
FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

*Giving Tito
His Due*

"Yugoslavia's 'Old' Communism: Europe's Fiddler on the Roof" by Laurence Silberman, in *Foreign Policy* (Spring 1977), National Affairs, Inc., 345 East 46th St., New York, N.Y. 10017.

Since Marshal Tito's 1948 break with Stalin, Yugoslavia has enjoyed a special relationship with the United States based on American desire to ensure the country's continued freedom from Soviet domination. But Washington's aid has never been reciprocated. Indeed, argues Silberman, former ambassador to Belgrade, Yugoslavia's "non-aligned" diplomacy has been "increasingly hostile to the United States."

The Yugoslavs, for example, supported the UN's 1975 resolution equating Zionism with racism and have called for the "decolonization" of Puerto Rico. Yugoslavia has permitted Soviet naval repairs in its Adriatic ports and did not object to Soviet planes overflying its territory to supply Arab armies in 1973 and the Soviet-backed insurgents in Angola in 1976. Yugoslavia has also abused its access to restricted U.S. civilian technology of strategic significance by passing it on to unauthorized Communist states; it has mistreated "unfriendly" American reporters and has charged that anti-Yugoslav activities undertaken by American-based émigrés have been coordinated by the U.S. government.

A realistic U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia, says Silberman, must recognize the Tito regime as an ideological adversary. The United States, he suggests, must be firm with the Yugoslavs, even as Washington supports Belgrade's non-aligned status. "In fact," Silberman concludes, "it may well be that the less support Yugoslavia gets from the United States the more they feel obliged to resist Soviet pressure" to maintain their relative autonomy.

*IRBMs, MIRVs,
SALT, and the USSR*

"The SS-20 and the Eurostrategic Balance" by Richard Burt, in *The World Today* (Feb. 1977), Oxford University Press, Press Road, Neasden, London NW10 0DD.

Analysts of American-Soviet détente have noted recent Soviet attempts to develop a new class of long-range ICBMs. What has been overlooked, says Burt, assistant director of London's International Institute for Strategic Studies, is Soviet stress on shorter-range "Eurostrategic weapons"—missiles which do not directly threaten the continental United States but could be deployed against Western Europe. Notable among these is Moscow's new intermediate-range ballistic

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missile (IRBM) known as the SS-20.

Although the SS-20 is classified by the Russians as a "tactical" weapon (a short-range, small-warhead system designed for use on or near the battlefield), the traditional distinction here between "tactical" and "strategic" is obsolete. The SS-20 is highly mobile and fitted with multiple, independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs). Burt suggests a more useful distinction—one between "super-power" weapons and "regional strategic" arms. The former would include ICBMs, long-range bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The "Eurostrategic" regional forces, however, are more disparate and include NATO and Warsaw Pact strike aircraft, Soviet medium-range bombers, French and Soviet IRBMs, and British and French submarine-borne missiles. Here, the U.S.S.R. already possesses a clear advantage. Deployment of the SS-20, Burt asserts, "will further distort the already lopsided Eurostrategic balance."

The SS-20 presents a unique problem for SALT negotiators. The Carter administration could "sour" relations with the U.S.S.R. by insisting on inclusion of the missile in a new strategic arms limitation agreement despite Soviet claims that it is not a "strategic" weapon. On the other hand, avoiding the issue could weaken NATO. If the latter course is followed, Burt warns, European allies, particularly Britain and France, would be compelled to develop larger and more independent strategic capabilities, which would create a more complex arms control problem.

The SALT negotiations, observes Burt, are not designed to grapple with such multilateral, alliance-wide issues, nor are the talks on "mutual and balanced force reductions" (MBFR). He concludes that the West must recognize the significance of the SS-20 and insist to the Soviets that Russian attempts to establish "nuclear hegemony" in Europe are illegitimate, will jeopardize SALT agreement with the United States, and could trigger the expansion of Western European nuclear weapons programs.

U.S. Arms for Peking?

"Future Sino-American Security Ties: The View From Tokyo, Moscow, and Peking" by Michael P. Pillsbury, in *International Security* (Spring 1977), Program for Science and International Affairs, 9 Divinity Dr., Cambridge, Mass. 02138.

In a widely discussed 1975 paper, Rand analyst Michael Pillsbury raised the possibility of future U.S.-China military ties. Since then, the Chinese have purchased (usually embargoed) British technology to produce Spey jet-fighter engines. The United States has agreed to sell Cyber computers, which have potential military applications, to Peking. But if such Sino-American ties now seem a somewhat more plausible option for Washington, there are considerable differences of opinion