By rejecting the adversarial stance of the late 1930s and early 1940s, contends Gillam, such neo-conservatives (and former liberals) as Bell, Nathan Glazer, and Irving Kristol have tended to view the workings of political power as rigidly managerial, elitist, and virtually unchangeable. On the one hand, he writes, these intellectuals are no longer sure that the mind "can or should resist the imperious advance of power"; on the other, they are strongly aware of the "unanticipated and usually negative" consequences of many government efforts at social uplift. They now urge a strategy of "salutary" neglect vis-à-vis a wide range of social issues; "coping" is all that one ought to expect.

Gillam quotes George Orwell, who 30 years ago contended that embattled intellectuals would "rob reality of its terror by submitting to it." Gillam claims that the neo-conservatives are doing just that, by asserting the impotence of "reason" in the search for solutions to social problems.

_Bargaining on Capitol Hill_


Congress-watchers have recently noted a curious phenomenon: When House and Senate meet "in conference" to resolve differences over a piece of legislation, Senate proposals usually win.

The authors, political scientists at the University of Illinois, report that, since 1960, in House-Senate conferences on appropriations and taxes, Senate modifications were adopted in 55 to 65 percent of the cases. (The House figure is 25 to 30 percent, with the balance classified as a "draw.") This result is surprising because the House—with its members' greater specialization, tighter organization, better committee attendance, and "tougher" bargaining stance—would seem the favorite to win in such contests.

Some analysts contend that the Senate is stronger in conference because Senate conferees enjoy greater support from the "parent chamber" than do House conferees. Others suggest that the greater media "visibility" of U.S. senators provides a cushion of popular support from interest groups, lobbyists, and the public.

But in fact, the authors suggest, the primary cause of Senate predominance is structural: The House acts first on most bills (it initiated 61 percent of all legislation passed during the 92nd Congress) largely because of its constitutional responsibility for revenue and appropriations bills; conferees acting first, the authors argue, "have an incentive" to accept amendments made by the other body in order to preserve the original core of the legislation. The second body thus acquires bargaining leverage because of its implicit veto power.