

**POLITICS & GOVERNMENT**

*Turning Around  
Old Voting Trends*

"Liberalism Upside Down: The Inversion of the New Deal Order" by Everett Carl Ladd, Jr., in *Political Science Quarterly* (Winter 1976-77), 2852 Broadway, New York, N.Y. 10025.

As many political analysts have noted, the New Deal voting pattern—relatively well-to-do Republicans vs. Democratic workers—has changed greatly since World War II. Ladd, a University of Connecticut political scientist, looks at the details. He analyzes the Democratic voting trends of the high, middle, and low "socio-economic strata" (SES) in the presidential elections of 1948, 1960, 1968, and 1972.

Among his findings: 30 percent of high SES votes went to Truman in 1948, 38 percent to Kennedy in 1960, 36 percent to Humphrey in 1968, and 32 percent to McGovern in 1972.

The shifts in the middle SES (lower white-collar or skilled manual occupations) and lower SES (semiskilled and unskilled occupations, service workers, farm laborers) are far more dramatic. Truman received 43 percent of middle SES votes and 57 percent of lower SES; Kennedy 53 and 61 percent; Humphrey 39 and 38 percent (Ladd does not discuss the impact of George Wallace's 1968 candidacy); and McGovern 26 and 32 percent.

High SES professionals (doctors, lawyers, scientists, and others in related fields) now have good incomes but many do not line up with "business." Rather, they tend to see themselves as members of an "intelligentsia" that responds to liberal "intellectual values and orientations." At the same time, much of the working class has gained a greater degree of material prosperity (e.g., a house in a "first suburb"). These voters are not only "anxious to preserve a status achieved at considerable effort" but are fearful that they will have to foot the bills for the ever-widening social services to the poor advocated by well-to-do liberals.

*The Burdens  
of Unemployment*

"39, 52, 65, Hike: The Lengthening Weeks of Unemployment Insurance" by Joseph M. Becker, S.J., in *Across the Board* (Feb. 1977), Conference Board, 845 Third Ave., New York, N.Y. 10022.

Since last fall, when HR 10201 was signed into law by President Ford, adding 9.1 million jobs to the total covered by unemployment compensation, about 93 percent of the U.S. civilian work force has been protected against total loss of income due to joblessness.

Yet, says Becker, a Georgetown social studies professor, this increased coverage and, particularly, the recent, recession-born extension of eligibility time have quintupled the "normal" cost (to \$15 billion) and placed stresses on the program it was not designed to bear.

Unemployment insurance is a federal-state program. Each state program must meet certain limited federal standards, but determination

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of nearly all the key provisions—amount and duration of benefits, eligibility requirements, disqualifications, tax rates for employers—is generally left up to the states. (In 1976, Texas employers paid about 0.3 percent of wages; California employers paid 2.1 percent.)

As of October 1976, 20 states and the District of Columbia had been forced to borrow an extra \$3 billion from the federal unemployment account in Washington, whereas other states had healthy reserves of federal funds, together with moneys they had raised themselves through taxes.

The new 1976 law creates a national commission to study unemployment compensation. Becker recommends that it separate myth from fact in unemployment research; it should consider whether or not employees should be taxed as well as employers and design a fair formula for state and federal sharing of the burden.

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**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**


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### *A Critique of SALT Ideas*

“Detente, Arms Control, and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT” by Colin S. Gray, in *The American Political Science Review* (Dec. 1976), 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Certain arms control theories and strategic perceptions have shaped U.S. policy in the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) with Moscow that began in 1969. As a result of these, SALT, in Gray’s view, has produced “no substantial measures” of arms control. The latest accord on numbers of missiles at Vladivostok in 1974, far from “putting a cap” on the superpower arms race (as Henry Kissinger put it), opened the door to “qualitative” competition and future strategic instability.

In a detailed critique of published U.S. thinking about SALT, arms control, and détente, Gray, a Hudson Institute researcher, suggests that revived debate on national defense strategy was overdue—and not only because of long-underestimated Soviet growth in ICBMs and heavy warheads.

The big questions, he suggests, still need serious study: “What really drives” the nuclear arms race? What have we learned about the “dynamics” and real “purposes” of arms control talks since 1958? What should be the criterion (“sufficiency” or “essential equivalence” with Moscow) for U.S. strategic forces in the long-range future? How do Soviet strategic concepts and negotiating policies differ from those of the Americans? And which of these differences are important?

Essentially, Gray says, American arms control theorists long assumed that, since both Moscow and Washington felt strong enough to ensure the destruction of the other side’s urban industrial base in