

FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE

case of nuclear war, mutual deterrence would work; hence, further increases in number or quality of strategic forces (e.g., bigger ICBM warheads) would make no sense politically or militarily. Then both Moscow and Washington could negotiate mutual reductions in the nuclear arms levels needed to maintain "parity," "sufficiency," and "stability."

"The crucial and avoidable Western error," Gray argues, "has been the enduring misconception that Soviet motivation [in SALT] could be explained in terms of American arms control theory." Washington's ignorance of Soviet motivations remains profound. But indications are that Moscow seeks "political gains" from military competition, that its leaders do not share the American notion of self-limiting nuclear "sufficiency," and that, unlike the Americans, they do not really regard SALT as "an institution where technical experts should seek to control a nuclear arms race that had evaded *political* control."

Only recently, writes Gray, has it begun to dawn on American arms control specialists and policymakers that the Soviets may be playing the SALT game by different rules and with different goals. The implications for U.S. defense policy are enormous. Badly needed, he contends, is less simplistic, more "political" analysis "relevant to a super-power strategic balance that is evolving in favor of the Soviet Union."

*Warnke's Views
of the World*

"We Don't Need a Devil (to Make or Keep Our Friends)" by Paul C. Warnke, in *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1976-77), 155 Allen Blvd., Farmingdale, N.Y. 11735.

The "complex game of global maneuver we play with the Soviets" should not be allowed to distort U.S. relations with other nations, writes Warnke, a Washington lawyer and President Carter's first choice as head of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Although the Soviets' military strength now approaches that of the United States, Moscow is still a "long way from first rank" in terms of economic weight and political influence; its aid to the Third World is "spotty" and "blotted with glaring self-interest." The Russians need U.S. technology and feed grain; Washington should try to work out agreements with Moscow that would contribute to world security, beyond the "imperative of an agreement at SALT that would effectively restrain the . . . accumulation of still more nuclear arms." One possibility: a U.S. offer of talks on Indian Ocean naval limits.

For Peking, observes Warnke, "our value as a friend may still be perceived as a function of our status as their enemy's [Moscow's] enemy." But U.S. policy toward China cannot hinge on how anti-Soviet we are. Nor, he adds, is it "our responsibility to re-establish Peking's control over Taiwan"; any Communist effort to settle the Taiwan issue by force would be a threat to U.S. interests in the area. Overall, the United States should act as the enemy of neither Moscow nor Peking, thereby "gaining our greatest ability" to make the future brighter.