


**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**

*Cruise Missiles  
and SALT*

"Cruise Missiles" by Kosta Tsipis, in *Scientific American* (Feb. 1977), 415 Madison Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.

A descendant of Germany's World War II buzz bomb, the new U.S. subsonic cruise missile's chief military potential is not as a long-range "strategic" weapon (Polaris submarines and ICBMs are far more effective) but as a relatively cheap non-nuclear "tactical" weapon with a 350-mile range.

In theory, writes Tsipis, an M.I.T. physicist, highly accurate cruise missiles, costing \$50,000 apiece, capable of being launched en masse from ordinary ships, could replace the Navy's \$10 million manned fighter-bombers and their associated multibillion dollar carrier task forces. In combination with precision-guided short-range missiles on the ground and pilotless drones as spotter planes, the cruise missiles



The Navy's 20-foot sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) is shown in both its tactical short-range version (top) and its strategic nuclear version (bottom). Externally the two versions appear identical—which is part of the "cruise missile problem" at the SALT talks.

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could conceivably displace most of the costly manned fighter-bombers in the U.S. arsenal.

The cruise missile per se, Tsipis contends, is not what threatens arms control agreement with the Russians in the current round of SALT talks. It is the difficulty in distinguishing non-nuclear tactical cruise missiles from strategic nuclear missiles. Further U.S. development of sea- or air-launched "strategic" cruise missiles, Tsipis argues, jeopardizes SALT agreement and is militarily unnecessary. He urges that Washington develop "tactical" cruise missiles, recognizable as such by their limited size and engine type, and agree to forgo the nuclear "strategic" variety. Any future Soviet effort to mass-produce the strategic version could be detected, and, with its technological edge, the United States could swiftly respond.

*The Politics  
of Nixon Diplomacy*

"Foreign Policy and the Politics of Interdependence: The Nixon Presidency" by Edward A. Kolodziej, in *Polity* (Winter 1976), Thompson Hall, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Mass. 01002.

U.S. diplomacy during the Nixon years was founded less on a grand design than on "a process by which foreign policy would be managed or manipulated" to enhance presidential stature, says Kolodziej, a University of Illinois political scientist.

Discounting ideology and relying instead on "maneuvering," the President and Secretary Kissinger drew old adversaries (notably China and the Soviet Union) into mutual competition, while each was drawn closer, in separate negotiations, to the United States. Pragmatism dominated U.S. foreign policy, with short-term stability the principal goal.

Much effort was spent by Nixon and Kissinger on discovering whom to deal with—in Congress or abroad. Overseas, this approach led to "a more fluid, less structured international system." But the administration's penchant for dealing with the most powerful individuals or governments diminished the roles of client states such as Vietnam and lesser but still important power centers (Japan and the European Community).

Nixon "ironically" acted on assumptions different from those of Truman, Kennedy, and Johnson. He believed strongly in the "interdependence" of domestic politics and foreign policy. He saw himself as a leader who, "by force of his intellect, will, and imagination could impress himself on events, gaining glory denied lesser men." By ignoring Congress, manipulating the U.S. electorate, and neglecting to build a broad, philosophically based consensus, Kolodziej contends, Nixon weakened his credibility in both domestic and foreign fields. The Gaullist "personalization of diplomacy" by Nixon tended, finally, to "deflect attention from the inherent limits imposed on a nation or its executive in conducting foreign affairs."