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missile (IRBM) known as the SS-20.

Although the SS-20 is classified by the Russians as a "tactical" weapon (a short-range, small-warhead system designed for use on or near the battlefield), the traditional distinction here between "tactical" and "strategic" is obsolete. The SS-20 is highly mobile and fitted with multiple, independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Burt suggests a more useful distinction—one between "super-power" weapons and "regional strategic" arms. The former would include ICBMs, long-range bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The "Eurostrategic" regional forces, however, are more disparate and include NATO and Warsaw Pact strike aircraft, Soviet medium-range bombers, French and Soviet IRBMs, and British and French submarine-borne missiles. Here, the U.S.S.R. already possesses a clear advantage. Deployment of the SS-20, Burt asserts, "will further distort the already lopsided Eurostrategic balance."

The SS-20 presents a unique problem for SALT negotiators. The Carter administration could "sour" relations with the U.S.S.R. by insisting on inclusion of the missile in a new strategic arms limitation agreement despite Soviet claims that it is not a "strategic" weapon. On the other hand, avoiding the issue could weaken NATO. If the latter course is followed, Burt warns, European allies, particularly Britain and France, would be compelled to develop larger and more independent strategic capabilities, which would create a more complex arms control problem.

The SALT negotiations, observes Burt, are not designed to grapple with such multilateral, alliance-wide issues, nor are the talks on "mutual and balanced force reductions" (MBFR). He concludes that the West must recognize the significance of the SS-20 and insist to the Soviets that Russian attempts to establish "nuclear hegemony" in Europe are illegitimate, will jeopardize SALT agreement with the United States, and could trigger the expansion of Western European nuclear weapons programs.

U.S. Arms for Peking?

"Future Sino-American Security Ties: The View From Tokyo, Moscow, and Peking" by Michael P. Pillsbury, in *International Security* (Spring 1977), Program for Science and International Affairs, 9 Divinity Dr., Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

In a widely discussed 1975 paper, Rand analyst Michael Pillsbury raised the possibility of future U.S.-China military ties. Since then, the Chinese have purchased (usually embargoed) British technology to produce Spey jet-fighter engines. The United States has agreed to sell Cyber computers, which have potential military applications, to Peking. But if such Sino-American ties now seem a somewhat more plausible option for Washington, there are considerable differences of opinion

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on the subject in Moscow, Tokyo, and Peking.

The Japanese, says Pillsbury, gain from the Sino-Soviet conflict, and will therefore "strongly resist" pressure to take sides. Japan's survival depends on maintaining working relations with all the major trading nations and military powers. (Japan has no significant military capability of its own.) Moreover, the matter of China policy remains "the most divisive issue in Japanese politics."

Although some analysts see U.S. military aid to Peking as triggering a Soviet attack on China, Pillsbury argues that Moscow, despite its paranoia and uncertainty, is constrained by several factors. The Soviets believe that ideological conflicts remain deep enough to preclude any active Chinese-American military cooperation against the U.S.S.R. The Kremlin can also, if necessary, apply considerable pressure against Western nations—Britain, France, Germany—to cut off China's other sources of military equipment. Finally, primitively equipped Chinese forces would have to be upgraded by a factor of 10 even to approach parity with the Soviet Union.

As for the Chinese, conflicting allegorical tales in several influential journals suggest that the U.S. aid issue is a sensitive one in Peking. But in any U.S. deal, says Pillsbury, the Chinese will want to avoid both the appearance of military weakness and the presence of large numbers of foreign technicians. Protracted negotiations will also reflect the mildly schizophrenic nature of Chinese politics. However, Pillsbury thinks the Chinese have taken a "cautious step" toward closer military relations with the West, apparently believing that only "joint pressure applied by Western Europe, Japan, China, and the United States" can contain Soviet expansion.

The Oil Crisis of the 1980s

"Oil, the Super-Powers, and the Middle East" by Ian Smart, in *International Affairs* (Jan. 1977), Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London NW10 0DD; "U.S.—Saudi Relations and the Oil Crises of the 1980s" by Dankwart A. Rustow, in *Foreign Affairs* (Apr. 1977), 428 East Preston Ct., Baltimore, Md. 21202.

The industrialized world was able to absorb the first demonstration of the "oil weapon"—the 1973 Arab embargo—without severe political or economic damage. But a more conclusive demonstration may yet come. According to some current projections, by the early 1980s OPEC exporters will control critical reserves, which, if withheld, could provoke a global crisis. The results for the West would be economic hardship and severe restraints on foreign policy.

The 1973 embargo and price increases threatened but did not upset world stability, argues Smart, deputy director of Chatham House. Reductions in Mideast exports to the United States, from 1.2