




The four main islands and the nearly 4,000 smaller islands of the Japanese archipelago total 143,818 square miles (equal in area to Montana) and extend northeast-southwest for almost 2,000 miles. Latest estimates put the population at 114 million. One-fifth of these people live in Tokyo and seven other major cities—Osaka, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, Kobe, Kita-Kyushu, and Sapporo.





# Japan

Despite its 15 centuries of recorded history, Japan remains more of a mystery to Americans than many of our less important trading partners and allies. The United States and Japan have each left deep marks on the other, yet there is a tendency in this country to see the Japanese people as all of a kind, unchanging, inscrutable, diligent, uncomplaining. The realities are different. Historian (and former U.S. Ambassador) Edwin O. Reischauer examines the origins of Japan's much-publicized postwar economic "miracle." Historian Nathaniel B. Thayer, using new research findings, traces changes in traditional Japanese values. And sociologist Koya Azumi describes the "Westernization" of labor and management attitudes in the workplace. Our Background Books cover other aspects of the Japanese experience, past and present.



## THE POSTWAR "MIRACLE"

*by Edwin O. Reischauer*

In 1945 Japan lay in ruins, a defeated, helpless pariah among nations—its cities destroyed, its industry at a standstill, its people exhausted, confused, and demoralized. Yet in only one generation the country has risen like the proverbial phoenix to become, next to the colossi of the United States and the Soviet Union, the greatest economic power in the world, with a remarkably free and stable society, an efficiently functioning democratic system of government, and a vibrant cultural life.

---

This triumphant metamorphosis so strains belief that it has been called a miracle; the miracle seems even greater if one compares contemporary Japan to the country not at its postwar nadir but when it was bent on the creation of the world's greatest empire. Now it is the least militarized of all the great powers, passionate in its hope for world peace and proud of a constitution that forswears all resort to war. The regimented, indoctrinated Japanese of World War II have been replaced by a people dedicated to the defense of a long list of constitutional human rights. The robot-like soldiers, who selflessly accepted death in the name of their Emperor, have been succeeded by a generation that is skeptical of all authority and vigorously resists any arbitrary exercise of power.

How did the Japan of the war years transform itself into the Japan of 1977, a change so complete as to appear unreal or at best shallowly rooted? The magic wand of a General MacArthur is not enough to explain such a change. A look back at the history of the country, however, reveals a continuity that makes the transformation more understandable. Contrary to what most observers imagine, present conditions and attitudes are deeply anchored in history, and their roots, though nurtured by the American occupation, are to be found in the past experiences of the people themselves.

Japan's postwar economic "miracle" is, of course, no miracle at all but rather the continuation of an accelerating rate of economic growth that can be traced back to the 1880s. When Japan was opened to the West in the mid-19th century, it was an institutionally complex nation with an advanced, nationally united economy, a plentiful supply of entrepreneurial talents, high rates of literacy, a disciplined work force, and a strong work ethic. It trailed the West in technology but, as it acquired technology step by step, the economic gap began to close. The relatively slow growth of the 1920s—throughout the world as well as in Japan—helped to account for the political crises of the 1930s, and in the 1940s economic productivity plummeted in the wake of wartime

---

*Edwin O. Reischauer, 66, is a professor of history at Harvard and former U.S. Ambassador to Japan (1961-66). Born in Tokyo of American parents, he is a graduate of Oberlin (B.A. 1931) and Harvard (M.A. 1932; Ph.D. 1939). His books include Japan, Past and Present (rev. 1963), The United States and Japan (rev. 1965), Translations from Early Japanese Literature (with Joseph Yamagiwa, 1951), Wanted: An Asian Policy (1955), Beyond Vietnam: The United States and Asia (1967), Japan, The Story of a Nation (1970), Toward the Twenty First Century: Education for a Changing World (1973), and The Japanese (1977).*

---

destruction. After the war, economic growth accelerated once again. It was particularly fast in the 1950s and '60s, as the Japanese restored their ravaged cities and adopted the technological advances from which they had been cut off by the war.

As they gained experience with modern industrial production, they began to apply their traditional organizing skills to new economic problems. Foremost among these skills were the ability of a diverse people to identify themselves with group interests and the ability of diverse groups to achieve decision through consensus. The first skill can be seen in the lifetime employment of Japanese in large industries (both management and labor), in the loyalty of both groups to the firm, and in the low incidence of disruptive strikes, despite vigorous annual bargaining over wages and perquisites. The second skill is illustrated by the sense of partnership between government and private business, an easy interchange of views between the two, and the willingness of sharply competitive businesses to accept governmental guidance.

### **The Third Way**

The entire pattern of the relationship between labor and management and between business and government in Japan is so at variance with the corresponding pattern in the United States and other Western nations as to constitute a third system of economic integration, halfway between that of the West and the planned economies of the Communist world. In many ways it is the most successful of the three. What is more to the point is that the system clearly derives from deeply ingrained attitudes and historical experience. Although it did not become full-blown until after the war, the Japanese system had begun to assume its present shape in the 1920s. Japan's astounding economic virtuosity therefore is no sudden flash in the pan but an established characteristic firmly based on historical antecedents. It should endure well into the future.

The transformation of the Japanese from old-fashioned imperialists and fanatic militarists to ardent believers in world peace may seem less convincing than the carry-over to postwar days of earlier economic skills, yet here, too, is a continuity of attitudes that is not at first apparent. Modern Japan became a heavily militarized state in the 19th century, not because of its feudal traditions, which had in fact produced a thoroughly bureaucratized and completely peaceful society, but because of the military menace posed by the technologically advanced West. A strong army and navy was created to meet this threat, and in the process

---

Japan became a player in the Western game of imperialism. Industrialization was the next step, both to ensure military strength and to stem the influx of Western machine-made products. Because a narrow geographical base made the country increasingly dependent on foreign raw materials as well as on markets to pay for them, imperialism, which started as a search for strategic security, evolved into a search for economic security.

In the aftermath of World War I, Japan was still making up for its late start on the road to imperialism at a time when most other great powers were content with the vast territories they already possessed. By and large, the Western world considered imperialism out of date. In any case, a spreading spirit of nationalism was making it more costly. This was especially true in China, the only available area for Japanese expansion. At the beginning of the 1920s, the Japanese were faced with the question: Should they continue on their imperialist course or rely on international trade in a peaceful world to supply their economic needs? The decision was in favor of peaceful trade; the country started to cut down its military strength and pull in its imperialist horns.

The 1920s, however, proved to be a period of stagnation in international trade that ended in worldwide depression and left the door open for the army and other advocates of the old imperialism to seize control of Japan's foreign policy and force the nation back on a course of military expansion. This led to the catastrophe of World War II. The lesson was not wasted on the Japanese. Since the war, they have rejected both militarism and imperialism with revulsion and embraced the concept of peaceful world trade as the only path to a viable future.

### **The Roots of Democracy**

Postwar conditions turned this emotional about-face into a firm, rational conviction. Rampant nationalism throughout the world made the old imperialism entirely impractical. Moreover, Japan's erstwhile military strength had been outmoded by nuclear weapons, and its narrow, crowded terrain made it impossible for the country to mount a credible nuclear deterrent. Furthermore, a greatly increased dependence on worldwide resources and markets ruled out the possibility of armed defense of its vital national interests, which now included worldwide resources, markets, and lanes of commerce. The prewar roots of the stand in favor of world peace have thus been made firm and permanent by postwar realities. This is no longer an area of political controversy in Japan.

---

What about democracy? Here, too, the roots go deep. The men who reorganized and modernized Japanese society in the second half of the 19th century had no interest in democracy as such, but they built into their system a small role for locally elected assemblies and a national parliament (the Diet). This was done in part to please Westerners, from whom the Japanese were trying to win acceptance as equals, but also as a technique to ensure wide support for the government and to provide a safety valve for popular discontent. In reality, a small group of nation builders, constituting a sort of oligarchy, ruled Japan in the Emperor's name. They assumed that their power could be passed on to their successors, but, in fact, the oligarchs had no clear successors. Once they themselves had faded from the scene, there was no equivalent body of men to control the various groups of political elites that had grown up in the meantime.

### **Discredited Militarism**

Of these elite groups, the Diet and the parties that controlled it proved the strongest and by the 1920s had come to occupy a dominant position in Japanese politics. Japan seemed well on the way to becoming a parliamentary democracy, but the Diet lacked effective control over the other branches of government, particularly the military. During the 1930s, the military seized power from the Diet, largely over the foreign policy issue. The disasters of World War II, however, discredited not only militarism but all authoritarian rule.

To the postwar Japanese, the obvious alternative to military or civil dictatorship was parliamentary democracy, and they enthusiastically supported the postwar constitution, which embodied this form of government. They had already had considerable experience with democracy—with elected local bodies in the 1880s, a national parliament in 1890, and party supremacy in politics in the 1920s—and were able to function successfully as a democracy from the beginning. Much controversy remains over the imperfections of the present system, but all political parties and virtually all citizens are firm supporters of parliamentary democracy in preference to any other conceivable form of government.

One question persists: Does Japan have the sort of society that can maintain such a system? The answer is an emphatic Yes. For centuries, the Japanese have been accustomed to living under a stable political system that functions according to a known body of laws and precedents. No people are greater


---

sticklers for legality and precedent. Building on relatively high pre-modern literacy rates, the Japanese achieved full literacy by the early 20th century. Today, with nine-tenths of the young people completing the 12 years of rigorous formal education that leads to graduation from senior high school, and with about a third of these going on to higher education, the Japanese may well be the best educated people in the world. Economic success has made the people relatively affluent, and wartime destruction and postwar policies have resulted in a fairly equitable distribution of the wealth, with less of a gap between rich and poor than in almost any other country outside the Communist world.

The Japanese have developed an extremely egalitarian society in other ways. The strict class distinctions of the 19th-century feudal system were virtually wiped out within two or three generations, largely through a nationwide, egalitarian educational system. By the 1890s, positions of leadership were attained not by birth or inheritance but by academic achievement and the passing of examinations, first for government posts, later for key positions in business as well. The Japanese today come as close as any large and complex nation to being a classless society. There is almost no sense of class but, if pressed, almost all Japanese admit to being "middle class."

Finally, despite their strong self-identification as members of groups, the Japanese have developed a pronounced sense of their rights as individuals—a concept that goes back to the "freedom and people's rights movement" that flourished in the 1870s. The postwar constitution enumerates individual human rights in great detail. In short, few societies are better prepared than Japan's to maintain a system of parliamentary democracy.

Japan's militaristic frenzy as it embarked on World War II and its agony at the end of the war make what has happened since then appear almost too miraculous to be fully credible. Nor is it any more credible to attribute the transformation to American intervention. If, instead, one looks at the development of Japan over a longer period of time and then considers the situation in which the Japanese now find themselves, the great change becomes quite understandable. Japan's present affluence, its devotion to world peace, its firmly based democracy, the stability of its politics, and the vigor and health of its society are no fleeting accidents of history.



## A NEW SOCIAL PORTRAIT OF THE JAPANESE

*by Nathaniel B. Thayer*

The postwar resurgence of Japan is one of the most amazing events in modern history. At the end of the war, the Japanese people faced the devastation of a costly struggle, the uncertainties of foreign occupation, and a hostile international environment. Today, 32 years later, Japan has regained its sovereignty and has become a valued ally of the United States and a major supportive force in the international system.

How have the past three decades of momentous economic and political change affected the psychology of the Japanese people? To find the answers, researchers for the Institute of Mathematical Statistics in Tokyo conducted a series of surveys at five-year intervals from 1953 to 1973. The results often contradicted the image of Japan presented in Western news media.

In aesthetics, they found that traditional Japanese concepts have grown stronger, despite an apparent predilection for American movies, McDonald's hamburgers, and blue jeans. During each survey, they showed 3,000 to 4,000 Japanese citizens a photograph of a Western garden and a photograph of a Japanese garden and asked, "Which garden is better?" In 1953, 79 percent said the Japanese garden was better; by 1973, the percentage had risen to 90 percent.

On the other hand, some ideas about the family showed a trend away from traditional values. In 1953, 73 percent of the husbands and wives queried said they would adopt a child to carry on the family line if they had no progeny (conforming to prewar practice). In 1973, fewer than half said they would adopt a child for



---

this purpose (36 percent), although 17 percent said that they might, depending on circumstances (Chart 1).

Religious values have changed scarcely at all. In the four surveys made from 1958 to 1973, researchers asked Japanese citizens whether or not religious faith was important. Each time, roughly 70 percent said Yes; however, another question showed a decided slip in the number of Japanese formally affiliated with an established church.

Ideas about nature, however, have seesawed. "To be happy," the questioners asked, "should man adapt to nature, use nature, or conquer nature?" Japanese who, during the 1960s, had discarded the traditional concept that man should adapt to nature returned to that belief in the 1970s (Chart 2).

Do the answers to these and thousands of other survey queries produce a coherent picture of the Japanese people today? That is the question that five researchers attached to the government television and radio network NHK asked themselves. As a first step, they gathered 1,500 national public opinion surveys conducted after World War II by the nation's leading newspapers, government ministries, and research organizations. For two years, they studied the responses to 20,000 questions and in November 1975 published their findings in *Sengo Seron Shi* [History of public Opinion in the Postwar Era].


The results provide a mosaic of a complex society undergoing significant change, yet sustaining cultural coherence. In the following analysis, I have borrowed liberally from the findings of the NHK researchers and from other material found in the first three volumes of *Nihonjin Kenkyu* [Study of the Japanese People] published in Tokyo, 1974-76, by the Society for the Study of the Japanese People, a research organization established in 1972 to analyze contemporary Japanese characteristics and culture.

In prewar Japan, the state and society took precedence over the individual. In postwar Japan, the situation has been reversed. Can the individual be called upon to sacrifice his freedom for the welfare of the state? An increasing number of Japanese reject


---

*Nathaniel B. Thayer, 47, is director of Asian Studies at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in Washington, D.C. He received his B.A. (1955), M.A. (1967), and Ph.D. (1967) from Columbia University and served as a foreign service officer for almost a decade in Asia, principally in Japan. He has taught at Columbia, City University of New York, and Harvard. He is the author of How The Conservatives Rule Japan (1969, 1973) and is currently at work on a history of Japanese diplomacy since World War II.*

**1. IF YOU HAD NO PROGENY, WOULD YOU ADOPT A CHILD TO CARRY ON THE FAMILY LINE?**



**2. TO BE HAPPY, SHOULD YOU ADAPT TO NATURE, USE NATURE, OR CONQUER NATURE?**



---

this suggestion each time it is made by pollsters. More and more Japanese subscribe to the proposition that the welfare of the nation depends on the happiness of the individual. When asked in 1974, "Do you want to do something for your country?" only 9 percent answered Yes, whereas 48 percent said they would rather get something from the country.

The growing importance of the individual is reflected in the national craze over health. "What do you value most? What concerns you most? What is necessary for a full life?" To all these queries, the Japanese gave a single reply: good health.

To a fourth survey question, "What do you worry about most?" the answers were, in order of importance, inflation, accidents, pollution, and sickness—the last three of which are bodily concerns. Better than 80 percent of the Japanese over age 60 said that their greatest desire was to live a long time.

The lack of concern over civic responsibilities shows up in the choice of a lifestyle. Every five years, Japanese citizens were asked which of these six lifestyles they preferred:

1. To live according to one's tastes without thinking about fame or fortune (the tasteful life).
2. To live from day to day without worrying (the happy-go-lucky life).
3. To work diligently and become a man of wealth (the monied life).
4. To live as correctly and cleanly as possible, abjuring the improper things of the world (the clean life).
5. To live selflessly, devoting oneself to the betterment of society (the selfless life).
6. To study seriously and become famous (the famous life).

The table on page 65 shows that the number of Japanese who want to live "tastefully," without thinking about fame or fortune, almost doubled in 20 years. Those who want to live happy-go-lucky lives have more than doubled, whereas those who want to lead correct, clean lives decreased from 29 to 11 percent, and the number wanting to dedicate their lives to society—never more than 10 percent—was down to half of that at the end of 20 years.

Closely related to questions of lifestyle are questions of family. The evidence suggests that the family is replacing the nation as the focus of Japanese loyalty, though nationalism still exists. First, the family takes precedence even over personal health in inquiries into values. Second, 70 percent of the Japanese queried say that they continue to revere their ancestors, an

---

**WHICH LIFESTYLE DO YOU PREFER?**

	The Tasteful Life	The Happy- Go-Lucky Life	The Monied Life	The Clean Life	The Selfless Life	The Famous Life	All Others
<b>1953</b>	21%	11%	15%	29%	10%	6%	8%
<b>1958</b>	27	18	17	23	6	3	6
<b>1963</b>	30	19	17	18	6	4	6
<b>1968</b>	32	20	17	19	6	3	3
<b>1973</b>	39	23	14	11	5	3	5

answer that I interpret as an expression of family rather than religious, interest. Third, although they are not willing to adopt a child, most husbands and wives want their family to continue from generation to generation. Most Japanese still adhere to the tradition that the family estate should not be divided at death but should be handed down intact to a designated heir; fewer Japanese now insist, however, that this heir be the eldest son. Fourth, 70 percent of the Japanese say they will be satisfied with their lives if their families can live in peace and harmony.

### Should Husbands Help?

How exclusive is this concern of a Japanese with his family? One survey posed the question "If you and your family are more or less secure, are you willing to concern yourself with other people in the world?" Only 7 percent answered Yes.

Japanese opinions about many other family matters have changed. Before the war, most parents believed they should arrange their children's marriages. Nowadays, most young people insist on selecting their own mates. Before the war, three generations lived under a single roof. Now many parents and more young

---

couples choose to live by themselves. In the prewar home, the husband worked and the wife managed the household. Nowadays, many younger wives work or want to work (the issue comes to a head after the first child is born). In the prewar family, the husband decreed and the wife obeyed. Now most couples agree to talk over household purchases and the children's upbringing.

"Should husbands help in the kitchen?" In 1952 a majority said No. In 1973 a majority said Yes. Family planning has become an integral part of Japanese life: 95 percent know about birth control; 61 percent use birth control devices. Before the war, a large family was considered desirable. Nowadays, 80 percent of Japanese couples prefer two or three children born less than three years apart.

Not everything about the family has changed. For example, most Japanese still believe in filial piety, and about half of all Japanese endorse the practice of staging elaborate weddings and funerals if the family can afford it—in spite of newspaper campaigns against such practices.

A majority of both sexes still believe that men are superior to women in reasoning and organizing ability. A majority of both sexes still believe that men lead the "harder" life and that a woman cannot support herself solely through her own labors, although the size of this majority is decreasing.

### **Wifely Discontent**

Some Japanese women express "economic dissatisfaction," but most prefer the role of wife and mother to that of worker outside the home. Most wives do not register discontent so long as their real family lives are not too different from their ideal. In 1973, 80 percent of the women said that they were satisfied with their lives, and 70 percent found their lives meaningful. On five occasions from 1950 to 1973, Japanese women were asked, "Would you want to be reborn as a man or woman?" In 1950, only 16 percent wanted to stay female. In 1973, it was 51 percent.

So long as Japanese concern is directed toward the family and the fulfillment of private desires, the Japanese woman will probably be content, since she is a central figure in the family. But should Japanese concerns come to be directed toward public and international problems at the expense of the family, her discontent may grow rapidly, since she is presently excluded from these fields.

Japanese thinking about government and politics is changing, too. The trend is toward greater insistence on personal rights,

---

dissatisfaction with government in general, and reluctance to participate in politics.

In 1946, the American occupation authorities rewrote the Japanese constitution, articulating many new rights for the people. At first, the Japanese either paid little attention to these rights or opposed them, believing that they were unnecessary and not in accord with Japanese values. But in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Japanese began to change their opinion, coming to believe that the state should serve the people rather than the people serve the state.

### **If a Messiah Comes**

In 1958 and 1975, surveys queried citizens on whether they had opinions about civic matters. The respondents fell into three categories: those who had no views; those who had views and articulated them; those who had views but talked to nobody about them. The largest category was citizens who had no views. In 1958, they totaled 61 percent, but by 1975 they had declined to 39 percent. Citizens who had views and articulated them remained at a constant 22 percent. Citizens who had views but remained mute were 17 percent of the total in 1958 and 29 percent in 1975 (10 percent in 1975 did not respond). In 17 years, people had become more interested in civic affairs, but their interest had not advanced very far in the direction of the talking, much less action, stage.

Other evidence buttresses the impression that the Japanese are increasingly unwilling to personally participate in politics. "How can we achieve the ideal society?" one survey asked. The two most popular answers, as revealed by two different polls, were to vote for politicians who would try to achieve such a society (43 percent) and to wait for good politicians to appear (26 percent). If a political messiah should come, would he be welcome? Twice, surveys asked for confirmation or denial of this statement: "When a superior politician appears, the nation benefits if its affairs are turned over to him rather than have the people decide those affairs themselves." In 1953, the respondents split evenly; 20 years later, only a slender majority (51 percent) opposed this sentiment.

So much for political leadership. What about political institutions? Twice a year, Japanese citizens have been asked, "Does the Diet [the national legislature] reflect public opinion?" In 1954, a third of the people said it didn't; 20 years later, the percentage had almost doubled (61 percent). "Does local govern-

---

ment reflect public opinion?" In 1952, a small percentage (16 percent) answered No; by 1975, the percentage had quadrupled (48 percent.) The Japanese, apparently, are dissatisfied with government at all levels.

Dissatisfaction with politics became most evident during the 1970s. In 1971, respondents who said politics were advancing in a discouraging direction totaled 47 percent; by 1973, even before the Lockheed scandals, this percentage had climbed to 70 percent. During the early '70s, Japan was struck by the oil crisis, double-digit inflation, and the full effects of pollution, developments to which the government responded, but not quickly or effectively. Perhaps these factors accelerated a growing disenchantment with politics, but the Japanese had undergone more serious crises in earlier years without losing faith in government. In 1971, people who were optimistic about political trends totaled 70 percent; by 1973, this percentage had shrunk to 40 percent. In yearly surveys between 1974 and 1976, only 20 percent of the populace was willing to express even partial satisfaction with politics.

Why? Responses to statements made in scattered surveys conducted by the NHK television and radio network over a nine-year period between 1965 and 1974 suggest an answer: The populace is estranged from government, and the estrangement is growing. In 1966, 40 percent of survey respondents agreed with the statement "Politics are decided by powers that the common people cannot control." By 1969, the percentage was 56 percent. Also in 1969, 53 percent agreed that "Political and economic policies are determined by persons the common people cannot touch." And in 1974, 78 percent conceded that "A small group wields power and moves society."

### **Estrangement from Government**

The Japanese citizen, then, wants to expand his personal freedom. He has political opinions but is reluctant to voice them, much less act on them. He awaits the coming of a national leader but worries about granting this leader sufficient power to govern. He has little faith in either the national or local government. He feels estranged. In the 1970s, this estrangement has contributed to widespread expressions of dissatisfaction with politics. One may hope that this dissatisfaction is a prelude to a greater popular involvement, but as of now the Japanese citizen appears to be politically passive.

How strongly do the Japanese identify with their nation?

---

How does Japanese nationalism differ today from the days before the war? Measuring Japanese nationalism is a tricky business. During the late 1940s and 1950s, the Japanese regarded nationalism as one of the causes of the disastrous Pacific War, and no one had anything good to say about it. In the '60s, this revulsion became less vocal. After the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, the Japanese realized that nationalism was not inextricably associated with war and began to evaluate it more rationally. Rather than use the prewar words for nationalism with their unfortunate connotations, the Japanese invented new words or borrowed English words to describe their feelings. They still do, and answers to questions regarding the subject will differ, depending on the Japanese word for nationalism used in the question.

### **Flag and Anthem**

The two great symbols of nationalism in any country are the flag and the national anthem. In Japan, neither flag nor anthem creates a semantic problem. In surveys made in 1961 and 1975, sentiment has been the same, first and last. About 60 percent of the populace feel love and respect for the flag and anthem; less than 1 percent feel antipathy.

Beyond the flag and the anthem, a symbol of nationalism unique to Japan is the Emperor Hirohito whose family has reigned since the 6th century, when history was indistinguishable from myth. Japan's 1889 constitution decreed that the Emperor was a "sacred and inviolable" sovereign, holding "the supreme rights of rule." During the 1945-52 occupation, the Americans changed the Emperor's status by having him declare himself to be a human being. The new 1946 constitution downgraded him from a sacred sovereign to a symbol of the state and of the unity of the people, declaring further that he shall not have powers related to government. Sovereignty now resided with the people.

As early as 1946, public opinion polls asked, "Should we or should we not have an Emperor?" Various versions of that question were asked six times from 1946 to 1965, and the answers were always the same. Although the feeling was held more strongly by older than by younger respondents, over 80 percent wanted to keep the Emperor. Initially, sentiment existed to restore his powers, but by the mid-1960s that sentiment was expressed by no more than 10 percent. Roughly 80 percent supported the clauses in the constitution that made the Emperor the symbol rather than the sovereign of the state.

"Do the people still regard the Emperor as godlike?" Accord-



---

ing to a 1950 survey, 81 percent considered him to be a "normal human being." "What emotions do the people hold towards the Emperor?" Throughout the 1960s, two-thirds of the people said they felt affection and respect; one-third felt nothing; less than 3 percent felt antipathy. At the beginning of the 1970s, the ratio changed. The affection-and-respect group shrank to 50 percent, and the no-feeling group grew to 40 percent, the antipathetic group remaining constant.

"What role do the people see the Emperor as performing?" A 1974 survey confirms a 1967 survey in which a few people still saw the Emperor as occupying the center of the political system, and a few people said he had no function. The rest of the respondents split fairly evenly, one group claiming that his role was no more than ceremonial and the other group asserting that he provided spiritual support to the people.

### **Does Japan Need an Army?**

In brief, the Japanese want to keep the Emperor but see his role as ancillary and symbolic. No one wants to change his status, but more and more people are thinking less and less about him.

Another significant national symbol is represented by the armed forces. Pollsters have plumbed Japanese attitudes toward militarism most thoroughly. On at least 20 occasions since 1950, they have asked, "Does Japan need armed forces to protect the nation?" The answer has been remarkably consistent. Some Japanese refuse to comment, but about 30 percent say Japan does not need armed forces, and 60 percent say that it does. In another 12 surveys, 70 percent of the respondents were supportive of the need, possibly because the questioner replaced the words "armed forces" with "self-defense forces." The rub comes when the Japanese are asked what the armed forces do. In two surveys 10 years apart, less than 5 percent of the respondents replied that the armed forces defended the country. About 80 percent said they best served as a disaster relief force. "Should the armed forces be strengthened or weakened?" Throughout the 1950s and '60s, the Japanese were mildly in favor of strengthening the armed forces; in the 1970s the trend is toward their reduction.\*

The Pacific War was the first war in which the Japanese had ever met defeat, and that defeat set off waves of self-doubt and feelings of cultural inadequacy when they compared themselves to other nationalities. A 1963 survey asked, "Are the Japanese

---

\*The Fourth Defense Build-Up Program (1972-76) called for total expenditures equivalent to about US\$15.3 billion, or less than 1 percent of Japan's GNP.

---

people superior to or inferior to Western peoples?" More Japanese than not answered Inferior. But that was the last year when the Japanese gave themselves the short end of the stick. By 1973, 39 percent of the Japanese considered themselves superior, 18 percent thought themselves equal, and only 9 percent considered themselves inferior.

In 1973, the Japanese were asked to rate themselves on levels of scientific technology, artistic achievement, economic strength, standard of living, and richness of emotional life. In science, art, and economics, they rated themselves extremely—or quite—high. In living standards and emotional life, they weren't sure if they were quite high or quite low. Clearly, however, the Japanese had recovered their self-esteem.

Since 1960, the news service JIJI has asked 2,000 Japanese every month which countries they like or dislike the most. The United States was the most-liked country until 1966, when disenchantment with American action in Vietnam sent its popularity to a new low and gave the lead to Switzerland, a country about which other surveys have shown the Japanese know very little. The Soviet Union has consistently been the most disliked nation, though in recent years it has been getting strong competition from the two Koreas. Since 1975, the Japanese have disliked South Korea more than North Korea. There is a noteworthy tendency for more and more Japanese respondents to say that they like or dislike no country. In the '70s, their percentage climbed above the halfway mark.

### **A Renaissance of Pride**

Over the past decade, the Japanese people have become greatly concerned with the destruction of the environment and the spread of pollution. Most analysts see this concern as a reaction against a postwar high-growth economic policy that has damaged or polluted the nation's air, land, and waters. Concern with pollution and the environment has grown apace with the renaissance of pride in country, suggesting that this reawakened love of the land is a manifestation of the new nationalism.

The pattern of Japanese perceptions, then, is like a set of rings enclosed in concentric circles. The outermost ring represents the international community. Color it pale blue; like the sky, the Japanese know it exists but they don't pay it too much attention. The second ring is the nation itself. Color it any of the earth colors; unlike prewar nationalism, which was fueled by a resentment against the outside world, today's sentiment seems to focus

---

on the land itself. The third ring comprises the government. Color it a somber shade; the Japanese are most pessimistic about it. The fourth ring comprises the family. If white is the most intense of colors, then color this ring white; the family is the quintessence of each citizen's loyalty, energy, and attention. Within the innermost circle—right smack in the center—is the individual. Color him grey-pink, the color of the Ueno cherry blossoms undulating in a March breeze, or orange-brown, the color of the wood in the Kiyomizu temple at sunset, or black-green, the color of the Matsu-shima pines in a misting rain. The Japanese citizen's views of his obligations, rights, and outlook are singular, derived totally from his culture. In Japan, the age of the individual is at hand.



## JAPAN'S CHANGING WORLD OF WORK

*by Koya Azumi*

Three themes usually dominate discussions of Japan at work: the homogeneity of the Japanese people; the diligence, loyalty, dedication, and high morale of Japanese workers; and the paternalism of management.

I submit that these stereotypes are false, or at least seriously outdated. The Japanese are, in fact, highly heterogeneous. Worker loyalty in Japan is a product of economic self-interest, not sentiment. And morale is often lower than it is among comparable workers in the United States and Europe.

It is indeed true that the Japanese are homogeneous in terms of race, language, and culture, especially in contrast to Americans. Overemphasis, however, can lead to a unitary image, which is unwarranted and misleading, particularly in matters where race, language, and culture have little relevance. It is better, I believe, to keep in mind that an industrialized society is necessarily hetero-

---

geneous; that Japan, as it industrialized, became increasingly heterogeneous; and that the forces that brought this about are likely to make the society more susceptible to rapid change.

The working-age population of Japan (15 years of age and older) is estimated at 86 million out of a total population of about 114 million. The active labor force—those employed or seeking jobs—totals 54 million. The distribution of this labor force shows a steadily declining percentage of those engaged in forestry and agriculture (9 percent compared to about 4 percent in the United States), typical of other industrialized countries. The remainder of the work force is engaged in various, primarily urban, occupations, including 14 million (26 percent) in manufacturing, 10 million (20 percent) in wholesale and retail sales, and 8 million (15 percent) in service jobs. Among those in the labor force, some 9 million (18 percent) are self-employed. The percentage of people in professional and technical occupations stands at about 6 percent, considerably below the more than 9 percent found in most Western industrialized economies.

This broad spectrum of workers, which includes a far higher proportion of university graduates in the under-45 age group than is the case, for example, in West Germany, represents a broad range of personal tastes, values, political views, and lifestyles.

It is clearly dangerous to make generalizations about the Japanese worker. While the Japanese people as a whole may have a greater sense of commitment to work than the people of other societies, there are broad variations in the degree to which this commitment is felt throughout the population. Perceptions of work and degrees of job satisfaction in Japan depend to a great extent (as they do in any society) on one's place in the social structure.

Surveys indicate that workers on the lowest socioeconomic levels and women generally are least content. White-collar workers are happier than those in blue-collar jobs. Older workers are more satisfied than young workers.

### **The Orient Express**

Not surprisingly, job satisfaction is also related, in part, to the type of industry and the nature of one's job. Workers in processing industries, such as oil refining, are more satisfied than assembly-line workers. Apart from the boredom of many repetitious assembly-line tasks, the important factors appear to be autonomy and control. The Japanese worker has no desire to become a robot. Job satisfaction drops when the pace and

---

nature of work is dictated by a machine and the worker loses a sense of control.

The Japanese people certainly appear to be hard-working. The Japanese work ethic—even more than the old “Protestant ethic” in the United States—views hard work as both a virtue and a moral responsibility. One can even find slogans posted by workers in Japanese factories proclaiming, “Work is religion.”

Japanese working abroad take their work ethic with them. Employees hired in New York City by Japan-based firms tend to work normal hours. But those sent out from Tokyo follow the custom of the home office, frequently working until 8 or 9 in the evening, and riding to their homes in the northern suburbs on a late train dubbed “The Orient Express.” Leisure time on weekends is frequently spent in some work-related activity, such as playing golf with a customer. By American standards, these workers neglect their families.

### High-Speed Work

When a United Auto Workers official, Douglas Fraser, visited Japan in the early 1970s, he is reported to have said that “in some plants Japanese workers put together cars at [high] speeds that would not be tolerated by American workers.” Are the Japanese really that diligent? The evidence is contradictory, at best. Personal observation leads me to believe that there is greater variation in work speeds within a country, than between one country and another. Workers in some shoe manufacturing plants I have visited in Massachusetts seem to produce at greater speeds than their counterparts in Japan, perhaps because they are paid at piecework rates.

A Japanese government youth survey in 1972 suggests that Japanese youth, compared to youth in other countries, are more work-oriented than people-oriented, but their values appear to be in a state of flux.

Are Japanese workers loyal? Many Japanese companies are

---

*Koya Azumi, 46, is professor of sociology at Rutgers University. Born in Tokyo, he received his B.A. from Haverford (1955) and Ph.D. from Columbia. He has taught at New York University, the University of Wisconsin, and Columbia. His recent publications include “Japanese Society: A Sociological View” in Arthur Tiedemann, ed., An Introduction to Japanese Civilization (1974) and “Worker Sentiment in the Japanese Factory: Its Organizational Determinants” (with Charles McMillan) in Louis Austin, ed., Japan—The Paradox of Progress (1976).*

---

known for ritualistic activities designed to foster among workers a sense of loyalty and identity with the firm. In some companies, the atmosphere is not unlike that of a revival meeting. In Matsushita Electric Company factories, where Panasonic electrical appliances are manufactured, it is customary to hold a daily assembly at which workers sing the company song and listen to speeches. Sometimes company officials will discuss practical matters, such as production plans, and occasionally a worker representative will deliver what amounts to an exhortation or testimonial.

However, when Konosuke Matsushita, the founder of the company, paid a rare visit to one of his plants and a delegation of workers, mostly young girls, was sent to the train station to see him off, the delegation was totally distracted by the sight of a popular television star. The TV celebrity proved far more important to them than the head of the highly paternalistic company that provides its employees with housing, recreational facilities, medical care, and a company store. Worker loyalty is less than absolute.

### A Relatively Unhappy Lot

Japanese workers fall roughly into three broad groups: those with job tenure, amounting to lifetime employment; temporary employees; and day laborers. More than 90 percent of wage earners have job tenure; the remainder are temporary workers hired and laid off according to business conditions. Studies by Robert M. Marsh and Hiroshi Mannari suggest that the tenured Japanese worker tends to spend his entire working career with one firm, not because he feels morally bound to do so, but because his status enhancement needs are better met by staying.\* These findings are at odds with an earlier thesis proposed by another American specialist, James C. Abegglen, who argues that the traditional Japanese sense of loyalty best explains both the systems of "lifetime employment" and a wage system that is based largely on seniority rather than performance.†

Other evidence also indicates that the Japanese are a relatively unhappy lot. Kunio Odaka, who has done much empirical research on industrial workers, found in the first half of the 1960s that Japanese worker morale was considerably lower than

---

\*Robert M. Marsh and Hiroshi Mannari, *Modernization and the Japanese Factory* (Princeton Univ., 1976).

†James C. Abegglen, *The Japanese Factory* (Free Press, 1958).

---

**AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF 'JOB SATISFACTION'**  
(Figures indicate % of 'Satisfied' Respondents)

<u>Jobs</u>	<u>U.S.A.</u>	<u>W. Germany</u>	<u>Sweden</u>	<u>Norway</u>
Skilled-manual	84	47		
			Middle class	
Semiskilled-manual	76	21	72	88
			Working class	
Unskilled-manual	72	11	69	83

Adapted by permission of the publishers from *Toward Industrial Democracy: Management and Workers in Modern Japan* by Kunio Odaka, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press © 1975 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. Original table was in Alex Inkeles, "Industrial Man," *American Journal of Sociology*, 66 (July 1960), p. 6.

that of industrial workers in the United States, West Germany, Sweden, and Norway.\*

Odaka discovered that only 40 percent of rank and file workers in five Japanese companies were satisfied with their jobs. Only in West Germany, where a mere 21 percent of semiskilled manual workers and 47 percent of skilled manual workers express satisfaction with their jobs, is there comparable disaffection. In the United States, the corresponding figures were 76 and 84 percent, in Sweden 69 and 72 percent, in Norway 83 and 88 percent.

In a more recent study, my colleagues and I found that only 39 percent of the 600 workers we surveyed extensively in Japan felt that their work suited them well, compared to 70 percent in Britain and 83 percent in Sweden. The study design provided control over such factors as plant size and product manufactured, and the same instruments were used to measure various facets of organization and personnel.

We found that attitudes toward work in Japan are clearly related to the structure of the employing organization, especially its hierarchy of authority. A sense of alienation is greatest where management and administration are highly centralized, and where the worker feels isolated from management. The

---

\*Kunio Odaka, *Toward Industrial Democracy: Management and the Workers in Modern Japan* (Harvard, 1975).

---

pervasiveness of rules (against smoking or eating on the job, for example) and a feeling that orders are not to be questioned also contribute to low morale. This suggests that many Japanese organizations provide little autonomy for the worker and frequently create an atmosphere in which the worker feels that he is being watched closely—and that he is not trusted.

Japanese companies are aware of this problem and conduct surveys of their own to test worker attitudes. Corrective measures include instituting provisions for greater lateral mobility as well as efforts to let workers develop multiple skills. These are not intended to upgrade a worker's job but rather to allow him to be shifted to a variety of dull, repetitive tasks, instead of remaining with just one.

### **Arranging Marriages**

It is also usual for the Matsushita organization, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Hitachi, and others to keep work units small so that workers develop a stronger sense of cohesion and loyalty to each other. The effect is such that it is not uncommon for workers to remain at the factory on their own time to discuss mutual problems, such as quality control. By the same token, sanctions against workers misconduct are more likely to come from fellow workers than from management.

The paternalism of Japanese management has been very real. It is manifested in generous fringe benefits (e.g., health care, paid vacations, housing allowances, free transportation to and from work), in the diffuse social relations between management and worker (a boss may even arrange a marriage for an employee), in the guarantee of lifetime employment, and in a reward system that includes both pay and promotion based on seniority and education rather than productivity and performance.

The no-firing policy is widespread but not universal among employees with presumed job tenure. Generally, the employer expects to retain the tenured employee and the employee expects to stay with the firm for the duration of his work career—that is, from his entry into the labor force after he leaves school until the compulsory retirement age, which has commonly been set at 55. This policy is by no means closely followed by all economic organizations. But it is sufficiently common to mean that management frequently cannot reduce its work force in response to technological innovations and market fluctuations.

Bosses consider it bad business, bad form, and bad public relations to fire employees, especially when large-scale layoffs are



---

publicized in the press. They prefer to reduce payrolls through early retirement or attrition. Even when a work force must be drastically reduced—as was the case in the aftermath of the 1971 disruption of U.S.–Japanese trade brought about by the surprise devaluation of the dollar, still referred to as the “Nixon shock”—companies usually make elaborate efforts to avoid firings.

Corporations could maintain the tradition of lifetime employment were it not for the economically irrational reward system, which awards both promotions and salary increases to tenured workers without regard for responsibility or productivity. Such practices can be continued only in an expanding economy. In the 1950s and 1960s, these conditions were largely met and Japan enjoyed a persistent better than 10 percent annual rate of economic growth. The prospect now, and an optimistic one at that, is for a relatively stable growth rate of 5 or 6 percent a year.


### **Japan's Aging Population**

Moreover, Japan has undergone substantial demographic changes. The decline in the birthrate in the 1950s, as well as an overall improvement in health conditions resulting in lowered mortality for all ages (Japan is now competing with Sweden for the world's lowest infant mortality rate), have made the population increasingly older. At the same time, the overall level of educational attainment of youth has risen, thereby increasing the number of college graduates and reducing the number of new workers fresh out of middle and high school, who filled labor's ranks in the boom years.

In addition to these factors, workers are demanding ever higher wages and bonuses, a shortened work week (from 6 to 5 days), shorter hours (down from 48.3 hours per week in 1960 to 43.5 hours per week in 1975 for manufacturing workers), and a higher compulsory retirement age (already raised to 57 or 58 in some industries because of labor shortages). In short, the conditions under which both lifetime employment and a reward system based on seniority and educational attainment can be maintained without threat to the survival of the firm cannot be expected to prevail much longer.

The problem of the aging, and therefore more senior, worker is readily apparent. In 1970, about one-third of the male labor force in manufacturing was under 30. Older workers (over 45) constituted slightly more than 20 percent. The percentage of older workers is expected to rise to about 37 percent by 1985, meaning higher payrolls when wages are pegged to seniority.

**OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES OF MALE COLLEGE GRADUATES BY AGE, 1970**



Source: Japan—Ministry of Labor, *Rōdō Hakusho*, 1976 edition. U.S.A.—1970 Census of Population.

A similar difficulty faces those firms that persist in granting promotions based on education and seniority. Currently, only about 4 percent of Japanese men aged 50-54 are university graduates, but this proportion is expected to rise to nearly 15 percent by 1985. In 1974, in establishments with more than a thousand employees 64 percent of university graduates aged 50-54 occupied high administrative posts. No comparable proportion of university graduates aged 50-54 can be expected to occupy high administrative posts in 1985 without rendering a firm so top-heavy with expensive managers as to risk bankruptcy.

Japanese management is well aware of this problem, and some changes are occurring in the reward system to make wages more dependent on performance. Hiring practices are changing as the demand for professional personnel and experienced workers

---

forces employers to recruit from rival companies. Union wage demands are being met by management, but productivity continues to rise as well. And in a recent survey of 300 major firms on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, conducted by the Japanese news magazine *Nikkei Business*, well over half the firms not only agreed that lifetime employment practices should be replaced but predicted that they *would* be replaced.

This does not mean that drastic changes are coming overnight. Nothing changes very rapidly in Japan. But the evidence indicates that the customs and mores of the Japanese workplace will increasingly come to resemble those of the United States and other Western industrialized nations. This is likely to keep Japanese exports competitive, while the Japanese worker experiences less paternalism, more job mobility, more individualism, and greater labor unrest.



---

## BACKGROUND BOOKS

---

### JAPAN

The complexity of Japan is not easy to encompass in a single broad volume.

Of the writers who have tried such surveys and histories, Edwin O. Reischauer (page 56) must be mentioned, both for **JAPAN: Story of a Nation** (Knopf, 1970, rev. 1974) and his new book **THE JAPANESE** (Harvard, 1977). Frank Gibney, former *Time* and *Newsweek* correspondent in Tokyo, is another. His readable general account of contemporary Japanese society, **JAPAN: The Fragile Superpower** (Norton, 1975), is particularly good on the business world (one chapter is entitled "How To Succeed in Business by Trying").

John Whitney Hall, in **JAPAN: From Prehistory to Modern Times** (Delacorte, 1970, cloth; Delta, 1971, paper), provides brisk coverage in 395 pages of the island culture and involvements with foreigners from pre-ceramic times (100,000 to 200,000 years ago) through the late 1960s. Hall, a Yale medieval historian, tends to favor his period, but since the feudal age in Japan was important and colorful, his emphasis is not misplaced.

Sir George Sansom's **JAPAN: A Short Cultural History** (London: Cresset, 1931; Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1943, rev. 1962) remains unsurpassed in its field, although it was first written nearly 50 years ago. It is a showcase for the kind of imaginative writing admired and practiced by this former British diplomat (later director of Columbia's East Asian Institute). A reviewer in the *Western Political Quarterly* called three more extensive studies by Sir George, **A HISTORY OF JAPAN TO 1334**, **A HISTORY OF JAPAN 1334-**

**1615**, and **A HISTORY OF JAPAN 1615-1687** (Stanford, 1958-63, cloth & paper), "a great, perhaps the greatest, contribution of Western scholarship to the study of the societies of East Asia."

The three Sansom volumes are not concerned with post-17th-century developments. These are well-covered, however, in W. G. Beasley's thorough **THE MODERN HISTORY OF JAPAN** (Praeger, 1970, rev. 1974, cloth & paper).

Two questions that have fascinated all scholars on Japan are: "How was Japan able to become a world power within the short span of a century?" and "Are there any lessons in the Japanese modernizing experience that might assist in the development of other nations?" In 1958, a group of scholars met at the University of Michigan to determine ways to explore further the answers to these and similar questions. The result was a series of seminars over the next six years and a book of essays edited by James Morley, entitled **DILEMMAS OF GROWTH IN PREWAR JAPAN** (Princeton, 1974). The special strength of this collection is that its authors refuse to see development as solely an economic problem; they examine sociocultural forces as well.

Only one scholar has written credibly about the American occupation, which followed the Pacific War. He is Kazuo Kawai, and his book is **JAPAN'S AMERICAN INTERLUDE** (Univ. of Chicago, 1960). The author has lived in both Japan and the United States and shows great ability in interpreting the former to the latter. A bibliographic study by Robert Ward and Frank Shulman, **THE ALLIED OCCUPATION OF**

**JAPAN: 1945-1952** (American Library Association, 1974), inventories more than 3,000 books, articles, and documents. The authors only hint at the scope and complexity of the American occupiers' endeavors to remold Japanese society; they make clear the immense amount of investigation that scholars must do before we have even a rudimentary grasp of these crucial years.

Two ways of examining the Japanese body politic are from afar with binoculars or close-up with a stethoscope.

Nobutaka Ike views from afar. His **JAPANESE POLITICS: Patron-Client Democracy** (Knopf, 1972, paper) is a broad sweep in a thin volume designed for the college classroom. But the book is more analytical than descriptive and the analysis is sophisticated. Ike examines various models of democracy. In the Japanese model, he says, the voter trades ballots for specific benefits. Issues and ideology are relatively unimportant. Demands for broadly conceived public policy are negligible. The system is prevented from degenerating into a scramble for pork-barrel benefits by a bureaucracy that has a long tradition of commitment to national goals. Because the bureaucracy is pluralistic rather than monolithic, policy competition is present.

Gerald Curtis wields the stethoscope. For him, "the electoral process is the heart of modern democracies, and the way in which it beats says a great deal about the health of the larger political system." For nine months, Curtis lived in the home (and dogged the footsteps) of Bunsei Sato, a conservative candidate for the lower house of the Diet, and followed him on the hustings. Sato was successful and so was Curtis, who provides a vivid description of a Japanese election campaign. His book, **ELECTION CAMPAIGNING JAPANESE STYLE** (Columbia, 1971), was translated

into Japanese and became a best seller.

The obverse to the domestic side of the political coin is foreign policy. During the past quarter century most Americans have agreed on the origins of the Pacific War: A small, willful group of military officers first gained control of the Japanese government and then set out to seize East Asia, a pursuit that left the United States no option prior to Pearl Harbor but to react (with oil embargoes, etc.) in its own interests. In 1969, Japanese and American scholars met at Lake Kawaguchi in Japan to see if this explanation was sufficient. Their papers are in **PEARL HARBOR AS HISTORY: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941**, edited by Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto (Columbia, 1973). The book runs on for 800 pages; new data, insights, and interpretations abound. The scholars did not agree on everything but they did conclude that blame lay with both sides and among a broad range of people as well as institutions, including Secretary of State Cordell Hull and the Japanese imperial staff.

For many years, we have been without a solid book on relations between Japan and the United States. That gap was filled in 1975, when Charles Neu published **THE TROUBLED ENCOUNTER: The United States and Japan** (Wiley, cloth & paper). He attempts to explain the dynamics of policymaking in Tokyo and Washington as well as to analyze the contrasting cultural and intellectual contexts. Neu emphasizes the period from 1890 to 1941. He concludes, "With few exceptions, policy makers in Washington and [U.S.] ambassadors in Tokyo had not been able to move beyond the [narrow] assumptions of their own culture."

I. M. Destler, Priscilla Clapp, Hideo Sato, and Haruhiko Fukui are interested in the politics of U.S.-Japanese

relations since 1945. In their book **MANAGING AN ALLIANCE: The Politics of U.S.-Japanese Relations** (Brookings, 1976, cloth & paper), they concentrate on three negotiations—the revision of the bilateral security treaty in 1960, the reversion of administrative rights over Okinawa to Japan in 1969, and the dispute over quotas for Japanese textile exports to the United States in 1971. In their final chapter they write, “We have found that [senior] U.S. officials recurrently take actions or make statements that damage or complicate U.S.-Japanese relations because their minds and interests are elsewhere.” In short, these writers reach the same conclusion for the postwar period that Charles Neu reached for the prewar period.

Over the past five years, we have been steadily bombarded with books on the Japanese economy. In early 1976, editors Hugh Patrick and Henry Rosovsky delivered the economists' blockbuster, **ASIA'S NEW GIANT: How the Japanese Economy Works** (Brookings, cloth & paper), a solid 943-page analysis of the Japanese economy of the past 20 years (see *WQ*, Autumn 1976, page 134).

Scholars from other disciplines have also offered information and analysis. One is sociologist Robert Cole, who worked in the factories he writes about in **JAPANESE BLUE COLLAR: The Changing Tradition** (Univ. of Calif., 1971, cloth & paper). Cole demolishes the notion that the Japanese worker is

submissive and loyal and points out that the Japanese worker supports the “Marxist” trade unions because their chiefs are the only ones who have the “ideology” to stand up to management.

Another sociologist, R. P. Dore, argues in **BRITISH FACTORY—JAPANESE FACTORY: The Origins of National Diversity in Employment Relations** (Univ. of Calif., 1973, cloth & paper) that Japan has leapfrogged over the other industrial democracies to produce a form of industrial organization more humane and advanced than those of the Western democracies.

Yet another view is offered by anthropologist Thomas Rohlen in **FOR HARMONY AND STRENGTH: Japanese White-Collar Organization in Anthropological Perspective** (Univ. of Calif., 1974). Rohlen's subject is the social structure, culture, and ideology of a medium-size bank in a small Japanese city. In Rohlen's bank, profits are never mentioned publicly; management accepts responsibility for an employee's misconduct even outside the bank; and the president invites the parents of new workers to their “initiation” ceremony and promises the parents, often tearfully, that he will take over the task of educating and caring for their children. Rohlen concludes that the bank “is not regarded . . . as primarily a legal entity or a complex money-making machine, but more as a community of people organized to secure their common livelihood.”

---

EDITOR'S NOTE. *Japan specialist Nathaniel B. Thayer (page 62) provided the above bibliography and many of the annotations. George Packard, deputy director of the Wilson Center, served as consultant. Mr. Packard was special assistant to Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer, Japan, 1963-65, and is the author of PROTEST IN TOKYO: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960 (Princeton, 1966).*