sadat's ultimate goal—the restoration of Egypt's 1967 borders—has yet to be

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achieved. But in the interim he has gained greater security, foreign investment, and economic relief.

Israel, Whetten contends, "has probably learned the least" after nearly 30 years of intermittent war. She remains "unable to convert her military strength into diplomatic initiative" and is increasingly dependent on the United States. Her "siege mentality" must change; "living on the margin of Middle Eastern life is too risky" until Israel defines more precisely the nature and terms of accommodation with her surrounding Arab neighbors.

The Target May Be China

"The Soviet Union and Anti-Space Defence" by Lawrence Freedman, in *Survival* (Jan.-Feb. 1977), Research Publications Service, Victoria Hall, East Greenwich, SE10 0RF, England.

Although the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 banned space-based nuclear weaponry, both the United States and the Soviet Union have continued to develop sophisticated military "support" systems for outer space. These systems are used primarily for arms-control verification, early warning, communications, and reconnaissance; they do not involve armaments. However, the prospect of this "strategic nervous system" being paralyzed, or its component satellites "blinded," bothers both Washington and Moscow. Western analysts are worried by periodic Soviet testing of an interceptor satellite apparently designed for use against U.S. satellites.

Although Khrushchev boasted in 1961 that Russian missiles could "hit a fly in outer space," notes Freedman, a Research Fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, only recently has the Kremlin shown real ability to destroy a satellite. Beginning in 1967, Soviet satellites demonstrated the capacity to perform complicated rendezvous and docking maneuvers. In 1968, after being launched into an elliptical orbit, the 2.5-metric-ton Kosmos 249 swooped in on Kosmos 248, then exploded. The experiment was repeated two weeks later and again in 1970. After a five-year hiatus coinciding with the SALT talks, testing of the interceptor program was resumed in 1976.

But Freedman notes some oddities in the Soviet program. Interception would take six hours—more than ample warning for the United States—and the Soviet satellites have not demonstrated the ability to intercept maneuvering targets. Moreover, the Soviet interceptions all took place at a relatively low, 500-kilometer altitude, whereas the U.S. tendency is to place satellites into 36,000-kilometer geosynchronous orbits. There is sufficient duplication in the U.S. satellite system to make its paralysis unlikely.

One possible explanation: The Soviet satellite program is aimed at China, not the United States. China's early efforts to develop a satellite surveillance capability have thus far been primitive, and the system is well within the range of the Russian interceptors.