The white-ruled Republic of South Africa, facing economic recession and black unrest, is still the area's strongest power. With the independence of Angola and Mozambique, its neighbors are now ruled by black African regimes, except for hardpressed Rhodesia.

Southern Africa

In the wake of the Angolan civil war, the independence of Mozambique, and the pressures for black majority rule in Rhodesia, Southern Africa is back in the news. Involved directly or indirectly in all these changes has been the Republic of South Africa, whose own tranquillity was shaken last summer by the rioting black youths of Soweto outside Johannesburg. The Republic's future as a locus of Western investment, a friendly military power, and prosperous citadel of white supremacy is again a matter of scholarly speculation and much debate. Our Background Books cover the entire area of Southern Africa. Our essayists focus on South Africa. Historian Lewis H. Gann examines the peculiar white experience which has so strongly shaped Pretoria's politics. Political scientist Gwendolen Carter reviews the blacks' long history of protest. Journalist Colin Legum examines possible outcomes, and anthropologist Absolom Vilakazi supplies additional commentary.

THE WHITE EXPERIENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

by Lewis H. Gann

It was a rough day at sea in April 1652, when the first mate of the Dutch vessel *Drommedaris* sighted land at the Cape of Good Hope. The crew, under the command of Captain Jan van Riebeeck, a thick-set, weather-beaten surgeon with much seagoing experience, dropped anchor, and the Dutch built their first crude fort of earth and timber on a site close to Cape Town's present main railroad station. Unwittingly, the Dutch had taken the first step toward permanent white settlement in

Southern Africa. They had merely been seeking a harbor where their ships might refit and obtain food and fresh water on the long trip to the Indies, but the fort and its market garden evolved into a colony as more settlers arrived. They came from Holland, Germany, and France. In 1679 a number of families moved beyond the isthmus into the Cape proper.

Life on the Frontier

The temperate climate enabled white women to settle in the country and raise healthy children. Their presence discouraged male colonists from marrying women of the indigenous Khoikhoi, a primitive, dark-skinned, pastoral people known to the settlers as Hottentots. Irregular interracial unions were not uncommon, but their offspring bore the badge of illegitimacy and were treated with contempt by both races. The Dutch introduced slaves from the East Indies into the country, which accustomed most colonists to look down on persons of color by associating menial labor with a dark complexion. More significant perhaps was the impact of the inland frontier, where European colonists confronted Khoikhoi herdsmen and the San (whom they called Bushmen), a Stone Age people dependent on hunting.

Life on the frontier did not always beget hostility. White hunters and traders often established amicable relations with the aboriginal communities, but white farmers clashed with their black neighbors over water sources, and pasture land. The native herdsmen were unable to defend their grazing grounds against the advancing whites, and many perished. Others were reduced to dependence or servile status; still others mingled with whites, acquired horses, guns, and wagons, adopted the language of their conquerors, and turned to farming on the European model.

As the tide of European conquest rolled on into the 18th

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century, the whites became increasingly color-conscious. Whereas it was possible for halfcaste Christian converts to acquire full civic status in the early days, the sacrament of baptism no longer sufficed to make a half-breed the equal of a white man in the civic sense. A Cape burgher now had to be born of free white parents to be accepted as a fully qualified citizen.

At the same time, white society split into two distinct segments: the society of the coastal Cape settlements, linked to Holland by ties of culture, ancestry, and religion (the Dutch Reformed Church) and the pastoral society of the interior. Cape Town had grown into a substantial port that looked toward both the Atlantic and the Indian Ocean. The adjoining settlements drew their grain supplies from farms of the European type in the Western Cape. These were substantial estates, worked by colored (that is to say, halfcaste Eurafrican) labor. The wealthier European farmers built substantial but simply furnished homes, embellished with whitewashed walls, great verandas, and fine portals.

The sedentary society of the Western Cape contrasted sharply with the rude society of the interior. As the colonists pushed deeper inland, they raised livestock rather than market crops. Subdivision of land, accompanied by more intensive cultivation, was not a feasible proposition as long as labor and capital were scarce, markets inadequate, and only land was plentiful. The *trekboer*, or Boer herdsmen, kept moving in order to avoid competing with their neighbors for pastures and wells. Trekking provided opportunities for the poor who could not afford to buy the required farmland. Frontiersmen who could afford the land were apt to exhaust the soil by their methods of cultivation. "The veld got tired," the saying went, and the trekkers moved on.

The Taming of the Wilderness

The *trekboer* first supplied the Cape markets. Later the economic center of gravity shifted more toward the new ports—Port Elizabeth, East London, Durban—that were being opened on the east coast. By the middle of the last century, the trekkers belonged to a new nation, no longer Dutch, although they spoke Afrikaans, a new language derived from Dutch. The *trekboer* became one of the world's great wilderness specialists. He knew how to handle a span of oxen in rough country. As a soil prospector, he knew how to find the best farming land in the wilderness. He was a crack shot and expert hunter. The interior had no terrors for him. The Boer's wagon, or *laager*, served both as a

means of transport and a means of mobile defense in battle. His weaponry and military skill defeated the Khoikhoi and the San. Later, the Afrikaners met far more warlike opponents, the Bantu-speaking Kaffirs, first encountered on the Great Fish River in 1778. The Bantu were familiar with the use of iron and had developed their own systems of farming and grazing. These were as extensive as those of the Boers, requiring ever new expanses of woodland and pasture for sustenance. Not surprisingly, Boer and Bantu met in battle. The Bantu fought hard, but by and large, the fortunes of battle favored the Afrikaners—less numerous but better armed and organized than their opponents, who depended on rudimentary tools like the hoe, simple weapons like spears, and sheer muscle power.

By the beginning of the 19th century, the white population at the Cape was estimated to be 27,000 men, women, and children. Of these, about 6,000 lived in Cape Town, the principal city; by contemporary standards, white South Africans were already a highly urbanized people. The Dutch, French, and German population was further reinforced by immigrants from Great Britain. During the long wars against the forces of the French Revolution and Napoleon, the British seized the strategically vital Cape of Good Hope. By 1806, they held it permanently, and British settlers found homes for themselves on the Eastern Cape and in Natal. Some became farmers; others turned frontiersmen, like the Afrikaners. The majority, however, became townsmen, so that British influence became dominant in trade and finance. The British, of course, also held political power, and tried to reshape Cape society in the British image.

The Great Trek

In 1833 slavery was outlawed as part of a wider movement to extirpate slavery throughout the British Empire. Guided by missionary and humanitarian influences, the British made some attempts to improve the civic condition of the Khoikhoi. Forced labor was abandoned, and the former slaves were gradually absorbed into a wage-earning proletariat. At the same time, the British attempted to "anglify" the Cape Dutch population, but the Dutch clung to their accustomed ways. The more uncompromising elements escaped British rule by trekking into the interior.

"We complain," wrote Piet Retief, one of the most prominent trek leaders, in words that were to echo later from Cape Town to Salisbury, "of the unjustified odium that has been cast upon us by interested and dishonest persons under the name of re-

ligion, whose testimony is believed in England to the exclusion of all evidence in our favour, and we can foresee as the result of their prejudice nothing but the total ruin of our country."*

The Great Trek was the Afrikaans-speaking frontiersmen's declaration of independence. By the end of 1837, some 5,000 men, women, and children had crossed the northern boundary of the Cape Colony. As the wagons rolled further and further inland, the trekkers fought bitter wars against the Bantu-speaking peoples of the interior and suffered unbelievable hardships. In the end they founded two independent states, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, with complete domination of the indigenous peoples.

Diamonds, Gold, Englishmen

The new farmer republics were not left alone for long. In 1867, diamonds were discovered in the interior near the Orange River. Prospectors of many nationalities, most of them English-speaking, invaded the Cape and set off for Kimberley, the tough frontier town that was attracting both white and black newcomers from many parts of the world. For the first time, substantial amounts of capital flowed into a region hitherto dependent economically on a few agricultural exports. The precious stones were first extracted by small entrepreneurs in open quarries, but this method soon became inadequate; control of the industry passed into the hands of a few large modern companies headed by mining magnates like the British empire-builder Cecil John Rhodes. The diamond industry was sufficiently profitable to generate more investment within South Africa. Additional expansion occurred in 1886 when gold was discovered at the Witwatersrand in the Transvaal. South Africa in time became the world's greatest producer of gold.

The exploitation of mineral resources had far-reaching consequences in South Africa. It encouraged the construction of railways and created a need for a broad range of secondary industries. The miners' compound provided markets for farm products. Johannesburg, as time went on, developed from a backwoods community into the center of Africa's greatest industrial complex. The unskilled laborers were migrants from the tribal areas in the countryside, but the businessmen, managers, and skilled workers were mainly of British origin, and they imposed the English language on the Witwatersrand.

*Cited in L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, *White Settlers in Tropical Africa* (Penguin, 1962) p. 31.

POPULATION OF SOUTH AFRICA, BY RACE

	Total	Whites	Blacks	Asiatics	Colored (Eurafricans)
1904	5,174,827	1,117,234	3,490,291	122,311	444,991
1921	6,927,403	1,521,343	4,697,285	163,594	545,181
1936	9,587,863	2,003,334	6,595,597	219,691	769,241
1946	11,415,925	2,372,044	7,830,559	285,260	928,062
1951	12,671,452	2,641,689	8,560,083	366,664	1,103,016
1960	15,982,664	3,008,492	10,907,789	477,125	1,509,258
1970	21,447,230	3,750,716	15,057,559	620,422	2,018,533

Source: *Economic, Financial and Statistical Yearbooks for South Africa* (Johannesburg: Da Gama, various years).

By the end of the 19th century the population of South Africa had undergone tremendous growth. The exact figure for 1800 is not known, but it was probably between 1 and 2 million. In a single century, the number had increased to about 5 million—roughly 1 million whites, 3.5 million native Africans speaking a variety of languages, less than half a million coloreds, and just over 100,000 newcomers from India. From 1900 on, there has been a demographic revolution due to a substantial number of new immigrants, white, Asian, and African (see table). Declining death rates, improved medical and transport facilities, and increased supplies of food all helped to shift the demographic balance. More importantly, the well-being of all races increased, albeit at vastly different rates, by reason of such mundane innovations as brick houses (which replaced primitive huts), sewage facilities, piped water, and the growing availability of soap.

Demographically, the black and colored peoples of South Africa more than held their own with the white immigrants, who remained a minority within the country. Politically, the dark-skinned races were unable to exert much power. Mission-trained Africans acquired a certain measure of education, but the military and technological balance of power remained with the whites, who were sharply divided into opposing groups—townsmen and countrymen; employers and employees; immigrants and old-timers; above all, English-speaking whites and whites who spoke Afrikaans and were primarily of rural origin.

Anglo-Afrikaner rivalry came to a head in the South African

War (1899–1902). For President Oom Paul Kruger of the Transvaal Republic, the struggle was one of national survival for the Lord's Chosen People. "The Lord transplanted this people and led it here among miracles," he declaimed. The time had come to defend the Afrikaner heritage against the new Babylon. The British view of the war was that it was being fought not only for local South African interests but for the British Empire and civilization in general. Sir Garnet Wolseley, commander-in-chief of the British Army, said in all sincerity, "I firmly believe that . . . I work in the cause of Christianity, of peace, of civilization, and the happiness of the human race. . ."*

To put it more realistically, Great Britain, supported locally by Natal and the Cape, went to war against the Boers of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal over the issue of who was to rule in South Africa. The struggle began as a colonial campaign against a foe whom many British officers considered barely superior to Afghan mountaineers. It ended as the greatest overseas military venture undertaken by a European power prior to World War I. Nearly 450,000 men (including English-speaking South Africans and volunteers from countries as far afield as Australia and Canada) served under the Union Jack, as against a total of about 87,000 on the Afrikaner side. To many Americans it was a replay of the American Revolution. To the Boers it was a war of national defense, known in Afrikaans history books as the Second Freedom War. To British South Africans in the Transvaal, it was a war for equal rights with the Afrikaans-speaking burghers. Socialists mistakenly regarded the war as a struggle for South Africa's gold. (The so-called Rand Lords were in fact divided.)

Defeat into Victory

Fundamentally, it was a white civil war, a war of territorial unification, comparable in a certain sense to the U.S. Civil War, with Afrikaners, Jews, Irishmen, and even Englishmen fighting on both sides. After a long and bitter struggle, the British won, but only in a military sense. In 1906, the conquerors restored self-government to the defeated Orange Free State and Transvaal, and in 1910 the four South African colonies joined in the Union of South Africa, a self-governing dominion as independent of British political control as Canada. The franchise remained largely confined to whites, of whom the Afrikaners were a majority, and Afrikaans remained the nation's most widely spoken language.

*Cited in Eversley Belfield, *The Boer War* (Hamden, Conn.: Shoe String, 1975), p. 5.

Politically, control began to pass into Afrikaner hands. (Since 1910, all South African Prime Ministers have come from the Afrikaans-speaking community.) The balance of economic power, on the other hand, continued to rest with English-speaking whites, and in a military sense, South Africa remained allied to Great Britain.

After the Boer War, South Africa seemed destined to simply supply overseas industries with raw materials, mainly metals. During the 1930s and 1940s, the most distinguished academicians predicted that South Africa's industrial progress was bound to be slow. Color-bar legislation, favoring white men in skilled jobs over black, said the experts, would prevent the country from embarking on a rapid course of industrialization, not to mention other obstacles, such as lack of capital. The country was seen as locked in a vicious cycle of rural poverty from which it could not speedily emerge.

But as happened so often in South African history, the academicians turned out to be wrong. Speaking broadly, the industrial revolution on the African continent began in South Africa. World War I saw a rapid growth of manufacturing. During the 1930s (at a time when nearly half of South Africa's European-descended population—mostly Afrikaners—were still classed as "poor whites"), South Africa began to manufacture its own steel, thereby laying the foundations of a major industrial system. During World War II, industrialization increased at a phenominal pace, and manufactures became increasingly diversified and complex.

Africa's Most Urban Society

In the 1950s, South Africa was the first African country to reach industrial parity with the developed nations of the world. By the late sixties, the country was not only exporting specialized mining equipment but was turning out sophisticated electronic and nuclear engineering products and demonstrating managerial and entrepreneurial skills that were to influence the economic fortunes of neighboring Rhodesia and Zambia. South Africa ceased to be totally dependent on foreign capital and, for a time, even began to export its surpluses.

The social effects of industrialization were far-reaching. The Afrikaners were drawn into the cities, like their English-speaking countrymen before them. (By 1970, 86.7 percent of all whites, as against 35 percent of Africans, had become urban dwellers.) The class of poor whites largely disappeared as unskilled whites

moved into semiskilled and skilled jobs, and skilled whites moved into the managerial class. This progression was accompanied by a form of "ethnic succession" as black Africans began to move into the cities to fill industrial jobs previously held by less well-paid whites, commonly Afrikaners. Afrikaners, once the butt of ethnic jokes by English-speaking South Africans, began to make their fortunes in industry, banking, commerce, and publishing, fields where English-speakers had once been supreme. Afrikaners' political predominance solidified in 1948 when the National Party, largely an Afrikaans-speaking organization, gained victory at the polls.*

This Afrikaner victory brought about a decisive change in South Africa's international reputation. During the Boer War, liberal opinion overseas had regarded the Afrikaners as virtuous underdogs, struggling for freedom from British rule. During World War II, Jan Christiaan Smuts, ex-Boer guerrilla leader and then South African Prime Minister, had given inestimable, much-lauded service to the allied cause. The British military effort in the Near East depended on control of the Cape route; South African gold helped to sustain the Allied cause. Liberals at home and abroad were loud in their praise of Smuts, and his fall in 1948 was interpreted by the British South African press and by academia as a disaster, indeed almost as an offense against the natural order. In time, South Africa came to be the prime target of international humanitarian criticism, the "unspeakable Turk" of the mid-20th century, its tyrannies seen as worse than those of Stalin, Ho Chi Minh, or the grubby despots of ex-colonies like Equitorial Guinea.

In South Africa after 1948, the ruling National Party made no verbal concessions to the real or supposed spirit of the age. The Nationalists remained committed to minority rule by European-descended South Africans. African opposition was to be assuaged by social reform (ironically enough, the record of the Nationalists in urban renewal and the provision of medical and educational services for Africans turned out to be much superior to that of the Smuts regime). In addition, the South African blacks would enjoy local independence.

The critics, however, totally rejected what they regarded as a form of social tinkering. The South African system, as they

*Since September 1966, the Republic of South Africa's National Party Government has been headed by Prime Minister Balthazar J. Vorster. The largely Afrikaans-speaking Nationalists, as of May 1976, held 122 seats in the House of Assembly; the divided, largely "English" United Party, which advocates a federation of racially based local governments with a multiracial central parliament under white guidance, held 35 seats; the Progressive Reform Party, formed in 1975 from a liberal faction of the United Party, held 12 seats.

saw it, depended on a ruling "pigmentocracy," comprising no more than one fifth of South Africa's total population. The Bantu homelands were but a sham. The gap between whites on the one hand and browns and blacks on the other, remained unbridgeable. At a time when the peoples of the Third World were throwing off the shackles of colonialism, South Africa (its critics insisted) remained a global anachronism, a neo-Fascist state, a peril to peace and to human liberty, the problem child of the guilty West. The system must be mended or ended—mended by reform or ended by revolution. Fundamental change, they argued, was both healthy and inevitable, even if accompanied by violence and temporary breakdown.

Myths and Realities

Those sympathetic to the cause of South Africa (like the present writer) took a very different line. The belief that South Africa was governed by a rigid, unchanging dictatorship, they held, rested on an optical illusion. White South Africans, during the last three decades, had in fact evolved in a fashion that would have appeared strikingly "negrophilist" to supposedly liberal statesmen of an earlier generation such as Prime Minister Smuts.

During the 1930's, the National Party had resembled in certain respects a Middle-European anti-Semitic peasant party composed of intellectuals, poverty-stricken farmers, and white workmen threatened by unemployment because of black competition. A generation later, the Nationalists had dropped their erstwhile hostility to the Jews. Their numbers included many solid businessmen and bankers willing to give employment to qualified workmen, no matter what the color of their skin.* South Africa, moreover, was anything but decadent. It was economically the most progressive country on the African continent. Blacks as well as whites benefited from economic development. Black wages had gone up steadily, despite wage discrimination. By late 1976, less than 3 percent of all jobs in South Africa were officially restricted to whites only.

Given South Africa's economic vigor, the chances for revolution were small. The opposition was divided. The Republic's army and the administration were neither inefficient nor corrupt,

*In his forthcoming *The Politics of South Africa* (Oxford, 1977), Howard Brotz writes that the National Party has long been unduly dominated by its apartheid extremists. Brotz argues that a new "center" coalition could attract a sufficient majority of relatively moderate white voters, both from the National Party and the United Party, to a policy of "reality, sense, and decency" with respect to the homelands, urban blacks, and "law and order." But Mr. Vorster's Nationalists, he maintains, must take the lead.—ED.

nor were they subject to infiltration like, say, the former government of South Vietnam. The country's military expenditures, though impressive by African standards, did not constitute an insupportable burden.* Despite predictions of a racial bloodbath, the whites had managed the country with infinitely less bloodshed than had occurred in independent African countries like Nigeria, the Sudan, Uganda, Zaire, and Angola. The Indian minority had grievances but were quite conscious of the fact that their existence in white-governed South Africa compared favorably with the plight of Indian minorities in black African states like Kenya or Uganda.

The Bantu-speaking black Africans likewise had grounds for discontent. There was rioting; there was much bitterness; but there was almost no black emigration. Few South African blacks left for Mozambique or Angola. On the contrary, many hundred thousands of foreign Africans had chosen to live and work within South Africa. The Bantu homelands policy suffered from a variety of severe, unresolved contradictions. It was certain, for instance, that the program would require more capital and would have to be much enlarged, and that the whites would have to concede municipal home rule to urban Africans as well. Yet by African standards, the homelands had not done too badly. (The per capita income of the Transkei—a Bantu homeland granted independence in 1976—was larger than that of Togo, Tanzania, Sudan, Somalia, Rwanda, Niger, Mali, or Malagasy; the per capita income of another homeland, Kwazulu, exceeded that of Guinea, Gambia, Ethiopia, Dahomey, Chad, and Burundi.)

No Revolution in Sight

In terms of civil liberty, South Africa is infinitely freer than most of the countries that condemned South Africa in the United Nations. The English-language press in South Africa, for instance, remains solidly arrayed against a supposedly totalitarian Afrikaans-led regime. The freedom that churchmen or dissident academics enjoy in South Africa would appear extraordinary to their counterparts in China, Russia, Vietnam, Cuba, or in most other African states. South Africa did not expel dissident ethnic minorities by the millions, as the Poles and Czechs, the Indians and Pakistanis, the Burmese, and the Ugandans had done after World War II, all without incurring global censure. Relations between the races in South Africa in the mid-1970s, though

*South Africa's military budget in 1976 totaled $1.5 billion (17 percent of the total national budget) for a 51,000-man army, air force, and navy.—Ed.

strained, were vastly more peaceful than relations between rival ethnic groups in Lebanon, Cyprus, Nigeria, and many other strife-torn countries of the world.

South African blacks were—and are—divided along linguistic, ethnic, and social lines. No disciplined cohesive cadres capable of leading a revolution exist. Armed intervention on the part of other African states is not presently feasible, given the strength of the South African military, and the logistic, organizational, and political weaknesses of Pretoria's foes.

The old-style trekker looked for fresh pastures whenever he saw smoke rising from some newly built homestead on the distant horizon. But future treks will not avail against the new challenges of the megalopolis, as economic expansion makes Johannesburg and Pretoria coalesce into great, multiethnic, urban complexes. It is, of course, conceivable that the South African economy, already faced with recession, inflation, and fluctuating gold prices, might be shaken to its foundations by a bloody civil war. To this writer, such a contingency seems unlikely, given the balance of power. Regardless of who wields political power in the future, the nation's major task will be twofold: to feed an expanding population and to solve the problems of an industrial society. In this great task, the whites will continue to play a major, perhaps a decisive, role. But first they will have to overcome obstacles that would have taxed alike the courage of a Jan van Riebeeck and the resolution of a Cecil Rhodes.

THE BLACK EXPERIENCE IN SOUTH AFRICA

by Gwendolen M. Carter

Behind the present tension in South Africa lies more than a century of intermittent protests against the steadily increasing social, political, and economic restrictions imposed on blacks by the dominant white minority. These protests have helped to forge an African nationalism that promises to transcend ethnic divisions. From the first, however, the blacks confronted a powerful white Afrikaner nationalism imbued with elitist Calvinism and a sense of white superiority. From the time of their arrival in the 17th century, the Dutch settlers were determined to dominate the heathen and build their own society in this new world.

The Dutch—and later the English—did not conquer South Africa without overcoming strong resistance, but by the late 19th century, even the best-organized African tribes had been crushed and scattered (see preceding article). Their members became farm laborers or squatters, or were driven into the limited territories long known as reserves and now called homelands.

Before the discovery of gold in the Witwatersrand reef in 1886, some Africans, despite the disruption of tribal organization, continued to produce not only for their own needs but also for sale. Some did well in adopting new crops and techniques. Although their relations with Afrikaners were often marked by roughness, there was little calculated racial discrimination. As long as land was plentiful and the struggle was primarily for land, it was possible to accommodate both black and white. With the opening of the mines, the emphasis was on labor. The ever increasing demand for cheap manpower to service the mines led to the imposition of taxes and other measures that steadily squeezed out self-sufficient peasant economies and forced Africans into the wage system.

The plight of the blacks was not eased by the reconciliation of the Afrikaners and the English after the bitter Anglo-Boer (or South African) War of 1899–1902. Indeed, the political and economic price for this reconciliation, sealed in the 1910 Act of Union, was paid by the Africans, whose small gains toward civil rights and equal status were halted, then reversed.

The new constitution provided that only whites could be elected to Parliament. In the Cape, Africans had possessed the vote since 1853 on the basis of the same economic and educational qualifications as whites and colored, and in seven border constituencies in the Eastern Cape they exercised a strong political influence on the election of white candidates. Cape liberals sought in vain to extend this qualified franchise to Africans in the other provinces.

The whites designed the structure for an independent South Africa, but black Africans were not silent. Since 1882 their nascent political organizations had been reinforced by a widely read newspaper, *Imvo Zabantsundu* (Native Opinion) edited by John Tengo Jabavu. Educated Africans demanded that Africans share the status and rights of "civilized British subjects." On the eve of South African independence, the National Native Convention protested the exclusion of Africans from Parliament. In 1912, the South African Native Congress (subsequently African National Congress) was established through the efforts of four British- and American-trained African lawyers. The African National Congress long remained the chief voice of organized blacks.

Poor Whites, Poorer Blacks

There was much to protest. Late 19th century laws, framed to benefit mine owners, pushed Africans off the land, leaving them no alternative but to work in white-controlled mines, commerce, and agriculture. The Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 and the Natives Land Act of 1913 ejected squatters from white farmlands. Other factors that pushed rural blacks—and whites—into the wage economy were growing population pressures, competitive food imports, local crop diseases, price fluctuations, and the worldwide trade depression of the 1890s.

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After World War I, persistent drought forced an increasing number of relatively unskilled Afrikaners off their farms into the cities, where they found that the better jobs were held by English-speaking workers and the unskilled jobs by Africans and colored. In the 1920s, South Africa faced the world's worst poor-white problem, with some 60 percent of all Afrikaners in or near poverty. Strong measures by the government were required to meet their needs.

In 1922, radical white miners on the Rand struck against a proposal by gold-mine owners that would allow Africans to assume some semiskilled jobs—at lower wages. In bloody fighting, the strike was put down by the government under General Jan Christiaan Smuts. Though temporarily defeated, white labor was victorious in the end. In 1924, General Smuts was turned out of office by General J.B.M. Hertzog at the head of a coalition of his Afrikaner National Party and the largely English-speaking Labour Party. The ultimate result was the enactment of what was known as "the civilized labour policy" that reserved all the better jobs for whites.

Besides protecting white labor against African competition, the Hertzog government was determined to eliminate the African vote in Cape Province, the one area where Africans shared voting rolls with whites. In 1934, during the crisis of the Great Depression, Hertzog joined with Smuts to form the new United Party, for the purpose of instituting the desired economic and political changes.

Rural and urban Africans protested. Under a new umbrella organization, the All African Convention, more than 400 black delegates meeting in Bloemfontein in December 1935 drafted a comprehensive charter of African grievances and urged that the African franchise be extended, not reduced. The whites—English and Afrikaner—refused. A constitutional amendment was passed by the necessary two-thirds parliamentary majority, taking Cape Africans off the common roll. After 1936, they could qualify for a direct vote only on a separate roll and then only to elect three whites to the House of Assembly to represent their interests (indirectly, they were represented with all other Africans by four white senators). In 1959, even this small degree of representation was abolished.

Although the blacks were defeated on the issue of the Cape African vote, the ferment in the late 1930s and 1940s brought rural and urban Africans closer together. Aside from sporadic anti-pass demonstrations and strikes, the African leadership until then had depended largely on verbal and written protests and

appeals to white authority. Now mass strikes, boycotts, and other forms of pressure were discussed—but not yet used.

While Afrikaner groups competed with each other for dominance, new African leaders and programs were arising within the African National Congress. In 1943, the Youth League was officially established. The names of its members were to become household words—names like Anton Lembede, A. P. Mda, Oliver Tambo, Walter Sisulu, and Nelson Mandela, a lawyer who, although imprisoned since 1961, is still the most widely acclaimed leader of black South Africans. In the same year, the African National Congress issued "Africans' Claims in South Africa," which not only emphasized African opposition to racial discrimination but also appeared to endorse the universal franchise without qualifications.

Separate and Unequal

In 1946, some 50,000 African gold-mine workers on the Witwatersrand, protesting low wages and discriminatory conditions, staged a walkout at the call of the African Mine Workers' Union. Also in 1946, the Natal Indian Congress began a massive resistance campaign in Durban against restrictions on Indian land ownership and occupation. Stimulated by these examples of protest, and despite the harsh official response, the African National Congress in 1952 started its own passive resistance campaign against "unjust laws." Most of these were laws passed by the Afrikaner Nationalist government after 1948 to enforce more rigid racial separation.

In 1948, when Daniel F. Malan's Afrikaner Nationalists came into office, whites were startled to learn that the number of Africans who had been forced to move off the rural reserves onto white farms and into urban townships was greater than the number remaining in the reserves. Moreover, the government's Fagan Commission disclosed that white dependence on black labor for the country's growing industrialization had led to "a settled, permanent Native population" in the urban areas. To Afrikanerdom this was seen as a new crisis.

Prime Minister Malan's National Party had campaigned on a platform of apartheid (racial apartness) without specifying how it was to be achieved. Once in power with overwhelming Afrikaner support, the National Party successfully increased its parliamentary majority at almost every election. This majority was used to push through progressively more restrictive racial segregation in so-called white areas. These programs not only

PRETORIA'S SOLUTION: THE HOMELANDS



Adapted from map by John Ray, Utah State University.

The homelands presently consist of 110 separate pieces of land, scattered around the periphery of South Africa (the Transkei still consists of 3). Government plans for further consolidation would eventually bring the number to 36 (the Transkei would end up with 2). KwaZulu, for example, would be reduced from 48 to 10 separate pieces of land, and Bopthuthatswana from 19 to 6. This "final" settlement is based on the 1936 Native Land and Trust Act, which promised to increase African-held land from 7 percent of the country's land area to roughly 13 percent.

Within these 110 fragmented areas live some 45 percent of the black population—more than 7 million in 1970, substantially more in 1977. Since agriculture is rudimentary, and exploitable mineral resources are virtually lacking, a high proportion of all adult males are forced into migratory labor; the Transkei alone "exported" nearly a quarter of a million laborers in 1972. The South African government will provide 80 percent of the Transkei's budget in its first year of independence; any reduction in such funding to homelands is likely to throw still more migrant workers into "white" South Africa, from which the homeland policy is supposed to remove them.

THE TRANSKEI: TEST FOR APARTHEID

On October 26, 1976, the South African Government formally granted independence to the first "homeland," the Transkei, after long preparation and much criticism from whites and blacks alike. Chief Kaiser Matanzima and other leaders in the Transkei found independence an attractive alternative to black subjugation in the white-run Republic of South Africa. Moreover, the Transkei [see map on p. 55] had advantages over other homelands: its area was less fragmented; 60 percent of all Transkeians had homes within its boundaries; and the local leadership had considerable political experience. Pretoria promised major financial aid and handed over Port St. Johns, giving the Transkei the homelands' only outlet to the sea. There was local opposition; Matanzima sharply curbed it.

But the Transkei was no mere puppet. In line with its long-term goal of making all Africans foreigners in the Republic, Pretoria declared that, with the Transkei's independence, all speakers of Xhosa or Sotho tribal dialects who were not citizens of another homeland automatically lost their South African citizenship and became citizens of Transkei. In sharp contradiction was the new constitution adopted by the Transkeian Legislative Assembly. It said that those South African citizens who "may" desire Transkeian citizenship, i.e. the million or more Transkeians outside the territory, must apply for it formally. In other words, the Transkei Government, supported by leaders of other homelands and urban black spokesmen, insisted that no black could be *forced* to give up his South African citizenship rights. The issue remains unresolved. For Pretoria to accept the Transkei's voluntary citizenship policy would mean giving up the basic tenet of "separate development" for blacks.

affected all nonwhite groups—African, colored, and Asians—but ultimately, and more significantly, inspired a corollary drive for separate *territorial* development for Africans.

The government's first real target was the colored, whom Hertzog had earlier called "an appendage to the whites" because of their long and close association. The 1949 Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act and a 1950 amendment to the 1927 Immorality Act struck at colored-white marital and extramarital relations. After a long constitutional struggle, the Representation of Voters Bill in 1956 removed the colored from the voting roll in Cape Province, just as the Africans had been removed in 1936. These

measures have remained sources of intense bitterness; the government's own Theron Commission recommended in mid-1976 that they be rescinded. Nonetheless, despite other efforts to conciliate the colored and despite considerable white sympathy for sharing the vote, the government immediately rejected the commission's proposals.

Two other far-reaching pieces of legislation in the early 1950s laid the cornerstone of the urban segregation policy: the Population Registration Act and the Group Areas Act, aimed at restricting each population group—as far as ownership, occupancy, and trading are concerned—to well-defined places in or near urban areas.

Today, under these laws, Africans outside the reserves, now called homelands, are closely controlled in their movements and living places by "influx control." They must at all times carry a pass (a document including information on ethic origin, birthplace, age, employment, etc.) under penalty of summary arrest, and secure official permission to accept or change jobs. Indians have been prohibited from living in the Orange Free State since 1891 and have long been subject to varying restrictions on property rights, occupancy, and trading in the Transvaal and Natal. The ultimate goal of the Group Areas Act was to establish residential "racial purity" by shifting groups from one place to another. In the process, colored and Asians have been moved out of long established communities in Cape Town and Johannesburg to far less desirable sites. Africans have lost their limited urban freehold areas, and a few whites have had to move.

Still more far-reaching has been the insistent pressure, formalized in 1967, to force all urban Africans who were not born or have not been long domiciled or employed in urban areas to return to the rural areas, notably the Bantustans, or homelands. Once settled in the homelands, most male Africans must become migratory workers to make a living. As many critics have noted, this type of labor means that officials in the homeland send Africans to particular jobs away from home for a specified period of time, usually a year, at the end of which workers are forced to return to the homelands.

The Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 was designed to re-establish the authority of government-appointed chiefs, the lowest tier of what was to become the political structure of the ethnic homelands. The second Bantu Education Act (1953) moved African education from provincial to central government control, reduced the role of churches in education, and threatened to make education a handmaiden of apartheid by training Africans

only for inferior roles in South African society. Subsequently, African higher education was also brought under central government control. With rare exceptions, the relatively few Africans, colored, and Asians who attend colleges and universities do so in segregated institutions.

No Right to Strike

Working conditions have not improved for Africans. Though far outnumbering all other industrial and commercial workers, they are legally omitted from the definition of "employee" and thus lack official union representation. Nor can they participate directly in negotiations over wages; their pay is low, often below subsistence levels. Although African trade unions, contrary to the common view, exist legally, they have never had any assured rights. The 1942 ban on strikes by Africans continued to

URBAN BLACKS IN SOUTH AFRICA

Some 9 million Africans, nearly twice the total white population, live in the so-called "white" area, many of them far away from the homelands. Nearly 4 million Africans work and live on white farms. The remaining 5 million live in dormitory townships near towns and cities. Except for Pretoria, where the number of government workers swells the total white population, and Cape Town, where the colored are more numerous, Africans outnumber whites in virtually all urban areas. The white population of Johannesburg is less than half a million; about 15 miles away, Soweto (or South Western Township) houses well over a million blacks, making it the fifth largest city in Africa south of the Sahara. A quarter of a million blacks commute by train, bus, or other means from Soweto alone.

Elsewhere, the mines and complexes like ISCOR, the state-financed iron and steel corporation, and SASOL, which produces oil from coal, have their own black dormitory compounds. Four largely urban centers of industrial concentration exist within the country—the southern Transvaal, the Western Cape, Durban-Pinetown, and Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage. Of these, the southern Transvaal, particularly the commercial capital of Johannesburg and the PWV (Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vereeniging) triangle with its spreading gold-mine complex and heavy industry, has accumulated the greatest concentration of black labor and the greatest potential for unrest.

exist until the spring of 1973, but the modifications made in the ban at that time were so hedged about with restrictions that any improvements were more theoretical than practical.

All this did not come about without further black protest. In January 1952, leaders of the African National Congress demanded as "an inherent right" both the abolition of "differentiating laws" and direct representation in Parliament and in provincial and municipal councils. Later that year, as white South Africa celebrated the tercentenary of Jan Van Riebeeck's arrival at the Cape on April 6, 1652, Africans boycotted many of the celebrations and at one mass counter-rally, Professor Z. K. Matthews of Fort Hare College, President of the Cape ANC, declared that "only the African people themselves will ever rid themselves [of] political subjugation, economic exploitation and social degradation." On June 26, 1952, a passive resistance campaign began. Using tactics later employed by the civil rights movement in the American South, batches of volunteers courted arrest by open violations of apartheid regulations, such as entering African locations without permits, sitting on benches marked "for whites only," or using white entrances to post offices. More than 8,000 volunteers had been arrested by December 1952, most of them in the eastern parts of Cape Province and in the Transvaal. The membership of the ANC swelled to 100,000, and the passive resistance movement spread to the reserves.

The Road to Sharpeville

Soon there were nationwide arrests of ANC and South African Indian Congress leaders. More serious were the sporadic outbreaks of violence in East London and Port Elizabeth in which a few whites and many more Africans were killed. When Parliament reassembled in January 1953, the government reacted by introducing the Public Safety Bill and Criminal Laws Amendment Bill. The former made provision for proclaiming a state of emergency and was used in 1960 after the Sharpeville shootings. The latter instituted heavy penalties, including the lash, for supporting a campaign of passive resistance, or for soliciting or accepting help for such a campaign.

Shifting from disobedience to demonstration, and from an African to a multiracial popular front, the ANC and its allied Indian, colored, and white organizations formed the Congress Alliance and held a massive Congress of the People at Kliptown near Johannesburg. A Freedom Charter was adopted by voice vote of the 3,000 persons present. The charter began: "South

Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and no Government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people."

The government's answer was to arrest 156 leaders of the Congress Alliance in December 1956 and put them on trial for high treason. In proceedings lasting over four years, all the accused were discharged a few at a time or finally held to be not guilty. As the trial went on, a split appeared in the ANC leadership. One faction upheld the multiracial sentiments of the Freedom Charter. The other identified with the tide of black nationalism then rising through most of Africa. The latter group under Robert Sobukwe broke away in 1959 to form the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). It was the PAC that organized demonstrations against carrying passes. On March 21, 1960, before the demonstrations were over, the police had fired into an unarmed crowd at Sharpeville in the Transvaal, wounding 186 African men, women, and children and killing 72—and creating a new level of interracial tension.

The government declared a state of emergency, outlawed the ANC and PAC, arrested and detained some 1,900 people, including, for the first time, members of the predominantly white Liberal Party which stood for a universal franchise under its leader, the internationally known author, Alan Paton. Thousands of African "idlers" were imprisoned. International censure on the killings was followed by an outflow of foreign capital. Only very gradually did the situation return to a semblance of normality.

The Resistance Ebbs

Despite internal dissension and the banning of their organizations, Africans made one last effort to construct a wide public front for mass protest. The "All-In Conference," with more than a thousand Africans in attendance, met in Pietermaritzburg in Natal in March 1961. Raids and arrests frustrated its call for a three-day work boycott. This was the last effort by Africans to organize such public demonstrations.

A few terrorist acts in 1962 by the PAC-inspired "Poqo" group spurred government counteraction, which systematically destroyed virtually all effective African organization in the country. Nelson Mandela, already in prison, was put on trial again in 1964 and sentenced to life imprisonment, together with Walter Sisulu. Sobukwe was already in prison on Robben Island off Cape Town and, although subsequently released, has remained under restrictions. The politically organized internal African struggle for

AMERICAN INVESTMENTS

The South African economy has long been buttressed by substantial Western investment, much of it from Great Britain, but a growing percentage from the United States, Japan, West Germany, and France. By 1974, the value of American private investment in South Africa was estimated at $1.46 billion, over 20 percent more than in 1972, representing 16 percent of all the private foreign investment in that country (the British share is 58 percent). The 480 American firms reported by the South African *Financial Mail* in August 1975 included 136 of the concerns on the 1971 *Fortune* "500" list; 55 of these firms were among the top 100 on the *Fortune* list, and 12 among the top-ranking 15. A large portion (45 percent) of U.S. private investment is in manufacturing, e.g., automobiles and electronics, to which American technology is as essential as U.S. capital.

rights was crushed. The ANC exile leadership, under Oliver Tambo and Duma Nokwe, and PAC's exiles, under Potlako Leballo, sought support outside the country, but their contacts with colleagues within the country were tenuous, and their plan to employ infiltration tactics was frustrated (until the liberation of Mozambique in 1974) by the great distances between independent African-controlled countries and South Africa.

Throughout most of the 1960s, such vocal opposition to discrimination as there was in South Africa came from the upper-middle-class white spokesmen of interracial organizations like NUSAS (National Union of South Africa Students), the Liberal and Progressive parties, Defense and Aid with its efforts on behalf of the dependents of political prisoners, and, from 1967 on, the University Christian Movement (UCM). These organizations' black members, under official suspicion by the mere fact of their membership, stayed in the background. Inevitably, the white leaders came to be regarded as the spokesmen for all dissent; and all too often pro forma protest took the place of hard-headed political planning.

The breakout from this state of dependence came first from some 2,000 black university students on their segregated campuses. In 1969 the black students organized the South African Students Organization (SASO) and shortly thereafter broke away entirely from the predominantly white NUSAS. In two ways, SASO was distinctive: it sought to unite Africans, Asians, and colored within a single organization; and its leaders made a calculated effort to instill a new black consciousness by openly

separating themselves from the liberal whites. In some ways, they were echoing the radical Africanism of the Pan Africanist Congress but with the larger aim of uniting all races that shared a common experience of discrimination. In their view, even formal relations with whites and the associated "multiracialism" philosophy diverted blacks from the reality that fundamental change in South Africa could come only through their own efforts; whites, no matter how sympathetic, inevitably formed part of the discriminatory system that blacks must ultimately transform. Student leaders saw the homeland system—with its African leaders—as a Trojan horse designed to undermine blacks' resolve to secure full rights in an undivided South Africa.

The government reacted with expulsions, bannings, and, from September 1974 on, with detentions and imprisonment of leading members of SASO, avowedly because of the students' proposed rally at Curries Fountain Stadium in Durban to express solidarity with the blacks of neighboring Mozambique in achieving independence. Thus, black-white confrontation was reinforced. That it now goes deep into the consciousness of urbanized youth has been demonstrated by the extended series of demonstrations and outbreaks of violence in Soweto and elsewhere since June 1976.

Labor's Latent Power

Less overtly organized but at least initially more effective in securing change have been the sporadic illegal strikes by black workers that have marked employer-employee relations since 1970. Of the more than 6 million Africans in the work force, at least 2 million are engaged in mining, construction, manufacturing, commerce, finance, and transport.

At the end of 1971, 13,000 Ovambo workers in Namibia (formerly South West Africa) went out on a long and partially successful strike that received international publicity. From January to March, 1973, workers struck approximately 150 firms in Natal. The strikes took place one after another without any apparent organization. Unlike earlier strikes, force was not used against the strikers, and they largely achieved their purpose of gaining appreciable wage increases. More far-reaching effects were the overseas publicity on low wages paid by foreign as well as South African firms, the establishment of negotiating machinery by many firms, and a new national awareness of African labor's latent power. When two three-day strikes kept most Soweto workers at home in September 1976, this awareness was reinforced.

In short, strong as South Africa appears, it is a state riddled with contradictions. This has always been the case, but it is increasingly so today. Every step taken by the white supremacy system to relieve the tensions within its boundaries creates another contradiction. Curbing the influx of job-seeking Africans into urban areas adds to the population pressures in the homelands, which it is government policy to develop into viable systems. Greater dependence by white industry on *migratory* labor means increasing the flow of relatively unskilled workers but rapid economic growth demands more skilled manpower. Providing the homelands with their own African political institutions as alternatives to a voice in white institutions creates a new challenge from a black power base—whether from the independent Transkei, or from Chief Gatsha Buthelezi of the Zulus and other black leaders—which may be reinforced by fresh protest in the black urban townships. As time goes on, the contradictions and tensions will surely grow.

LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

by Colin Legum

South Africa is completely different from any other country on the continent. It is rich and powerfully armed. Even more important, it is a country where the process of economic (if not yet social) integration of the races has already gone so far as to lock the races into interdependence. The refusal of the architects of apartheid to acknowledge the extent of this integration has resulted not only in a total failure to separate the races (except into residential zones) in the industrial cities and white rural areas but has also sharpened the internal contradictions to the point where they have now actually become a more serious threat to the present system than an armed struggle.

Another major difference between South Africa and the former African colonial territories is that it ceased being a colony almost 70 years ago; South Africa does not depend on decisions

taken by a faraway metropolitan power that, like Portugal, can decide to give up an empire and withdraw its citizens. The size of its white community (more than 4 million) is greater than the combined white communities in the rest of Africa in the heyday of colonialism. White South Africans, especially the Afrikaners, whose families have been rooted in African soil for over three centuries, have no other home where they might hope to find refuge. These millions of whites still find it unthinkable that they will not continue to live in the country of their birth whatever the circumstances at the time of the transfer, or redistribution, of political power. And no black leader of any consequence has ever publicly suggested that the whites should be "driven into the sea." Quite the contrary: the blacks have always insisted on the right of the whites to remain, demanding only that they abandon their *herrenvolk* ideas.

Yet, today, there is little prospect of white South Africans—and especially of Afrikaners—yielding to such a demand, at least not before they see effective power slipping from their hands. There are signs that this possibility has begun to flicker through some minds; but most Afrikaners believe, like Mao Tse-tung, that power springs from the muzzle of a gun. And the whites have the guns. There seems to be no reasonable hope of white South Africans agreeing to meaningful negotiations with the black majority while they still remain sufficiently confident of their own strength.

Is there, then, no reasonable hope that white South Africans will consent to a peaceful process of political change? Could a nonracial society exist in which they would share a common home and destiny with blacks, through a federal system or other appropriate arrangements? Any answer to these questions must be heavily qualified. It is most unlikely that fundamental political change will come peacefully, but it could come without a totally ruinous conflagration. The idea of a federal or confederal solution might figure more urgently on the nation's agenda once the ex-

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Colin Legum, 58, is an associate editor of the Observer *of London. He was born in South Africa, where he began a journalistic career at the age of 16. He has traveled throughout Africa since joining the* Observer *in 1949, and was in the Transkei during the past winter. His many books include:* The Africa Contemporary Record *(annually since 1969),* Southern Africa: The Secret Diplomacy of Detente *(1975), and* After Angola: The War Over Southern Africa *(1976). His essay, like Gwendolen Carter's, is based on a chapter in* Southern Africa in Crisis, *to be published this spring by Indiana University Press (© Indiana University Press).*

periment of creating separate black states—the Bantustans—has proved to be a failure, and if Western policies are altered to exert a positive influence.

For more than a decade, most white South Africans have been led to believe that the current policies of "separate development," culminating in the creation of eight or nine black, independent, economically viable republics and one white republic is the *only way* to safeguard their way of life. If this Bantustan experiment fails, as is likely, on economic grounds alone, white hopes will be dashed and a desperate search will begin for some new, perhaps more realistic alternative. Whatever it is—whether federal or confederal—its success can be assured only if South African blacks and whites sit down together at a conference table for the first time in their history. The longer this negotiation is delayed, the surer the prospect of widespread violence and of irreconcilable racial bitterness, and the fewer the chances of mutual accomodation.

One strong possibility is that the entrenched whites will resist to the bitter end, rather than accept black majority rule. The other possibility is that after three to five years more of considerable resistance, they will come to accept the necessity of negotiating a new constitution settlement with representative black leaders to replace the 1910 Act of Union.

Thus, it is extremely unlikely that any serious white attempt to negotiate will come before the situation becomes more violent and the economic system is manifestly threatened with paralysis and even collapse. This conclusion must follow any analysis of South Africa's white political society. None of its leaders, or groups of leaders, is now able to make the kind of autocratic decision which General de Gaulle made to end the 1954–62 war in Algeria. In South Africa, political power lies exclusively with the white electorate, the majority of them Afrikaners. This electorate is still predominantly composed of diehard believers in white supremacy, even under siege conditions. If Prime Minister Vorster and his Cabinet were now to decide for practical reasons that a radical readjustment of power were urgently necessary (as some leading Afrikaner moderates already believe) they would likely be rebuffed by their own Nationalist parliamentary caucus, which faithfully reflects Afrikaner voters' hard-line attitudes.

Some of the most powerful Afrikaner leaders in the past have had this humiliating experience. For example, General Jan Christiaan Smuts decided during World War II that racial segregation was at odds with the reality of the country's increased economic integration; his cautious attempt to edge the electorate towards

softening segregation helped bring on his defeat and the election of the Nationalists' apartheid regime in 1948. Even such a commanding figure as the late Hendrik F. Verwoerd was unable, at the pinnacle of his power as prime minister, to get his parliamentary supporters to accept his more radical proposals to give greater substance to the idea of the Bantu homelands, of which he was the principal architect. Today, even if Mr. Vorster were to throw his own authority behind a more realistic approach to race relations, it is unlikely that he would succeed.

A Necessary Trauma

The critical factor is timing: to move too far ahead of the white electorate's perceptions would destroy Mr. Vorster's leadership as completely as it did General Smuts's; to move too slowly, in terms of the blacks' perception of their own growing power, could destroy any hope of a relatively peaceful settlement. If this analysis is correct, then the conclusion must be that the white electorate will not be ready to yield before they have suffered an extremely serious trauma. The white Rhodesians experienced such a trauma when they found themselves faced not only with a black guerrilla movement and economic strangulation, but also with open disavowals of support from South Africa, the United States, and Britain.

In white South Africa such a trauma might occur in the following way:

Urban black violence (such as that in Soweto) increases and becomes more difficult to repress. This persistent unrest erodes the whites' confidence in the effectiveness of their military-police power. The newly "independent" Transkei and other homelands become new bases of black power and serve to sharpen the confrontation between black South Africans and the white Republic.

Since the whites' basic assumption has been that the "independent" homelands will serve to *diminish* racial confrontation, this development comes as a profoundly disillusioning shock and leads to a fresh search for alternative policies. Meanwhile, black majority rule in Rhodesia and Namibia isolates the white Republic in the continent and further heightens the expectations of black South Africans, who become more defiant, and more insistent on early change. All these related developments make the Republic's basic instability more visible.

Earlier Western assumptions about South Africa being a safe place for investment are revised, and the Republic finds it increasingly difficult—and expensive—to raise new investment

ABSOLOM VILAKAZI: A WORD OF CAUTION

Anthropologist Absolom Vilakazi, 63, has taught at American University since 1965. He left his native South Africa in 1958 but has returned as recently as last year on research trips. At a seminar early this year with other Africanists at the Wilson Center, he commented on current talk of the impending "liberation" of South Africa:

The only external pressure for change that I can see as important would come from the United States, Great Britain, and the Western powers. There is a whole range of things that could happen there, but I would not want to be overly optimistic. South African whites can be pushed so far and no farther.

Insofar as black Africa is concerned, I'm afraid I am rather pessimistic. As a matter of fact, I discount all the rhetoric you hear in the U.S. from black African diplomats. It is all sound and fury, signifying nothing. Ask them, "How many troops are you going to commit to liberating South Africa?" None of them is going to commit anything.

South Africa is to Southern Africa what the United States is to the Western Hemisphere. It's like expecting Latin America to penetrate the United States.

The South African black movements—the African National Congress and the Pan-Africanist Congress—have existed outside South Africa for 10 to 15 years. They make quite a lot of noise in London and New York and Washington—very safe distances. The nearest group is in Lusaka, Zambia, but again that is a very safe distance. I would pin my hopes much more on the struggle inside South Africa.

The assumption that there are no black leaders inside the country is absolutely nonsensical. They have a lot of problems because they are right there, face to face with Vorster. But the students, for instance, have done something. They are disorganized, but they have been much more effective than the people outside. My own view is that the scenario, the kind of model which was presented by Mozambique and Angola, just doesn't apply to South Africa. We don't even approximate the Rhodesian model; our blacks are not fighting like the Rhodesian blacks. South Africa is different.

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capital (currently, South Africa needs $1.5 billion of new capital for its homeland development programs alone). New investment slows down, leading to increased black unemployment. This development not only contributes further to instability but leads to a major policy reappraisal by the United States and by the nations of Western Europe.

Then, like Rhodesia in 1975–76, South Africa finds itself isolated, not only within the continent but more than ever in the Western community, its lifeline for economic support and defense against the "communist enemy." The Communist nations increase their aid to the black challengers and to their allies in Mozambique. The Western nations are then faced with the choice of either buttressing South Africa at a time when white power has already begun to slip badly, or identifying their national interests with the black and white forces demanding majority rule. The likelihood is that Washington and London will "tilt the balance to the blacks," as the Ford administration did in Rhodesia and Namibia.

Another more hopeful but unfortunately less likely prospect would be for the Vorster regime to react with the same kind of realism to its own situation at home as it displayed toward Mozambique and Rhodesia after the collapse of the Portuguese empire. White leaders respond to demands for a new constitutional conference, trying at first to confine black representation to the homeland leaders. But they are soon compelled to bring in the urban black leaders as well, while excluding the young militants and the leaders of the banned African National Congress. The white willingness to begin negotiations helps to defuse the more militant black opposition and wins strong Western backing. The fact that white and black leaders are negotiating the country's future helps to condition white South Africans to accept the inevitability of a "shared society"—as has already happened in Namibia. It also strongly assists the cause of those white and black South Africans who believe that the country's future lies in agreement on a new federal or confederal constitution.

Faced with such possibilities, what policy might one expect from the major Western nations if they hope to help avert the violent disintegration of South Africa and, in terms of their own particular national interests, to prevent the collapse of South Africa's economy and minimize the chances of anti-Western forces gaining power with the help of external communist support? Such a policy should include:

¶ A joint U.S.–European approach to prevent the Pretoria regime from further exploiting Western differences (e.g., using the French as their major supplier of sophisticated weapons);

¶ An unequivocal commitment to the principle of majority rule in South Africa;

¶ A collective Western policy in support of the idea of a national convention, open to white and black representatives,

freely chosen for the purpose of negotiating a new constitution, with no outside dictation as to what form such a constitution should take (that is a decision for South Africans themselves);

¶ Discouragement by the West of any new capital investment before the South African whites show a willingness to call a national convention (other forms of economic disengagement should also be considered);

¶ Effective enforcement of the UN Security Council's arms embargo.

Once such a policy has been agreed upon in Washington, London, Bonn, and Paris, it would become possible to mount a concerted, carefully calculated drive to induce South Africa to seek a negotiated domestic settlement. By ending their present ambiguous policies toward South Africa, the Western nations would put themselves in a much stronger position to encourage proper change and to appear in a more convincing role as champions of "the struggle for independence, for racial equality, for economic progress, for human dignity," as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger put it in Lusaka in April 1976.

BACKGROUND BOOKS

SOUTHERN AFRICA

What was Southern Africa like before the current protagonists arrived on the scene? Who lived in the area now dominated by the Republic of South Africa but consisting also of Namibia (South West Africa), Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), and independent Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Swaziland?

Brian Fagan and Roland Oliver in **AFRICA IN THE IRON AGE** (Cambridge, 1975) briefly sketch the evidence for the Bushmen as the original inhabitants and describe the emergence of early Iron Age African civilizations at sites established by Bantu groups migrating southward. Prehistory figures also in the early chapters of the basic **OXFORD HISTORY OF SOUTH AFRICA** edited by Leonard Thompson and Monica Wilson (Oxford, 1969–71). In Vol. I, subtitled **South Africa to 1870,** the authors show African hunters and herders arriving first in what is now known as South Africa, followed considerably later by the first Cape Town Dutch colonists in 1652. (Today's Afrikaners insist that their forebears arrived first.)

The focus of Vol. II of the Oxford history, subtitled **South Africa, 1870–1966,** is the peace imposed by Britain on the Boers and its failure to create the basis for the development of a multiracial society. Much of the background to this story is in the letters, resolutions, press statements, and other "raw materials" that fill three volumes of **FROM PROTEST TO CHALLENGE: A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882–1964** edited by Thomas Karis and Gwendolen M. Carter (Hoover, 1972–74).

Professor Carter's own book, **THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY: South Africa Since 1948** (London: Thames & Hudson, 3rd ed., 1962) is a detailed account of the crucial period after the National Party came into office. Political groups examined include the opposition as represented by the United Party, the Torch Commando (originally the War Veterans Action Committee), Labour, Liberals, Union Federalists, Conservatives, and non-European organizations.

Whether in history, politics, economics, sociology, or literature, the pervasive theme in writings about Southern Africa is race relations.

In contrast to the many largely polemical works, several studies help to illuminate South Africa's black and white politics. One is Leo Marquard's **THE PEOPLES AND POLICIES OF SOUTH AFRICA** (Oxford, 4th ed., 1969, paper), a succinct and thoughtful introduction to parties and parliament, trade unions, and economic interest groups. Another is T. Dunbar Moodie's **THE RISE OF AFRIKANERDOM: Power, Apartheid, and the Afrikaner Civil Religion** (Univ. of Calif., 1975). Moodie makes clear the relationship between the Afrikaner's Calvinist theology and the "civil religion" on which the modern South African state is founded.

South Africa is the wealthiest state in Africa. Its economy dominates the region. D. Hobart Houghton in **THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY** (Oxford, 3rd ed., 1973) discusses the rich agricultural and mining resources, the impressive industrial boom, and the rural/urban, black/white, and other imbalances and inequities of a diversified and growing economy subject to powerful

internal and external constraints.

Since 1948 the state itself has emerged as a major investor. Foreign private investment has been essential, however, in providing both capital and technology. The controversial argument that U.S. government pressures on American firms can influence the South African regime is made in a new book, **WHITE WEALTH AND BLACK POVERTY: American Investments in Southern Africa** by Barbara Rogers (Greenwood, 1976). Practices of U.S. firms in South Africa are aired in the September 1976 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings, **U.S. POLICY TOWARD SOUTHERN AFRICA,** available free from the Committee.

South Africa's relations with its neighbors are subject to considerable change. *Washington Post* correspondent Jim Hoagland received a Pulitzer Prize for reporting that led to his readable **SOUTH AFRICA: Civilizations in Conflict** (Houghton Mifflin, 1972). He sees little hope for heading off a violent confrontation with militant new nationalist regimes in the neighboring black states.

Mozambique, most militant of the bordering states, still depends on South Africa for jobs for its emigrant laborers and for management of its ports and railways, finance and markets, and its giant Cabora Bassa hydroelectric project. Eduardo Mondlane, the American-educated anthropologist who launched Mozambique's nationalist movement, was assassinated in 1969. His legacy includes **THE STRUGGLE FOR MOZAMBIQUE** (Penguin, 1969, paper), his account of the FRELIMO movement, guerrilla war against the Portuguese, and involvement with the Republic of South Africa.

Richard Stevens' **LESOTHO, BOTSWANA, SWAZILAND** (London: Pall Mall, 1967) describes the history and current situation of these three weak states created by 19th-century treaties with the British that served to avert Afrikaner encroachments. Botswana has sought to use its mineral resources to reduce its economic dependence on South Africa; Lesotho, poverty-stricken and completely encircled by the Republic, resists the South African giant as best it can; conservative Swaziland, with its casino and sales of *Playboy* magazine, has catered to the demands of South African whites for pleasures forbidden at home.

The story of white Rhodesia's decolonization and likely emergence as independent black-run Zimbabwe is still being written. Former U.S. Ambassador to Zambia Robert C. Good, in **U.D.I.: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion** (Princeton, 1973), provides a scholarly account of the Rhodesian white minority's seizure of independence in 1965 in defiance of Britain and the world. African impatience with both British "liberalism" and the Ian Smith regime is summed up in Eshmael Mlambo's **RHODESIA: The Struggle for a Birthright** (London: Hurst, and Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1972, paper).

Little-known Namibia with its vast deserts, sparse multiracial population, and history of German, then South African, occupation is nearing political adulthood and possible strife. No definitive book on this country has been written. Among lesser studies that express black African aspirations are **A DWELLING PLACE OF OUR OWN: The Story of the Namibian Nation** by Randolph Vigne (London: International Defense and Aid Fund, 1973) and **NAMIBIA '75: Hope, Fear, Ambiguity** edited by Jorden Lissner (Geneva: Lutheran World Federation, 1976).

The complex societies of Southern Africa, with their mixtures of class and

race distinctions, tradition, and modernization, have generated a rich sociological literature. One sociologist who maintains that Afrikaner political rule is likely to prevail for some time is Heribert Adam. In **MODERNIZING RACIAL DOMINATION: The Dynamics of South African Politics** (Univ. of Calif., 1971, cloth; 1972, paper) he argues dispassionately that increasing class differences within Afrikaner society will bring evolutionary change, avoiding Armageddon.

Novelist, biographer, Christian militant, and political agitator Alan Paton in **SOUTH AFRICA AND HER PEOPLE** (London: Butterworth, 1970) pleads for a de jure multiracialism based on a nationalism transcending racial and ethnic conflicts. His book also provides an appealing portrait of the human and physical splendors of the vast veldt, the Karoo Desert, and the golden coastal sands. Two other important books, both by men of religion, are **DISCARDED PEOPLE: An Account of African Resettlement in South Africa** (Penguin, 1972, paper) by Cosmas Desmond, and **BANTU PROPHETS IN SOUTH AFRICA** (Oxford, 2nd ed., 1961, paper) by Bengt Sundkler. Father Desmond is a white Catholic priest currently under house arrest. His book, which is banned in South Africa, is a systematic denunciation of Pretoria's "homeland" effort. Sundkler examines the proliferation of separatist churches as Africans sought to reconcile white oppression with religious promise.

In South Africa's prolific literature as in its troubled politics, glimpses of the future as well as the tormented past and present abound. Alan Paton's 1948 novel, **CRY THE BELOVED COUNTRY**, the story of a rural African preacher who seeks his missing son in sinful Johannesburg, won world renown. The roster of talented writers includes the late Chief Albert Luthuli, Ben Jacobson, Bessie Head, Peter Abrahams, playwright Athol Fugard, Nadine Gordimer, poet Dennis Brutus, Laurens Van der Post, Richard Rive, Alex La Guma, poet Oswald Mtshali, Ezekiel Mphahlele, and Luandino Vieira, among others. Two collections that provide an introduction to some of their writing are out of print but available in most libraries. Editors Jack Cope and Uys Krige, in **THE PENGUIN BOOK OF SOUTH AFRICAN VERSE** (Penguin, 1968, paper), assemble translations from Afrikaans and several African languages, as well as English-language poetry. All sing the love of the fiercely contested land. Nadine Gordimer, herself a gifted novelist, and Lionel Abrahams edited **SOUTH AFRICAN WRITING TODAY** (Penguin, 1967, paper), a selection of short stories by writers of both races, dealing mostly with life in the cities. Out of their harshness and bitter humor comes a sense of a society being born—Black Africa's first completely urban society, spawned by the apartheid laws that sought to deny its existence.

EDITOR'S NOTE. *Comments on many of these books were provided by Galen Hull, a researcher with the Southern Africa project of the African-American Scholars Council, and Aaron Segal, program manager for International Science Studies, the National Science Foundation and co-author,* The Traveler's Africa *(Hopkinson & Blake, 1973). We are indebted also to Patrick O'Sheel, political counselor in the American Embassy, Republic of South Africa, 1965–69; and Africanists Absolom L. Vilakasi, professor of anthropology at American University; Pauline H. Baker, who has made two Rockefeller Foundation–sponsored research trips to Southern Africa; and John Purcell, Fellow, the Wilson Center.*