RELIGION & PHILOSOPHY

An Argument for Women Priests

"Women, Ordination and Tradition" by Francine Cardman, in *Commonweal* (Dec. 17, 1976), 232 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10016.

Cardman, a Roman Catholic professor of church history at Wesley Theological Seminary in Washington, contends that current objections to women as priests based on interpretations of Church "practice and traditions" are "unsound either as history or theology."

First, she says, Catholics must recognize the difference between Tradition (the Gospel of Jesus Christ in the Church) and changing traditions. Influenced by the Old Testament, the early Church developed clerical asceticism, celibacy, and limited roles for women, accompanied by a "questionable" sexist theological rationale. Attention was "focused on the *maleness*" of Christ, overlooking the "common *humanity* which he had taken upon himself." Then and later, it was easy to forget that Christ was the "last and only high priest"; thus, liturgy could become an end in itself with a dominant male priestly caste to serve it.

If both sexes serve as priests, Cardman suggests, women and men will see in the church "the full meaning of the ministerial expression of the priesthood of Christ, namely the representation of the fullness of redeemed humanity . . . that has been taken up in Christ."

SOCIETY

How Poor Is 'Poor'?

"Poverty Status of Families Under Alternative Definitions of Income," in Congressional Budget Office *Background Papers* (Jan. 1977), Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

How many people are "poor" in the United States depends on how "poor" is defined.

Congress's own Budget Office (CBO) says its new definition decreases the number of families living below the poverty line from 9.1 million (11.4 percent of all families) to 5.4 million (6.9 percent).

This is done, says the CBO, by including in family and individual incomes the "in-kind" benefits (food stamps, Medicaid, Medicare, child nutrition, veterans and housing benefits). Such in-kind benefits have increased 16-fold in the past decade.

Total federal, state, and local expenditures for social welfare went from \$77.2 billion in 1965 to \$286.5 billion in 1975. But this increase was accompanied by no great decrease, either in absolute or percentage terms, in the number of poor families as defined by the Census Bureau.

Income, as reckoned by the CBO, includes all revenue from jobs, dividends, rents, government, and in-kind transfers to families and individuals—minus payroll and income taxes.

The Census Bureau calculation is the same, except that the Bureau does not substract taxes or include in-kind benefits, even though such benefits account for 22 percent of all transfer payments (public aid to individuals and families).

Both the Census Bureau and the CBO use the same "poverty line," however. Adjusted annually for inflation, it is currently \$5,500 for a nonfarm family of four and \$2,800 for individuals. This is roughly based on the assumption that a poor family spends one-third of its take-home income for food. Thus, the "minimally adequate" food budget (one-third of \$5,500) works out to about \$35 a week for the family of four.

The effectiveness of in-kind transfers as a means of lifting families and individuals out of poverty varies according to age, location, and type of family. Incomes of families in the Northeast and North Central states are more enhanced than those of families living in the South and West. The incidence of poverty (calculated before in-kind benefits are added as income and taxes are subtracted) is greater for nonwhites than for whites, but figuring income according to the new CBO formula seems to raise the status of whites and nonwhites about equally. According to the Census Bureau's calculation, one in every two families headed by a person more than 65 years old is below the poverty line; according to the CBO yardstick, poverty in such families is "virtually eliminated."

Why the South Didn't Rise Again

"The Post-Bellum Recovery of the South and the Cost of the Civil War" by Peter Temin, in *The Journal of Economic History* (Dec. 1976), Eleutherian Mills Historical Library, Wilmington, Del. 19807.

Why didn't the South regain its agricultural prosperity after the Civil War? Three conflicting scholarly explanations have recently emerged. Gavin Wright blames a shrunken world demand for cotton; Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch say the end of slavery lowered productivity. Claudia Goldin and Frank Lewis believe the wartime destruction of the region was responsible. Temin, an MIT economic historian, seeks to reconcile "these stories and to present a unified interpretation."

He concludes that the South's postwar slump would have been about the same, had either emancipation or the slump in cotton occurred in isolation; in combination, they help to explain Dixie's slow recovery. But, Temin finds, the Goldin and Lewis wartime-destruction thesis overestimates the war's "hidden costs" by a factor of 4. Wartime damage was soon repaired; the slump in cotton and the metamorphosed labor situation were more long-lasting.