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of nearly all the key provisions—amount and duration of benefits, eligibility requirements, disqualifications, tax rates for employers—is generally left up to the states. (In 1976, Texas employers paid about 0.3 percent of wages; California employers paid 2.1 percent.)

As of October 1976, 20 states and the District of Columbia had been forced to borrow an extra \$3 billion from the federal unemployment account in Washington, whereas other states had healthy reserves of federal funds, together with moneys they had raised themselves through taxes.

The new 1976 law creates a national commission to study unemployment compensation. Becker recommends that it separate myth from fact in unemployment research; it should consider whether or not employees should be taxed as well as employers and design a fair formula for state and federal sharing of the burden.

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*A Critique
of SALT Ideas*

“Detente, Arms Control, and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT” by Colin S. Gray, in *The American Political Science Review* (Dec. 1976), 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Certain arms control theories and strategic perceptions have shaped U.S. policy in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) with Moscow that began in 1969. As a result of these, SALT, in Gray’s view, has produced “no substantial measures” of arms control. The latest accord on numbers of missiles at Vladivostok in 1974, far from “putting a cap” on the superpower arms race (as Henry Kissinger put it), opened the door to “qualitative” competition and future strategic instability.

In a detailed critique of published U.S. thinking about SALT, arms control, and détente, Gray, a Hudson Institute researcher, suggests that revived debate on national defense strategy was overdue—and not only because of long-underestimated Soviet growth in ICBMs and heavy warheads.

The big questions, he suggests, still need serious study: “What really drives” the nuclear arms race? What have we learned about the “dynamics” and real “purposes” of arms control talks since 1958? What should be the criterion (“sufficiency” or “essential equivalence” with Moscow) for U.S. strategic forces in the long-range future? How do Soviet strategic concepts and negotiating policies differ from those of the Americans? And which of these differences are important?

Essentially, Gray says, American arms control theorists long assumed that, since both Moscow and Washington felt strong enough to ensure the destruction of the other side’s urban industrial base in

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case of nuclear war, mutual deterrence would work; hence, further increases in number or quality of strategic forces (e.g., bigger ICBM warheads) would make no sense politically or militarily. Then both Moscow and Washington could negotiate mutual reductions in the nuclear arms levels needed to maintain "parity," "sufficiency," and "stability."

"The crucial and avoidable Western error," Gray argues, "has been the enduring misconception that Soviet motivation [in SALT] could be explained in terms of American arms control theory." Washington's ignorance of Soviet motivations remains profound. But indications are that Moscow seeks "political gains" from military competition, that its leaders do not share the American notion of self-limiting nuclear "sufficiency," and that, unlike the Americans, they do not really regard SALT as "an institution where technical experts should seek to control a nuclear arms race that had evaded *political* control."

Only recently, writes Gray, has it begun to dawn on American arms control specialists and policymakers that the Soviets may be playing the SALT game by different rules and with different goals. The implications for U.S. defense policy are enormous. Badly needed, he contends, is less simplistic, more "political" analysis "relevant to a super-power strategic balance that is evolving in favor of the Soviet Union."

*Warnke's Views
of the World*

"We Don't Need a Devil (to Make or Keep Our Friends)" by Paul C. Warnke, in *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1976-77), 155 Allen Blvd., Farmingdale, N.Y. 11735.

The "complex game of global maneuver we play with the Soviets" should not be allowed to distort U.S. relations with other nations, writes Warnke, a Washington lawyer and President Carter's first choice as head of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Although the Soviets' military strength now approaches that of the United States, Moscow is still a "long way from first rank" in terms of economic weight and political influence; its aid to the Third World is "spotty" and "blotted with glaring self-interest." The Russians need U.S. technology and feed grain; Washington should try to work out agreements with Moscow that would contribute to world security, beyond the "imperative of an agreement at SALT that would effectively restrain the . . . accumulation of still more nuclear arms." One possibility: a U.S. offer of talks on Indian Ocean naval limits.

For Peking, observes Warnke, "our value as a friend may still be perceived as a function of our status as their enemy's [Moscow's] enemy." But U.S. policy toward China cannot hinge on how anti-Soviet we are. Nor, he adds, is it "our responsibility to re-establish Peking's control over Taiwan"; any Communist effort to settle the Taiwan issue by force would be a threat to U.S. interests in the area. Overall, the United States should act as the enemy of neither Moscow nor Peking, thereby "gaining our greatest ability" to make the future brighter.