

---



---

**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**

---

*Eurocommunism:  
Kissinger's View*

"Eurocommunism: A New Test For the West" by Henry A. Kissinger, in *The New Leader* (July 18, 1977), 212 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10010.

Recent surges in voting strength among Western European Communist parties pose disturbing questions for American foreign policymakers. (The Italian Communists got more than a third of the vote in 1976; the French party came within one percentage point of victory in 1974.) What alternatives are available to the West if France, Italy, Portugal, or Spain elects a Communist government?

Some analysts have dismissed the threat to NATO security by emphasizing the relative independence from Moscow of Western European Communist parties. The former U.S. Secretary of State, however, finds this "independence" questionable. While Italian party chief Enrico Berlinguer and his French counterpart, Georges Marchais, have both pledged devotion to "national independence" and "political pluralism," so too, notes Kissinger, did Hungarian party boss Erno Gero in 1944 and Polish party leader Wladyslaw Gomulka in 1946.

Moreover, if the Western European Communists have in fact repudiated Moscow, it remains problematic whether the West can manipulate the division to its advantage. "No major Communist split," observes Kissinger, "has ever been generated or sustained by deliberate Western policy." The Soviet Union's disputes with China and Yugoslavia festered "for months, possibly years" before the West became aware of them. Washington's ability to bar elections of Communists is limited. U.S. diplomacy must tread a path of noninterference, says Kissinger, without leaving the impression that it considers Communist victories inevitable.

*Military Unions,  
Pro and Con*

"Should Military Unionization Be Permitted?" by Charles L. Parnell, in *Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute* (July 1977), U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md. 21402; "Unions and Democracy" by David Cortright, in *Military Review* (Aug. 1977), Fort Leavenworth, Kans. 66027.

U.S. servicemen learned how to sort mail during a nationwide strike by 200,000 postal workers in 1970. They may also have learned that Washington is unwilling or unable to cope with strikes by federal employees. Pressure for a military union is growing; the American Federation of Government Employees has announced its

**FOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE**

intention to begin organizing on military bases; and defense officials are studying the possible effects of a military union on national security.

Cortright, an associate with the Center for National Security Studies, is not worried. Labor leaders, he notes, concede a military union's need for a strike ban during times of national crisis. Morale in the armed services is low; a union, he believes, would eliminate the "reservoir of discontent" among soldiers who have come to regard themselves simply as "employees." Grievance procedures would be institutionalized. Unions would also help assert civilian control over the military. Moreover, experience with unionized armed services in West Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden "shows no damage to military strength."

Not so, says Parnell, a navy commander now assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency. In highly unionized Sweden, he writes, the government faced a walkout of army personnel in 1971 when troops balked at being used to break strikes. U.S. military unions, he adds, would foster the "sloppiness" and "unreliability" characteristic of the Dutch Army. The U.S. chain of command would be weakened, "professionalism" would decline, and hostility between enlisted men and their officers would be stimulated.

As for the issue of civilian control, says Parnell, the history of unions in the United States suggests that "our society appears to have better means at hand to control arbitrary military authority than it does to control arbitrary union actions."

### *The Pentagon's Industry Woes*

"Let's Change the Way the Pentagon Does Business" by Jacques S. Gansler, in *Harvard Business Review* (May-June 1977), P.O. Box 9730, Greenwich, Conn. 06830.

The "defense industrial base"—the industry portion of the "military-industrial complex"—expands rapidly during periods of sustained world crisis and shrinks just as rapidly when the crisis subsides. While Pentagon planners anticipate this "fact of life," writes Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Gansler, management of the post-Vietnam turndown has caused "considerable concern."

Annual Pentagon procurement outlays, Gansler notes, have declined to the lowest point in constant dollars (\$17 billion) since the early 1950s. (As a result, defense contractors rely increasingly on foreign arms sales, up to more than \$10 billion annually from \$1.6 billion in 1970.) Excess production capacity at "prime" U.S. aerospace contractors now averages 30 percent; in the aircraft industry, 45 percent. In some cases, key parts are now supplied by a single company, compromising U.S. capacity to increase output quickly. (When Congress approved a rapid tank build-up after the 1973 Mideast War, Chrysler, the prime contractor, was ready, but the