



*The United States bases its security on the Mutual Assured Destruction theory—each side holds the other's cities hostage against nuclear attack.*



# Strategic Arms Control

Last spring, President Carter's surprise proposals for a deep cut in both U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces got a sharp rebuff from Moscow. However, the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), begun in 1969, have continued in Geneva, and once again Americans face the complexities inherent in reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union on curbing nuclear weapons. Here, historian Samuel Wells traces U.S. policy on strategic nuclear matters back to 1945; scholar-diplomat Raymond Garthoff discusses lessons learned during his SALT experience; political scientist Jack Snyder analyzes conflicting U.S. explanations of Soviet strategic moves; and theorist Colin Gray examines the basis of the "American" approach to arms control.



## AMERICA AND THE "MAD" WORLD

*by Samuel F. Wells, Jr.*

Technology has infatuated the American people for at least a hundred years, but only in the 1970s have significant portions of society begun to raise questions about its costs in energy, about environmental damage, and unexplored alternatives. Nuclear weapons are surely the most deadly product of that love affair. Since the late 1940s, the United States has based its security overwhelmingly on atomic and hydrogen warheads. Could we have prevented a nuclear arms race with the Soviet Union? Probably not—but American leaders could

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have taken steps, despite the lack of Soviet cooperation, to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons and limit the opportunities for nuclear proliferation. Why this was never done makes a complex and tragic story.

### **The Era of Nuclear Monopoly, 1945-49**

The United States initiated the atomic age on the premise that nuclear weapons required no special conditions or constraints in their use. Franklin D. Roosevelt ordered the development of an atomic bomb in 1941, convinced that Nazi scientists were engaged in a similar effort. He continued the crash program even after it became clear that Germany had abandoned its research. When word of the first successful atomic explosion reached President Harry Truman at the Potsdam Conference, there was little debate about whether to use the awesome weapon against Japan. President Truman did not warn the Japanese or even inform all the Allied leaders about the new weapon. Then, on August 6, 1945, "Little Boy" exploded over Hiroshima, taking 70,000 lives. "Fat Man" fell on Nagasaki three days later, killing another 40,000 people.

Neither atomic attack killed more Japanese than the 84,000 who died in the firebombing of Tokyo the previous March 9, but they led the Emperor to intervene in the government debate and tip the scales in favor of immediate surrender. The American people and their leaders rejoiced at the end of the war in the Pacific and generally approved the use of the new weapon, but, as wartime attitudes dissipated, questions about the morality and usefulness of atomic weapons began to be heard.

Some critics, like radical author Dwight Macdonald, saw the bomb as further proof of the erosion of individual responsibility, the "decline to barbarism" provoked by the en-

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croachment of science into human affairs. Many scientists, guilty about their role in unleashing this new form of destruction and concerned about its future uses, worked to educate the public about the dangers inherent in the use and testing of nuclear weapons.

Army and Navy leaders believed the A-bomb gave the United States a significant advantage, although they resisted incorporating it into their doctrine and strategic plans, in part because it accorded the primary role to the Air Force. Only a few senior officials, notably Secretary of State James F. Brynes, hoped to use the nuclear monopoly to America's diplomatic advantage. Most political leaders, including President Truman, viewed the bomb as an ace in the hole, which they hoped would never have to be used again.

#### **Arms Control Without Risk**

By the end of 1945, there was widespread agreement among American government officials and opinion leaders on the need for international control of atomic energy. Washington assumed that the Soviet Union was developing nuclear weapons, and the search for a form of control that was both enforceable and acceptable to the Soviets quickly became the major issue. President Truman met in Washington in November 1945 with Prime Ministers Clement Attlee of Great Britain and Mackenzie King of Canada and agreed to work within the United Nations to ensure the use of atomic energy solely for peaceful purposes and to outlaw nuclear weapons with appropriate safeguards.

Drawing on the work of a committee headed by Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson and David Lilienthal, Bernard Baruch presented the American program for international control to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission in June 1946. Under the Baruch Plan, the United States proposed that all existing nuclear weapons be destroyed, that no further bombs be made, and that all information relating to the production and use of atomic energy be turned over to a proposed international agency. Steps toward nuclear disarmament would occur by stages after acceptance of a treaty that established a system of inspection and control, including sanctions that could be voted by a majority of the UN Security Council and were not subject to veto.

The Soviet Union, not surprisingly, rejected the Baruch Plan. The Russians were years away from development of their own atomic bomb and even further from a reliable

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delivery system suitable for an attack against the United States. From Moscow's perspective, it was totally unacceptable to open their closed society to an inspection system and give up their veto in the Security Council before the United States had disposed of its weapons. The Soviet representatives responded with a proposal to destroy all atomic bombs first and *then* create a system of control, an arrangement that would have accorded them military predominance, especially in manpower, far superior to that of the demobilized West.

The United States refused to consider the Soviet proposal, thereby creating a deadlock in arms negotiations that would last until 1955. The sterile debate over whether disarmament or controls should come first continued; without a willingness on either side to make basic concessions, the discussions degenerated into a propaganda contest.

### **An Atomic Strategy**

Washington moved toward greater reliance on atomic weapons for U.S. defense when confronted with both a Soviet threat of growing dimensions (Russia totally dominated its neighbors in Eastern Europe and occupied North Korea) and domestic pressures to reduce military manpower and balance the budget. During 1947, the administration advanced the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan as elements of a policy of containment of Soviet expansion by political and economic means.\* Recurrent crises in Berlin and a Communist coup in Czechoslovakia in the spring of 1948 persuaded many American officials that a more forceful response to the Russians would soon be necessary.

In this atmosphere, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff in May 1948 approved the first emergency war plan of the postwar period. Codenamed Halfmoon, this plan postulated that the Soviet Union would initiate a war with concurrent offensives in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia and called for the United States to respond with a devastating A-bomb attack on more than 20 Russian cities within the first two months of the war.

Before the operational plans for Halfmoon could be completed, the Soviet blockade of the western zones of occupied Berlin in late June 1948 raised serious questions about Ameri-

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\*The Truman Doctrine, announced March 17, 1947, offered U.S. assistance in freeing "peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." The Marshall Plan, named for Secretary of State George C. Marshall and made public June 5, 1947, offered economic aid to all European countries willing to cooperate with others in helping themselves. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were included in the plan but spurned it.

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can military capabilities. Several of the President's top civilian advisers wanted to adopt a tough stance, but the Joint Chiefs pointed out the inability of American conventional forces to break the blockade as well as the lack of effective atomic power. At that time, fewer than 40 B-29 bombers were able to carry the unwieldy nuclear weapons; the atomic stockpile contained only a slightly larger number of bombs, many of which were later discovered to be defective and unusable; and there were neither bombs nor delivery aircraft located outside the United States and within range of the Soviet Union.

The Berlin blockade highlighted the nation's weak and uncoordinated postwar defense posture; it convinced the President that the Pentagon would have to make better use of its resources. Even before his surprise re-election in November 1948, Truman took steps to ensure greater military preparedness and to end interservice squabbling over appropriations by proposing a tight defense budget with a \$15 billion ceiling for the coming fiscal year.

### **The Push of Technology**

The combination of budget pressures and the availability of new technology caused the United States to adopt an atomic strategy. The success of the 1948 atomic tests promised a large stockpile of new weapons, which were cheaper, smaller, had a wide range of destructive force, and used much less fissionable material than the original A-bombs. At the same time, new long-range B-36 and B-50 bombers became operational, and the Air Force perfected new techniques of inflight refueling. The military, unable to match the immense Soviet ground forces, concluded that an air-delivered atomic offensive was the only adequate means of defense within the economic limits imposed by the President. NATO also fitted into this strategic plan, with America's European allies providing the forward bases needed for strikes against the Soviet Union. By mid-1949, the United States was entrusting its basic security to nuclear weapons capable of being delivered from European bases by the bomber crews of the Strategic Air Command (SAC).

Just as this atomic strategy matured, the United States lost its nuclear monopoly. The first Soviet atomic test in August 1949 signaled a new phase of the Cold War. For the first time since becoming a great power in the 1890s, the United States was vulnerable to strategic bombardment.

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In response to this new Soviet capability, the President called for a study on the advisability of building a fusion, or hydrogen, bomb. Senior officials rejected the arguments of scientists like J. Robert Oppenheimer and diplomats like George F. Kennan that a superbomb would not increase American security. Convinced by hostile Russian behavior that no reliable arms limitation agreement on nuclear weapons could be reached with the Soviets, Truman approved an accelerated research program to determine the scientific feasibility of a fusion bomb and, as a concession to critics of the H-bomb proposal, he ordered a broad review of basic U.S. national security policy in light of the new Soviet nuclear capabilities.

The review group, under Paul H. Nitze, then director of the Policy Planning Staff at the State Department, reported to the National Security Council (NSC) in April 1950. In the study known as NSC 68, Nitze and his colleagues argued that the United States should strengthen its defenses and prepare for a time of "maximum danger" from the Soviet Union in the year 1954. Truman did not endorse the study immediately. While agreeing that Soviet-American relations were headed for difficult times, he was suspicious of a large military build-up and wanted to know how much the study's recommendations would cost. Before the agencies and departments could provide an answer, the outbreak of war in Korea made the question moot.

### **The Era of Massive Retaliation, 1950-59**

The North Korean attack of June 25, 1950, destroyed the Truman administration's resistance to increased military spending and provoked a significant escalation of the Cold War. Assuming the North Korean offensive to be directed from Moscow (the Soviet Union had equipped the North Korean forces and approved an attack but had expected it to come later in the summer), American officials viewed the invasion as concrete evidence of Soviet aggressive intent and quickly decided to resist with force this probe of Western will. Truman ordered U.S. ground troops into South Korea, and spending for defense rose from \$13 billion in Fiscal Year 1950 to a peak of \$50 billion in Fiscal Year 1953. Outlays would decline as the war wound down, but defense spending would never again go below \$40 billion a year.

In addition to financing military operations in Korea, this

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infusion of new funds supported guarantees and increased aid to the Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan and the French in Indochina, the dispatch of four additional U.S. Army divisions to Europe, and the rearming of West Germany within an integrated NATO force. With regard to strategic arms, the Korean War years saw the development of a large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, rapid expansion of the Air Force, and the construction of numerous air bases at home and overseas. Programs begun in this period increased SAC bomber strength from 520 aircraft in 1950 to 1,082 in 1954, and to a maximum of 1,854 in 1959.


The impact of the Korean War on U.S. diplomatic commitments and strategic programs is hard to overestimate. The war sounded an alarm bell in the demobilized West. The United States extended the policy of containment to Asia and placed overwhelming reliance on military means to restrict Communist expansion. In response to an attack by a Soviet client-state in an area the United States had previously declared outside its Asian defense perimeter, the Truman administration surrounded Russia with air bases, built an immense nuclear arsenal, and transformed NATO into a significant military alliance with conventional forces. So great became the opposition of the American public to the indecisive, limited war in Korea that national security planners confirmed their commitment to an atomic strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union in the future. By the summer of 1952, the Truman administration had developed plans to use tactical atomic weapons in any wars to come. The Democrats had thus taken the first step toward what came to be called the policy of Massive Retaliation.

### **The New Look**


As he fulfilled his campaign pledge to end the war in Korea, President Eisenhower initiated a broad study of U.S. defenses that resulted in the New Look policy. The Republican administration's approach, approved in October 1953, rejected the concept of a predicted "year of maximum danger" and sought to avoid limited wars like that in Korea. Emphasizing the importance of a sound economy to a national strength, Eisenhower and his top advisers sought a military program that could be maintained over what the President called the long haul without bankrupting the country. Their plan called for increased emphasis on strategic offense and defense against air attack, and it further reduced ground forces while



**TIME CORRELATION OF WORLD EVENTS AND THE DEPLOYMENT**



OF STRATEGIC WEAPONS SYSTEMS: USA & USSR



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making them more mobile, Although Republican spokesmen stressed its novelty, Eisenhower's New Look closely resembled the pre-Korean War plans of the Truman era.

Eisenhower's views on nuclear weapons, however, represented a significant departure from those of the previous administration. He insisted that atomic weapons should be used on the first day of a general war and that any war with Russia would be a general war. He rejected distinctions between conventional and atomic munitions. With regard to tactical nuclear weapons, he told a press conference on March 16, 1955: "In any combat where these things are used on strictly military targets and for strictly military purposes, I see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else."

In strategic terms, these views became the doctrine of Massive Retaliation, which held that the United States should respond to any aggression, conventional or nuclear, with an all-out atomic attack. As Secretary of State John Foster Dulles explained the policy to the Council on Foreign Relations on January 12, 1954, the administration had made "the basic decision . . . to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly by means and at places of our choosing." Although Dulles insisted that the administration did not intend "to turn every local war into a general war," strategists from the President on down clearly expected this policy of calculated ambiguity about the nature of an American response to deter Communist aggression of any sort.

#### **Ike as Arms Controller**

While relying on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, Eisenhower at the same time made great efforts to curb the arms race and lessen Soviet-American tension. Advances did not come easily. The detonation of a Soviet hydrogen bomb in August 1953 enhanced Moscow's power, and the triumvirate that assumed leadership after Stalin's death the preceding March (Malenkov, Bulganin, Khrushchev) refused to negotiate any agreement that placed Russia in a position of permanent strategic inferiority to the United States.

Nevertheless, Eisenhower initiated many studies and proposals for the limitation of armaments. His December 1953 Atoms for Peace address, calling for the creation of an international agency to receive and utilize donations of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes, led to the establishment, with Soviet participation, of the International Atomic Energy

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Agency in Vienna in July 1957.

In order to reduce the dangers of surprise attack, the President at the Geneva Summit Conference in 1955 advanced the Open Skies proposal, which would have required the United States and Russia to exchange blueprints of their military establishments and to allow reciprocal aerial inspection of their territory. Although rejected by the Soviets at the time as a scheme for legalized espionage, the Open Skies concept, along with Ike's 1958 proposal for the peaceful exploration and development of outer space, formed the basis much later for verification of arms agreements by reconnaissance satellites, a necessary feature of the control mechanism in the SALT I Agreements.\*

In the spring of 1955, American officials headed by Harold Stassen began a series of comprehensive arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union covering conventional and nuclear arms, limits on testing, nuclear free zones, and restricted aerial inspection. Prospects for agreement faded when Soviet successes in rocket development in 1957 threatened to alter dramatically the strategic balance.

### **The Sputnik Shock**

America's sense of technological superiority was rudely jolted when the Soviet Union launched the first successful intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in August 1957 and followed it in early October with the orbiting of the first earth satellite, Sputnik I. The Eisenhower administration belittled the Soviet achievement at first, but most Americans were greatly impressed. Policy studies urged the President to accelerate U.S. missile development, disperse SAC bombers, improve early warning systems, expand the civil defense effort, and increase funding for basic research and scientific education.

Responding to these recommendations and to the pressures generated by widespread discussion in Congress and the press of an impending "missile gap," Eisenhower increased the pace of missile development, won passage of the National Defense Education Act, and opened negotiations with the Russians in Geneva over ways to reduce the chances of surprise attack.

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\*The Soviet Union accepted the peaceful uses of space in principle in 1963, and the proposal became the basis for the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. In a less vital area, the United States, the Soviet Union, and 10 other nations signed the Antarctic Treaty in 1959, which opened Antarctica for scientific investigation but prohibited weapons testing there or the creation of military bases. This treaty, which became effective on June 23, 1961, was the first arms control agreement of the nuclear age.

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The Geneva talks collapsed in December 1958 after six futile weeks because of a Soviet insistence on discussing broad issues, such as the removal of all nuclear and rocket-powered weapons from both parts of Germany, instead of the technical aspects of surprise attack (e.g. aerial reconnaissance) to which the Americans had limited the agenda. Meanwhile, the American missile build-up gained momentum; the first Atlas ICBMs became operational during 1959.

The United States overreacted to Sputnik, much as it had to the North Korean invasion of 1950. Eisenhower was correct in his basic feeling that America led in technology and was developing satellites and missiles of much greater sophistication than the Russians. We know today that the Sputnik accomplishment was largely bluff. Under immense pressure to provide propaganda victories for the Khrushchev regime, Soviet space scientists had grouped 20 inefficient rocket engines in a two-stage cluster and without adequate testing or safeguards had launched the first Sputnik into orbit. At Khrushchev's insistence, Soviet scientists continued their efforts to beat the Americans at every stage of the space race, yet Soviet technology was never superior to that of the United States.\*


### **The Era of American Missile Superiority, 1960-70**

As John F. Kennedy quickly learned after entering the White House, the United States did not, in fact, lag behind the Soviet Union in strategic power. In addition to its superiority in long- and medium-range bombers, America held the lead in land- and sea-based missiles in terms of numbers deployed, reliability, accuracy, and production capacity (see chart on p. 69). Yet, for the first time, the United States was vulnerable to a devastating Soviet attack. Though lacking a long-range bomber force, the Soviets now had giant missiles that could hit cities in Western Europe and the continental United States. It no longer made sense for America to threaten nuclear war in response to localized aggression. Massive Retaliation, having become a two-way street, was no longer an adequate defense policy for the United States.

Kennedy and his Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara drew on the research of systems analysts and so-called defense intellectuals to shape a new strategy of Flexible Response. With regard to strategic weapons, their objective was to

\*See *The Russian Space Bluff* (London: Stacey, 1971), by Leonid Vladimirov, a Soviet space-science journalist, who defected to Great Britain.

**TOTAL "STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES" (Bombers, Missile Launchers)**  
*After the Cuban Missile Crisis*



**1976 STRATEGIC FORCES**

	<u>USA</u>	<u>USSR</u>
Long-range bombers	453	135
Submarine-launched ballistic missiles	656	1317
Intercontinental ballistic missiles	1054	1675

Source: *The Military Balance, 1976-1977* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1976), pp. 73-74, 106-108.

create a secure second-strike retaliatory force that would serve as a deterrent to nuclear war. The relatively invulnerable Polaris fleet with its submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) provided the solution to this problem.

To enhance strategic stability, the administration developed in 1963 the concept of the "triad," a balanced offensive force that included ICBMs, SLBMs, and manned bombers. For limited non-nuclear conflicts, Kennedy and his advisers expanded the country's mobile ground forces and strengthened the Green Berets for nonconventional guerrilla warfare. Reversing Eisenhower's New Look, they rejected the use of tactical nuclear weapons except in cases of extreme danger. They advanced, and subsequent administrations have maintained, the theory of the "firebreak"—that the major threshold in escalation was the move from conventional to nuclear weapons and that the costs of taking that step ought to be raised so that it would never be taken.

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Nikita Khrushchev's October 1962 gamble in secretly installing Soviet intermediate-range missiles in Cuba gave Kennedy the opportunity to apply the principles of Flexible Response and resulted in a reassessment of strategic policy on both sides. Backed by a recognized superiority in nuclear forces, the United States pursued a series of graduated conventional steps from a naval blockade to the threat of air strikes and invasion of the island, which forced Khrushchev to capitulate.

In the aftermath, McNamara worked to rationalize force structure and cut back projected missile strength to 1,054 ICBMs and 656 SLBMs, a plateau that would be reached in 1967. Believing that the Russians would develop an antiballistic missile (ABM), the Army increased its effort to create a similar defensive system.

The Cuban crisis had an unexpected effect on Soviet strategic policy. Since 1945, Russian military priorities had overwhelmingly stressed conventional offense and strategic defense forces. They had not built a long-range bomber fleet and were slow to produce and deploy ICBMs despite their early successes in this field. But the Cuban episode, coming after Khrushchev's failure to bluff Kennedy out of Berlin in 1961, proved sharply humiliating to the Russians. First Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov spoke for many when he declared, "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again."\* Thereafter, the Russians launched a massive ICBM building program that resulted in parity with American forces within a decade. With this surge in Soviet missile strength, a debate began in the United States over what the Russians were trying to achieve—parity or superiority in strategic power.

### **Mutual Assured Destruction**

Although unaware of the magnitude of the projected Soviet ICBM force, American defense officials concluded in 1965 that it would be impossible to maintain a degree of superiority in strategic power that would prevent serious damage to the United States in a general war. McNamara convinced President Lyndon Johnson that the best policy for America was to hold the population centers of the Soviet Union hostage. Any hope of pursuing a "Damage Limitation Strategy" (combining civil defense efforts at home with an announced policy of targeting only enemy military forces and

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\*Quoted in the *New York Times*, May 9, 1972.

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installations rather than civilian population centers) was abandoned in favor of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). In February 1965, the Secretary of Defense announced to the House Armed Services Committee that, while he sought in the event of war "to limit damage to our population and industrial capacities," the primary objective of American defense policy was "to deter a deliberate nuclear attack upon the United States and its allies by maintaining a clear and convincing capability to inflict unacceptable damage on an attacker."

McNamara judged that the level of damage sufficient for deterrence was 25-30 percent of the Soviet population and about 70 percent of its industrial capacity. Subsequent strategic refinements have included the addition of "flexible options" to allow targeting of Soviet military installations in a limited war situation, but MAD has remained the basic American strategy.

#### **Arms Limits at the Margin**

While there is much disagreement among American experts over whether the Russians have accepted the underlying premise of MAD, it is clear that U.S. strategic policies and the size of both Soviet and American strategic forces as we know them today were fixed by 1965. New strategic weapons, given current technology, require 10 to 15 years for development, and the Russians, in particular, adhere to rigid five-year defense plans that restrict innovation.

The high hopes for arms control expressed by officials of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations had meager results, producing only a series of limited agreements in areas where the superpowers did not deny themselves anything of value. The U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) was founded in September 1961 as an independent organization to develop and advocate new approaches to arms control within the Washington bureaucracy. It was unable to make progress, however, until the Cuban missile crisis and its threat of nuclear war revived interest in stabilizing the arms competition. The Cuban confrontation led directly to the signing in June 1963 of the "Hot Line" Agreement, which provided for rapid Soviet-American teletype communication "in time of emergency."

The following August, building on the experience of the 1958-61 voluntary test ban, the two superpowers and Great Britain signed in Moscow the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which



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prohibited nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.

Among other agreements, the most important were the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. These last two accords did not affect the Soviet-American strategic balance, although the Non-Proliferation Treaty was accompanied by an announcement that the superpowers had agreed to enter discussions on strategic arms limitations.

### **The Era of Strategic Equivalence, 1971-**

When Richard Nixon entered the White House in 1969, the Soviet Union was building giant missiles at a rate that would produce general parity in the number of strategic delivery vehicles (ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range bombers) by 1971. In order to establish détente with Russia and stabilize the strategic arms race, President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger added new programs and options to the established McNamara concepts and created the Strategy of Sufficiency. Concentrating less on the effects of each new weapon system on strategic stability than on negotiating technique, Kissinger relied heavily on "bargaining-chip" tactics. Weapon systems of marginal benefit or cost-effectiveness to the United States were developed; they could then be traded off for concessions by Moscow.

The antiballistic missile highlighted the difficulty of maintaining strategic stability under the 1965 MAD doctrine. Mutual Assured Destruction rests on the assumption that enemy cities will be undefended and therefore will become hostages against a first strike. This strategy cannot survive the introduction of damage-limiting innovations such as extensive civil defense, ABM defense of cities, or high-accuracy ICBMs designed to hit the hardened silos of the other side's retaliatory missile force.

Although an extensive ABM system proved very expensive and difficult to build, the Nixon administration pursued ABM development as a bargaining-chip. The United States had also produced the Multiple Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV), a missile which separates into 3-14 separately targetable nuclear warheads. American officials knew the Soviets were several years behind in MIRV technology, but to counter the Russians' ABM and improve American striking power, Nixon directed the deployment of MIRVs starting in June 1970. While giving the United States a substantial lead

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in total warheads deployed, the decision now poses grave problems for stability (the Russians are MIRVing too) because it is virtually impossible to verify whether a missile is MIRVed.

The United States and Russia began a long series of strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) in November 1969. Designed to be the Nixon administration's centerpiece of détente, SALT has so far produced three agreements signed in Moscow in May 1972 and the Vladivostok Accord of November 1974. In Moscow, President Nixon and General-Secretary Leonid Brezhnev signed a statement of Basic Principles of relations between their two countries. They agreed to an ABM treaty, which restricted each side to two ABM sites, with no more than 100 missiles at each location. Most important, they signed an interim agreement that limited the number of offensive missiles each side could possess. The agreement, which expired in October 1977, restricted the Soviet Union to 1,618 ICBMs and 950 SLBMs in 62 submarines, and the United States to 1,054 ICBMs and 710 SLBMs in 44 submarines; it put constraints on the number of large ICBMs and provided for replacing old ICBMs with additional SLBMs.

The follow-up Vladivostok Accord, signed by President Ford and Brezhnev in 1974, filled some of the gaps in the interim agreement. It limited each side to a total of 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles, including bombers, and allowed each to place MIRVs on no more than 1,320 of its missiles. There was no provision in the agreement for verification of the limits on MIRVs.

### **The SALT Process**

The SALT I agreements are milestones in the history of arms control, and they have unquestionably benefited the United States by placing the first limits on offensive nuclear weapons and effectively terminating one weapon system, the ABM, which undermined Mutual Assured Destruction and the American theory of deterrence.

But SALT was designed as a continuing process in the expectation that limited initial agreements would lead to more substantial concessions and eventually to cuts in the number of weapons. Unanticipated events have, however, interrupted the process. Domestic political attacks on the agreements, the loopholes that have been exposed in the terms, and overselling by the Nixon administration have all produced disillusionment and suspicion among the American

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people. The discussion of SALT in the 1976 election campaign, together with President Ford's rejection of the term *détente*, demonstrates the vulnerability of arms control diplomacy to political pressures generated in an election year.

The Carter administration's "Deep Cut" proposals\* presented to an astonished Soviet leadership in Moscow in March, 1977, had the effect of offering a total ban on development of the U.S. long-range cruise missile in return for a freeze on development and deployment of new ICBMs and a reduction by half in the number of large Soviet ICBMs. The Soviets rejected the proposals outright, warning that the Carter proposals threatened the Vladivostok Accord, including Brezhnev's agreement to omit from the SALT equation U.S. forward base systems (e.g., intermediate-range ballistic missiles and nuclear-armed tactical aircraft capable of attacking the Soviet Union from overseas bases).

Despite this spring's rebuff in Moscow, the SALT negotiations have resumed. New initiatives came from Washington, but as autumn approached, there was little prospect of a diplomatic breakthrough. The SALT process remains vulnerable to new weapon systems, sudden political changes in Moscow and Washington, and events in the Middle East or Africa. The current status of technology in satellite reconnaissance, mobile ICBMs, and cruise missiles threatens many changes in strategic weapons within the next few years. It is imperative that new arms control agreements be concluded before technological developments or political changes make negotiation more difficult.

### Lessons of the Nuclear Age

The history of American nuclear policy over the last 30 years provides some "lessons" in the form of sensitivity training. We have much to ponder, notably our past assumptions about the motives and capabilities of the other side. We underrated Soviet fears of our nuclear supremacy after World War II. We overreacted to both the Korean War and to

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\*The United States proposed: a reduction in strategic delivery vehicles for each side from the Vladivostok maximum of 2,400 to 1,800-2,000; a reduction in MIRVed missiles from 1,320 to 1,110-1,200; a limit on land-based multiple warhead ICBMs of 550 each; reduction of large, modern Soviet ICBMs from 308 to 150; a freeze on development and deployment of new ICBMs; a ban on the modification of existing ICBMs; a ban on the development, testing, and deployment of mobile ICBMs; arrangements to assure the United States that the Russian Backfire bomber was not to be deployed as a strategic weapon (e.g. limiting fuel capacity or gear for inflight refueling). In exchange for these limitations, which would bear harder on the Soviets than the Americans, the United States suggested a total ban on development of strategic cruise missiles with ranges over 2,500 miles.


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Sputnik. We tended to confuse Soviet rhetoric with Soviet capabilities. But to blame the United States primarily for the failure to halt the momentum of the nuclear arms race is both naive and without foundation.

Although America has led in technological innovation each step of the way (with a few exceptions like Sputnik), we have also led in efforts for arms control. But our arms limitation proposals frequently included elements such as on-site inspection that undermined aspects of the Soviet domestic security system. And our current human rights policies are reviving Kremlin fears and complicating strategic arms negotiations, despite the Carter administration's denial of any linkage between the two issues.

Moreover, we found that our early lead in atomic weaponry produced no guarantee of national security; the advent of the ICBM has made the continental United States vulnerable to surprise attack for the first time in history. Our own system of weapons procurement has given technology a momentum of its own—leading to deployment of weapons useful only as bargaining-chips. Such ventures can be costly, as President Carter discovered last spring in analyzing, then rejecting, the proposed B-1 bomber with its price tag of \$102 million per airplane.

The best results in our negotiations with Moscow have come not when the United States enjoyed clear superiority, but when both sides possessed roughly equivalent power. The United States, which has traditionally approached arms control negotiations with "worst-case" assumptions, should now develop initiatives that take some risks for international control and limitation of nuclear arms. In a MAD world, the payoffs in terms of survival could be substantial.



## NEGOTIATING SALT

*by Raymond L. Garthoff*

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have been a familiar feature of United States-Soviet relations for almost eight years. They are, in fact, the broadest, most extensive U.S.-Soviet negotiations ever undertaken and therefore offer some useful clues on how, and how not, to negotiate with the Russians.

First proposed more than a decade ago (by the United States in December 1966), postponed because of the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, the SALT negotiations finally opened in Helsinki in November 1969. The U.S. and Russian negotiators shuttled between Helsinki and Vienna and in 1972 settled in Geneva, where their discussions have continued, punctuated by occasional summit meetings.

The U.S. delegation, including advisers, interpreters, administrative staff, and Marine guards, has numbered up to 100 people—the equivalent of a major embassy staff, but costing to date something less than the price of one modern jet fighter. The Soviet delegation has been roughly similar in size and composition.

A presidential appointee heads the American negotiating team: 1969-73, Ambassador Gerard C. Smith, then director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; 1973-76, U. Alexis Johnson, a veteran State Department diplomat; 1977, Paul C. Warnke, lawyer, former Defense Department official, and present director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Also on hand are several senior delegates, representing important bureaucratic constituencies in the executive branch, including the Department of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Arms Control and

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Disarmament Agency, and sometimes the defense-scientific community.\*

The Soviet delegation, which in eight years has exhibited far fewer changes in personnel, is basically similar in composition, except that there is greater military and military-industrial representation and no representation equivalent to that of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. It has been headed for all eight years by Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Semenov, who came to the talks with considerable negotiating experience, although not specifically with the United States or in arms control.

Serving with Semenov have been at least two three-star generals and two senior scientific representatives, including initially Colonel General (now Marshal and First Deputy Minister of Defense) Nikolai Ogarkov; Academician Alexander Shchukin, a radar specialist and renowned scientist, then in his 70s; and Peter Pleshakov, deputy minister (later minister) of the Ministry of Radio Industry.

As in all negotiations, in SALT I, time spent in preparation vastly exceeded that devoted to formal negotiating. Senior delegates on the American side usually met together five days a week, for two or three sessions of several hours each, to discuss draft presentation, tactics, and strategy.

The two delegations (usually with about 10 persons each) met for several hours twice a week for the first year or so; formal sessions were later held less often. They were held alternately in the American and Soviet Embassies. The host for the day would welcome his opposite number and invite him to make his presentation. The procedure was rigidly formal, with little time devoted to actual discussion. After each formal "plenary" meeting the delegations split into small groups to chat. These informal chats provided moderately useful opportunities for clarification and argumentation.

After each session in Helsinki or Vienna, the U.S. delegates would return to their offices in leased buildings, with secure, tap-proof conference rooms, Marine Guards, and secure communications, to talk over highlights of the plenary session and the informal meetings that followed. Cables to

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\*In the years leading to the 1972 SALT I Agreements, the first senior State Department delegate was the late Llewellyn Thompson, followed in 1970 by J. Graham Parsons, former U.S. ambassador to Laos and Sweden. The representative of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was Lieutenant General Royal B. Allison, an Air Force staff officer and former fighter pilot. Paul Nitze, onetime Secretary of the Navy and a man with broad experience in the Defense and State Departments, represented the Secretary of Defense. Harold Brown, now Secretary of Defense, then president of the California Institute of Technology and previously the Pentagon's director of Defense Research and Engineering and Secretary of the Air Force, represented the military-scientific establishment.

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Washington were prepared and cleared, and informal talks were written up in MemCons (Memoranda of Conversation)—some 500 in the two and one-half years of SALT I.

Formal Soviet presentations, accounts of Ambassador Smith's meetings, and highlights of other conversations were sent to Washington by cable. MemCons were sent by diplomatic pouch for background use by the Washington SALT community, which numbered 50 or so government professionals. All cables from the SALT delegation had very restricted circulation within the Departments of State and Defense and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Formal meetings of the two delegations were an essential part of SALT I, but they were "on the record" and by themselves were not adequate for actual negotiating. The two delegations later experimented with smaller "mini-plenaries," with only a few senior members present. These sessions were usually held to discuss treaty specifics, such as restrictions on the numbers and locations of radars allowed in an antiballistic missile (ABM) system. Discussions at these mini-plenaries were exploratory and seldom evoked an authoritative official response or change of position from either side.

But important informal probings and exchanges between Soviet and American negotiators often took place over long luncheons and dinners preceding private meetings of the delegation chiefs. They were useful in scouting out possibilities, in underlining particular proposals or rejections, and in shading degrees of advocacy or opposition without changing formal positions.

Eventually such meetings became a principal channel for negotiating many of the most difficult provisions of the SALT I Agreements. They resolved such matters as radar controls, ABM levels, the key provision in Article I of the treaty in which both sides agreed to limit their ABM systems, and corollary restrictions on other radar systems (e.g., early warn-

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ing and air traffic control radars) that might be upgraded for ABM use.

Recourse to this informal mechanism proved highly useful in SALT I. Regrettably, it was not much used from 1973 through 1976 in SALT II—a reflection of Washington's view that the delegation should operate under a more limited negotiating mandate. I, personally, found these sessions the most fascinating part of the work. As the "point men," we entered first on new terrain or tried to find paths through well-known minefields. Minister Semenov called us "the wizards." Those Americans not participating sometimes used less flattering terms.

Two representatives from each side were usually present, both to ensure straight reporting and, in the case of the Americans at least, to protect the representatives from possible charges of exceeding their mandate. When I was alone, as was sometimes the case, or accompanied by a Russian-speaking colleague, we usually spoke Russian with the Soviets; otherwise we used English.

#### **Partnerships of Interest**

More formal working groups were set up in the summer of 1971 to work on ad hoc technical matters and, on a regular basis, to prepare joint drafts of the agreements—initially with many bracketed alternatives reflecting points of disagreement. These sessions were held alternately in the two embassies.

One of the peculiarities of prolonged international negotiations is that "transnational" or "transdelegation" partnerships of interest develop, whereas unanimity of views may be lacking within a delegation (or within the home offices of the delegation). For example, in the SALT negotiations, certain American and Russian negotiators wanted to ban "futuristic" types of ABM systems; others, on both sides, did not. Also, Paul Nitze felt strongly about controls on radar, while General Allison and the Joint Chiefs were less determined to press the issue. Nitze's exchanges with Soviet Academician Shchukin eventually led to Soviet acceptance of some significant restraints on radars. To my knowledge, there were no instances on either side of disloyalty to a delegation or its instructed position. But there were issues on which some delegates and advisers sought earnestly to persuade members of the other delegation, while their compatriots did not.

Back in Washington, a "Verification Panel" was established early in the negotiations to deal with the important



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verification, or "policing," aspect of strategic arms control. Henry Kissinger, in his role as assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, rapidly converted the panel into the sole senior-level American group dealing with SALT, aside from the White House's National Security Council. (The Verification Panel held 12 to 15 meetings on SALT in 1971, in contrast to the Council's 2 or 3.) Its members included Kissinger, as chairman, the deputy secretaries of State and Defense, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the director of the CIA, and a few others, including, for no apparent reason, Attorney General John Mitchell.

### Secret "Back Channels"

At the same time, unbeknownst to the U.S. SALT delegation abroad, President Nixon in January 1971 began a "back-channel" correspondence on arms control with Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin, supplemented by secret meetings of Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin in Washington. These meetings and exchanges continued until mid-May of that year. Both sides agreed to seek a separate ABM treaty as well as certain, not clearly defined, interim measures to limit offensive strategic weapons, rather than continuing to try for a single comprehensive treaty. Ambassador Smith (and Secretary of State William Rogers) were informed of this negotiating effort on May 19, only one day before release of the official announcement, although the American SALT delegation had heard from members of the Soviet delegation earlier in May that some special talks were taking place.

The back-channel was again employed by Kissinger in the spring of 1972 (by then the Kremlin principal was General-Secretary Leonid Brezhnev rather than Kosygin) and involved a secret trip to Moscow by Kissinger, accompanied by Ambassador Dobrynin.\* Minister Semenov was recalled to Moscow for the occasion, but the American SALT delegation and even the American ambassador in Moscow, Jacob Beam, were unaware of the meetings until after they had ended. These back-channel meetings produced high-level endorsement for an ABM agreement worked out by the SALT delegations in April, as well as an interim agreement on offensive arms to include SLBMs (Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles), but

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\*This Brezhnev-Kissinger "mini-summit" marked the beginning of Kissinger's practice of relying only on Soviet interpreters—a practice he favored to prevent possible leakage to other American officials, and one adopted by President Nixon at summit meetings dealing with SALT but later abandoned by President Ford.

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a number of other issues were left for the Nixon-Brezhnev summit negotiations in June 1972.

Kissinger relished the process of personal involvement. In many cases he served brilliantly, but in others he failed to recognize the role that professional diplomacy and diplomats could play and even came to resent, and perhaps be jealous of, the professionals who were effective. He therefore curtailed the role of the professionals and in the process spread himself too thin.

From his early success in mastering issues that came before the Verification Panel, Kissinger developed a conviction that he did not need the government bureaucracy. A small personal staff, he felt, could skim the cream off the ponderous interagency staff studies that he ordered to keep the bureaucracy occupied. In this way, he thought, he could learn all he needed to know about a subject.

Unfortunately, this was not always the case. On some occasions, his penchant for going it alone prevented him from getting needed advice, and U.S. interests suffered as a consequence. This happened, for example, in 1971, when Kissinger agreed with the Russians that the interim agreements on strategic offensive weapons need not include submarine missile fleets, thus permitting both sides to strengthen their SLBM forces. The agreement was to be in effect for a five-year period, but the United States, unlike the Russians would not benefit. Why? Evidently Kissinger was unaware that a follow-on navy ballistic missile submarine design was not yet ready, and U.S. submarine-building facilities were committed to work on other types of submarines.

### **Differing Approaches**

During SALT I, in marked contrast to earlier post-World War II negotiations with the Russians, there was a remarkable absence of extraneous ideologizing and propaganda or, indeed, of irrelevant political discussion. Each side, of course, presented and justified its position in terms of its own rationales, but the talks stuck to business. Agreement with the Soviets was readily reached on maintaining secrecy during the negotiations. On the whole, confidentiality was strictly observed by both delegations. There were, however, a number of leaks to reporters in Washington, including some by Kissinger that were perhaps intended to prepare for public acceptance of the final agreement.

The United States and the Soviet Union took markedly

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different approaches to SALT. As is often the case, the Russians sought "agreement in principle" prior to agreement on specifics, or even before disclosing their proposals. By contrast, the more pragmatic American approach was to offer a fairly complete, complex, and detailed package proposal. Arguments can be advanced for each technique, but the two are difficult to reconcile.

Essentially, the Russians' approach offered them greater flexibility; they would have the advantage when nailing down specifics after getting us committed to a general line. One principle they sought, unsuccessfully, to establish was the definition of a "strategic" weapon as one capable of striking the homeland of the other side. This would have meant that U.S. tactical aircraft in Europe were "strategic," but that Russian medium-range missiles and bombers aimed at Western Europe were not.\*

Where the Russians wanted a general, "politically" significant accord, American negotiators favored specific measures that would add up to a "militarily" significant agreement. Such an accord would both enhance mutual deterrence and maintain "crisis stability" in the sense that promoting the invulnerability of strategic weapons (ICBMs, Polaris submarines) would discourage the precipitous launching of missiles by either side at the first sign of danger. At the same time, such measures would ease the fears of the American public about relative Soviet-U.S. strength by seeking equal overall limits on strategic delivery systems and limits on the numbers and size of Soviet intercontinental missiles.

#### **Delegation Initiatives**

American negotiators differed on whether it was advantageous to be first in advancing proposals. In practice, the United States did take the lead, not only because we were the initiating side but because of the complex of considerations noted above. I believe this was an advantage, because it is helpful to stake out the negotiating ground first and because, despite all our internal problems, we were generally more flexible and efficient in reaching an agreed negotiating position, whereas a proposal hammered out in Moscow might take months to revise.

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\*From the start, the Russians were suspicious of possible fishing expeditions by Americans seeking intelligence data—especially before they found the U.S. side rather forthright in presenting, and relying on, American intelligence information concerning Soviet military weapons and forces. Moreover, being in the weaker strategic military position (in their own eyes), the Soviets were reluctant to reveal their strategic worries by being the first to propose limitations on specific weaponry.

### U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS: A CHRONOLOGY

- 1959 Dec** Antarctic Treaty: Agreement by the United States, the U.S.S.R., and 11 other nations to internationalize and demilitarize the Antarctic Continent. *Washington.*
- 1963 Jun** "Hot Line" Agreement: Establishing a direct communications link between the United States and the Soviet Union. *Geneva.*
- 1963 Aug** Partial Test Ban Treaty: Banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. *Moscow.*
- 1967 Jan** Outer Space Treaty: Governing the activities of nations in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies. *Washington, London, Moscow.*
- 1968 Jul** Non-Proliferation Treaty: Prohibiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons. *Washington, London, Moscow.*
- 1971 Feb** Seabed Treaty: Banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the ocean floor. *Washington, London, Moscow.*
- 1971 Sep** Nuclear Accidents Agreement: To reduce risk of accidental outbreak of nuclear war between the United States and the U.S.S.R. *Washington.*
- 1971 Sep** "Hot Line" Modernization Agreement. To improve the U.S.-U.S.S.R. communications link. *Washington.*
- 1972 Apr** Biological Weapons Convention: On the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxin weapons. *Washington, London, Moscow.*
- 1972 May** SALT ABM Treaty: On the limitation of antiballistic missile systems. *Moscow.*
- 1972 May** SALT Interim Agreement: On the limitation of strategic offensive arms. *Moscow.*
- 1973 May** SALT ABM Protocol: Limiting the United States and the Soviet Union to one ABM deployment area each. *Moscow.*
- 1974 Jul** Threshold Test Ban Treaty: On the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests. *Moscow.*
- 1974 Nov** Vladivostok Accord: On the limitation of strategic delivery vehicles and MIRVs. *Vladivostok.*

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Some elements of our position were endorsed more strongly by U.S. military planners, others by arms control representatives. As a rule, the military had the last word on proposals that would impinge on existing or planned Pentagon programs, whereas the arms control representatives had the greater influence on proposals that would most severely affect Soviet programs. The same rule probably applied on the Soviet side as well, although the nonmilitary Russian delegates were clearly less well informed about their own military programs than their U.S. counterparts and less able to override purely military, as opposed to basic political, arguments.

The U.S. delegation operated on the basis of presidentially endorsed NSDMs (National Security Decision Memoranda) specifying in some detail American objectives and positions. The delegation was responsible for decisions on tactics, arguments and presentations of positions, and development of agreed texts.

#### Washington "Guidance"

One example of effective "transnational negotiation" concerned Article I of the 1972 ABM treaty, which contained the rationale for the very limited ABM deployment permitted. On November 19, 1971, the Soviet delegation introduced a new draft of a proposed Article I, calling on each side "not to deploy ABM systems for defense of the territory of the [entire] country." The American delegation, uninstructed on this point, reported the proposal to Washington and warned that the Soviet wording could be used by them to argue against specific limitations on radars and related ABM-system infrastructure. We did not request guidance.

Much negotiation over the next month led to Soviet agreement to continue working on other specific limitations and to go along with the revised language developed by American negotiators, which broadened and made more specific the agreement not to seek a basis for a territory-wide defense or to deploy ABM systems for defense of a particular region.

This language, which constitutes the final version of Article I, signed by President Nixon and Chairman Brezhnev in May 1972, was worked out entirely by the American delegation with no guidance from Washington at any stage. It was submitted to Washington as part of a revised joint draft text, but in this instance there was not sufficient disagreement among agencies in Washington to bring the matter to the

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attention of Kissinger's Verification Panel or any other senior review group.


Since Article I is a basic provision, often cited by later commentators as fundamental, it is striking that at no time was guidance regarding it addressed to the delegation by Washington!

Perhaps the biggest problem for the American side in SALT has not been the Russians—tough negotiating partners that they are—but the absence of high-level consensus in Washington on American negotiating objectives and the burden of continually negotiating (and maneuvering) among various factions within the U.S. government.

Effective negotiation obviously suffers if decisions, once made, are regarded merely as tentative and reversible by important elements in our own government. Yet, this has frequently been the case with SALT. One man's "bargaining-chip" becomes another's vital interest; positions advanced for bargaining purposes with the other side become, instead, part of one's own final position. Nowhere more clearly than in SALT have differences within the American government so shaped and reshaped negotiating approaches and goals in ways that undercut and complicated a sound and effective negotiating strategy.

The lesson in all this is that negotiating with the Russians requires firm leadership, direction, and support from the President on down. Objectives must be clear and consistent. The integrity of the principal negotiating channel—the two SALT delegations—must be preserved despite the powerful temptation to skip between secret back-channels and official forums. The attraction of summit deadlines and other artificial time pressures linked to domestic political concerns must be vigorously resisted; they simply give additional leverage to Moscow.

Today there is a greater Soviet readiness to look for possible agreements on a broad range of issues. Compromise is no longer a taboo for Soviet negotiators. In part, this reflects increased Soviet sophistication. It also reflects growing self-confidence. To this extent, the growth of Soviet strength to a level of near equality with the United States has produced not greater intransigence but a more businesslike approach. Agreements on mutually advantageous strategic arms limitations are not easy to reach—but they are attainable.



## THE ENIGMA OF SOVIET STRATEGIC POLICY

*by Jack Snyder*

Analyzing Soviet strategic arms policy is something like taking a Rorschach test. The process reveals more about the predispositions and biases of the analyst than about Russian intentions.

Why is the interpretation of Soviet strategic arms policy so difficult? Can it be made less so? And if not, how should American policy function in light of U.S. uncertainty about Russian intentions?

Since the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) began in 1969, a broad range of conflicting interpretations of Soviet policy has won a correspondingly wide spectrum of supporters in Congress, in academia, and among various factions in the State Department, the Pentagon, and the CIA. The disagreements do not concern nuances so much as the origins and fundamental nature of Soviet strategic thinking. By and large, it is conceded that, for the foreseeable future, Soviet leaders will not press their goals recklessly enough to risk major armed conflict with the West. But beyond this, almost all questions are open to debate. For example:

Does Soviet participation in SALT indicate a desire to achieve a long-term strategic *modus vivendi* with the United States? Or do Brezhnev and his colleagues see SALT as a temporary, tactical maneuver to lull the West and improve Russia's strategic position?

Does Soviet deployment of new generations of heavy, MIRV\*ed missiles represent a conscious attempt to achieve a one-sided capability to destroy hardened American ICBM silos? Or are these deployments merely Moscow's prudent reactions to American advantages in warhead accuracy?

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\*Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicles. Each missile carries several warheads aimed at different targets. American MIRVs carry a smaller payload but are more accurate than their Soviet counterparts.

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How does the Politburo evaluate the effect of inequalities in strategic forces on the outcome of East-West diplomatic contests?

The following four explanations of Soviet strategic policy illustrate the diversity of positions in the debate. Mutations of these ideas pop up in Senate speeches and Pentagon briefings, as well as in the pages of *Time*, *Commentary*, *The New Republic*, and the scholarly journals. Because evidence about Soviet intentions is ambiguous, each of these radically different interpretations is plausible enough to have won a considerable following among informed observers in government, journalism, and academia.

*Seeking superiority.* Some analysts contend that the Soviet Union is consciously seeking superiority in strategic arms both to improve the outcome of a war, should one occur, and to intimidate the United States in confrontations short of war. Two beliefs underlie this interpretation. First, the Soviet system, though mellowed since Stalin's time by bureaucratization and ideological "middle age," remains fundamentally expansionist. Second, it is claimed that, for various historical and organizational reasons, Soviet nuclear strategists have never viewed Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD, based on the complete vulnerability of populations and the invulnerability of retaliatory forces) as either inexorable or desirable as a strategic concept. At best, the Soviets see MAD as a transitory phenomenon that must be accepted only until it can be nullified by civil defense measures to protect the Soviet population or by improvements in Soviet ICBM capabilities that would make possible the destruction of American land-based retaliatory forces in a surprise first strike.

If seeking superiority is the key to Soviet strategic policy, competition is inevitable, because the United States must take the necessary steps to counter persistent Soviet attempts to gain unilateral advantage. This view is closely associated with "Team B," a group of nongovernmental strategic theorists assembled by the Ford administration in the summer of 1976 to provide an independent assessment of Soviet intentions, using classified data that had previously been analyzed by the CIA. Prominent members included George J. Keegan, Jr., retired chief of Air Force Intelligence and now executive vice president of the United States Strategic Institute, Thomas W. Wolfe of the Rand Corporation, Richard Pipes of Harvard, and Leon Goure of the University of Miami.



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*Just trying to catch up.* In this view, Soviet behavior can be explained by the Russian desire to catch up with the United States in ultra-advanced weapons technology and in the meantime to balance quantitative advantages against qualitative deficiencies. This interpretation is founded on two premises. First, Soviet political leaders—if not always the military—have consistently recognized and accepted the technological fact of absolute deterrence based on Mutual Assured Destruction. Moscow's reluctance to enshrine this concept in official pronouncements has no operational significance; it is only a verbal concession to military esprit de corps and Leninist doctrinal sensibilities (explicitly embracing MAD seems only a half step away from endorsing "bourgeois pacifism"—a long-standing taboo in Soviet circles). Hence, U.S.-Soviet military competition is unnecessary, once a rough equivalence has been achieved. Expressions of this view can be found in the writings of Paul Warnke, currently director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Jan Lodal, former staff member of the National Security Council under Henry Kissinger.\*

*Political compromise.* This interpretation suggests that Soviet behavior results from logrolling among important political and bureaucratic personalities. Thus, it is not surprising that evidence about Soviet strategic arms policy points toward several seemingly contradictory interpretations, since the policy itself is a fusion of conflicting outlooks and preferences, not a coherent strategy. For example, Communist Party leader Leonid Brezhnev may personally view the continuing deployment of new Soviet heavy MIRVed missiles as a counterproductive provocation, and yet he may have had to authorize these programs to win approval of military and party skeptics for a new SALT agreement. According to this view, American

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\*Paul Warnke, "Apes on a Tread Mill," *Foreign Policy*, Apr. 1975; Jan Lodal, "Assuring Strategic Stability: An Alternative View," *Foreign Affairs*, Apr. 1976.

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policy influences Soviet policy by affecting the credibility of the arguments put forward by various Soviet factions. Presumably, American restraint in the deployment of new weapons would strengthen the hand of those Russian leaders who believe that an acceptable *modus vivendi* is possible and desirable.\*

*Organizational processes.* Some feel that even the "political compromise" explanation assumes too much purposefulness in Soviet behavior. Analysts like Graham T. Allison, dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, suggest that Soviet strategic "choices" (e.g., whether to build more ICBMs or more long-range bombers) may be largely explained as the result of the routine, half-conscious behavior of the Soviet military-industrial establishment. Kremlin choices are so constrained by bureaucratically filtered information, options, and the sheer momentum of established programs that it would be wrong to try to infer any detailed, conscious strategy from observable behavior. As Allison explains it, top decision-makers—including Presidents and Premiers—can *change or disrupt* routinized bureaucratic behavior by conscious intervention, but only rarely can they *control* it sufficiently to obtain the precise outcome they desire.†

### Superiority or Just Catching Up?

Faced with this proliferation of theories, how can we choose among them? *Prima-facie* cases are based on gross aspects of Soviet behavior that are alleged to "speak for themselves." Thus the going-for-superiority school considers the SS-18 heavy missile proof that the Soviets are consciously acquiring a one-sided capability to threaten U.S. missile silos, a development said to be obviously incompatible with a sincere concern for equitable security arrangements. Other

\*See Raymond Garthoff's "SALT and the Soviet Military," *Problems of Communism*, Jan.-Feb. 1975, and *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* by John Newhouse, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1973. Of course, the reverse argument can be made that unilateral American restraint would bolster the belief in Moscow that uncompromising bargaining tactics had caused an American retreat. It is equally difficult to predict the effects of U.S. firmness. In the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, it is possible that American firmness convinced the Soviets of the foolhardiness of brinkmanship and led directly to a thaw in U.S.-Soviet relations. At the same time, it could be argued that Kennedy's firmness in Cuba helped to discredit Soviet leaders like Nikita Khrushchev who favored a minimum deterrent force and that it led to the great expansion of Soviet strategic forces in the late 1960s. Thus, even if we accept the "political compromise" view of Soviet policymaking, the implications of that view for American policy are uncertain.

†See Graham T. Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1971.

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schools of thought advance their own *prima-facie* cases. For example, the just-catching-up school claims that the ABM treaty obviously signifies Soviet acceptance of stable mutual deterrence. The trouble with all of these arguments is that several plausible explanations for any action, be it SS-18 deployment or the ABM agreement, can nearly always be advanced.

For this reason, any serious attempt to choose from among rival explanations must fall back on "creative reconstructions" of Soviet motivations, using as evidence speeches, press statements, indirect inferences about internal political struggles, and the like. These "creative" approaches generate their own difficulties, because of the unreliability of the data employed. For example, hawkish Soviet journal articles on strategic doctrine are often cited as proof that the Soviets reject the notion of a stable deterrent balance. But these articles are written in such abstruse and polemical language that they shed little or no light on how Soviet strategic forces would actually be used. Worse still, it is far from certain that their main concern is of operational concepts at all. On the contrary, it may be propaganda, exhortation of the troops, or simply ammunition for use in bureaucratic budget fights. Even the best "creative analysis" is necessarily based on the pyramiding of inferences from such questionable sources.

Attempts to interpret Soviet SALT policies demonstrate the shortcomings of both the *prima-facie* and creative analysis approaches. First, let us examine the *prima-facie* cases mentioned above—that the ABM ban and the SS-18 deployment "speak for themselves" as clear-cut evidence of the trend of Soviet policy. American observers who argue that the Soviets are seeking superiority point to Soviet insistence on deploying large numbers of heavy missiles. This, coupled with multiple warhead technology and inevitable improvements in accuracy, will give the Soviet ICBM force an effective, large-scale capability to knock out U.S. ICBMs in a surprise first strike—a capability that is difficult to reconcile with a sincere, enduring interest in arms control based on equality of security.

At the same time, those who make this argument deny that the 1972 U.S.-Soviet agreement limiting deployment of antiballistic missiles (ABM) shows that the Soviets have renounced the quest for superiority or accepted the immutability and desirability of deterrence based on Mutually Assured Destruction. Instead, they argue that the ABM agreement merely shows that Soviet decision-makers believe that their own ABM would not work but that an American ABM might,

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given the U.S. lead in ultrasophisticated technologies. The Soviet leadership, they contend, restricted "defensive" competition to passive measures like civil defense and dispersal of industry, areas in which an authoritarian society has an advantage.

By contrast, observers who argue the *prima-facie* case that the Soviets are seriously interested in long-term SALT accords point to the ABM treaty as marking the end of doctrines of "nuclear victory" in both the Soviet Union and the United States. With ballistic missile defense systems banned, cities will always remain hostages to invulnerable submarine-based missiles, making a meaningful war-winning posture impossible. SALT I marks a point of no return, they claim, and therefore Soviet insistence on heavy missile deployments should be seen as part of an awkward transition period from unrestrained competition to collaborative stability.

### **Easing Mutual Fears**

During this transition period, it is held, the Soviets feel they need such quantitative advantages to provide a partial offset to the American edge in technology, which the Soviets see as the most ominous threat to the long-run strategic balance. Once the U.S. potential for a qualitative breakthrough is sufficiently circumscribed by SALT, the Soviets will be more willing to limit or ban heavy MIRVed missiles. Thus, U.S. reluctance to submit our cruise missile innovations to tight SALT controls touches on the Soviets' fear of our technological dynamism, just as Moscow's reluctance to limit heavy silo-busting missiles touches on our fear that Soviet strategists have not accepted the American goal of ensuring the mutual survivability of retaliatory forces. In this view, the main goal of SALT should be to find a formula that minimizes these residual and largely needless fears.

A third explanation tries to account for apparently self-contradictory Soviet behavior by presenting Soviet policy as the outcome of a political bargaining process. Thus, Soviet proponents of SALT may have had to mollify doubters in their own camp by promising not to consider proposals that would curtail the development of new generations of ICBMs.

Finally, a supplementary explanation seeks to remind us that bureaucratic momentum in itself may account for some Soviet moves. In this view, the deployment of advanced ICBMs requires little explanation. Since this is the Soviet bureaucracy's path of least resistance, it should be explained

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not as a calculated decision but as the result of normal bureaucratic procedures. The ABM ban, by contrast, was a true "decision" that required the conscious contravention of a program's momentum.

Each of these contrary explanations seems plausibly consistent with the coarsely sifted evidence. For this reason, of course, none succeeds in establishing a *prima-facie* case against the others. To pursue the question, it is necessary to resort to finer-grained analysis which, given the nature of Soviet data, means building a shaky pyramid of speculative inferences. This is a formidable task that should be undertaken with caution.

Take, for example, an attempt at fine-grained creative analysis to support the political compromise interpretation of Soviet SALT policy. First, the analyst might discuss the Kremlin policymaking process in historical perspective in order to show that intra-Politburo politics and bureaucratic infighting have greatly influenced policy outcomes in the past. He may succeed in showing these effects convincingly and in detail for a study of, say, agricultural policy, but he is less likely to generate much more than vague speculation about defense case histories, due to Soviet secrecy.

#### **Pitfalls of Fine-Grained Analysis**

Using Kremlinological techniques, it is difficult enough even to determine which Soviet actors (bureaucratic or individual) supported which policies, much less how greatly each influenced the outcome. American analysts, therefore, disagree fundamentally both about historical case interpretations and about the generalized picture of the Soviet policy process that emerges from them.

Secondly, the analyst would delve deeply into recent published Soviet material on SALT in order to glean evidence of a policy debate. Thomas W. Wolfe, of the Rand Corporation, for example, presents evidence of a debate on strategic issues between Soviet military and nonmilitary authors carried on in the pages of various Russian journals in the months leading up to the 1974 Vladivostok Accord.\* However, the debate took place on the esoteric issue of whether nuclear war could be considered an instrument of politics. The underlying

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\**The SALT Experience: Its Impact on U.S. and Soviet Strategic Policy and Decisionmaking*, Santa Monica: Rand, Sept. 1975 (R-1686-PR). The "muted argument," Wolfe notes, pitted a group of writers identified with the Brezhnev détente line, many of whom were associated with G. A. Arbatov's Institute of the USA in Moscow, against a number of military theorists who expressed skepticism about détente in the pages of *Red Star* and *The Communist of the Armed Forces*.

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issues and positions are not explicit; they can only be imagined. Nor do we know whether the terms of the Vladivostok Accord, for example, represented a compromise or an outright victory for one faction over another.

Similar problems confront fine-grained attempts at creative analysis to support the other interpretations. As a result, the claim that fine-grained analysis can fill the gaps left by the coarser-grained approach remains largely unfulfilled.

How then can the United States choose a rational SALT policy in light of our ignorance of Soviet motives, intentions, and likely reactions to future American actions? One traditional "solution" is to distinguish between Soviet capabilities (i.e., present and projected Soviet ICBM forces) and Soviet intentions and claim that we must be prepared to counter the former, regardless of the latter.

This distinction falters on two grounds. First, since existing Soviet "capability" alone cannot provide a *decisive* military victory against the United States under present conditions, additional capability is useful only insofar as it affects the international climate for political coercion and bargaining. To deny that intentions govern attempts at political coercion is to refuse to deal with the significant questions. Second, focusing on Soviet capability is often a euphemism for accepting the worst possible assumptions about Soviet intentions. If the worst-case assumption is wrong—and Soviet intentions less hostile than anticipated—a hard-line U.S. policy might act as a self-fulfilling prophecy and provoke the very behavior we would like to discourage.

Another pitfall is overcommitment to a single estimate of Soviet intentions. Overcommitment to one interpretation is likely to desensitize us to new information on Soviet motives. Disastrous intelligence failures can often be traced to the premature adoption of an exclusive interpretation that locks out all but the most blatant disconfirming evidence.

The need for action under conditions of uncertainty is unavoidable in political life. What can be avoided, however, is the current harmful tendency among academics, politicians, and Washington "experts" alike to deny that our strategic analyses and policy rationales vis-à-vis the Soviet Union are highly tentative—and, frankly, unreliable.



## ARMS CONTROL "THE AMERICAN WAY"

by Colin S. Gray

The modern arms control community in the United States was born in the late 1950s. Its family tree exhibited two very dissimilar roots. On the one hand, there was the nuclear-scientific group that had designed the means for mass destruction and had begun to feel guilty about its technical triumphs; on the other, there was the small but rapidly growing group of "defense intellectuals" who did not feel personally or collectively guilty but who were convinced that, through both explicit and tacit cooperation, the superpowers could jointly manage their "balance of terror" so as to obtain a degree of mutual safety and economy that could not be attained through unalleviated competition.<sup>1</sup>

These new arms control advocates were very different from earlier disarmament lobbyists, who argued from various combinations of religious, political-theoretical, and frankly emotional premises. The latter were against the means for making war, against the "merchants of death," against war itself. The new advocates of arms control tended not to be very interested in disarmament. The principal goal of control, they felt, was to *stabilize* strategic relationships and thus avoid a nuclear conflict. If reductions in armaments would advance that goal, well and good, but the goal was not the reduction of strategic force levels per se. Indeed, passionate advocacy of disarmament was unfashionable; sophisticated thinkers considered that reductions in force levels might even have a destabilizing effect.\*

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\*Heretical though this may sound, major force-level reductions through SALT are not merely of little interest to negotiators but could be positively dangerous. The basis for the SALT negotiations is a healthy redundancy in the means for conducting strategic retaliation. The lower the strategic force levels, the more rigorous must be the rules for verification, the more important any major technical surprise, and the more obvious any differences in the structures and capabilities of the strategic forces of the superpowers—not to mention the encouragement that lower strategic force levels would give to another (nuclear-armed) power desirous of diminishing the strategic differential between the Big Two and itself.

To this day, American arms control theorists tend to believe that very substantial disarmament is both unattainable and undesirable. The undesirability of a major ICBM cutback by both sides, for example, lies in the premium it would put on cheating and the resulting delicacy of any strategic balance based on low numbers of opposing weapons. Technical breakthroughs, cheating, and the growing unreliability of some weapons systems are less severe as sources of concern if one has an arsenal of 2,400 strategic delivery vehicles (land- and sea-based ballistic missiles and long-range bombers—the limit mentioned in the Vladivostok Accord) than if one has 250–300 (the number under discussion in the Carter administration as an eventual goal).

The body of ideas that still constitutes the lion's share of U.S. working intellectual capital in the field of arms control, was produced in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Arms control theory in its post-1945 form was largely the product of defense intellectuals—or academic strategists who became influential in the United States in the 1950s. They included such figures as Albert Wohlstetter, Bernard Brodie, Henry Rowen, Paul Nitze, and Thomas Schelling.\* As consultants or participants in government, these men sought to identify a survivable and plausibly usable military posture that would be relevant to U.S. foreign policy. They also explored ways in which potential nuclear-armed adversaries might, through cooperative endeavor, reduce the risks that appeared to be inherent in their strategic competition.<sup>2</sup>

The road that led eventually to SALT may be said to have begun in 1958 with the convening in Geneva of a Soviet-American conference of experts on problems of surprise attack.† Notwithstanding the many changes that the world has seen between 1958 and the mid 1970s, there is a really remarkable continuity in American premises and approaches.

\* With the exception of Paul Nitze, all of these men had been connected with the Rand Corporation. Nitze was director of the State Department's policy planning staff from 1950 to 1953 and later served as Secretary of the Navy and deputy secretary of Defense.

† In the 1955–57 period, the United States discovered arms control as opposed to disarmament. In 1958, largely as a result of lessons drawn from its 1941 Pearl Harbor experience, the United States was convinced that the *deployment* of strategic air power and—even more significantly—strategic missile power would encourage fears of surprise attack and hence would encourage precautionary alert procedures that should promote acute anxiety on the part of the adversary. The Americans understood that the Surprise Attack Conference in Geneva was intended to address predominantly technical issues bearing on decisions to commit or withhold strategic forces. The historical context should be recalled: A major study conducted for the U.S. government (the Gaither Report of November 7, 1957) forecast a vulnerable condition for American manned bombers that could become critical by 1959; in the meantime, following the first Soviet ICBM test in August 1957 and the first successful Sputnik launch in October of that year, fears concerning a missile gap were growing apace.



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In Geneva in 1958, the Americans discovered that Soviet officials were relatively uninterested in narrow technical issues such as inspection procedures. Instead the Soviet delegation appeared to see arms control questions almost totally in a political light and to believe that arms control had an overarching political meaning.<sup>3</sup> The way to eliminate the problem of surprise attack, the Russians argued, was to ban nuclear weapons and eliminate American bases overseas.

### From Bible to Dogma

In 1960, in the wake of the Geneva conference, the American Academy of Arts and Sciences convened a Summer Study on Arms Control and published many of the papers prepared for that gathering in a special Fall 1960 issue of *Daedalus*. That publication, issued in revised form as a book in 1961 (*Arms Control, Disarmament, and National Security*, edited by Donald Brennan), warranted its later reputation as the bible of American thought on arms control. Certain fairly distinctively American concepts surfaced in that publication, as they had during the Surprise Attack Conference in 1958, and as they did in many subsequent articles, books, and conferences. The authors of the 22 *Daedalus* papers were not issuing an arms control credo; they were offering some ideas that seemed interesting enough to warrant analysis and possible use in policy formulation. But what happened, essentially, in the 1960s, was that some of the more important and tentative 1959-60 ideas hardened into dogma despite the fact that empirical support for them was absent or, at best, very tenuous. The most significant of these American ideas-become-dogma are the following:

¶ Arms control is a means whereby technical end runs can be effected around the barriers of worldwide political and

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ideological competition between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Through arms control we could foster a habit of limited explicit cooperation in narrow technical areas that might/should/will (expectations escalate) spill over beneficially into political matters.

¶ Arms control really is about "stability." Because both superpowers would benefit from a strategic context wherein fears of surprise attack were greatly reduced, and acute anxiety was not promoted by developments in a qualitative/quantitative arms race, there *must* be a basis for agreement on technical arms issues that pose a common threat.

¶ Soviet officials are backward in their understanding of arms control issues, hence "the American interest in raising the Russian learning curve."

By the late 1960s, the American arms control community generally endorsed the notion that strategic stability was achieved through the secure, reciprocated development of a military capability to impose unacceptable damage in retaliation upon an adversary in the event of war.<sup>4</sup> Weapon systems like the ABM or the big, silo-threatening ICBM that threatened the capability for Mutual Assured Destruction were deemed to be destabilizing by their very nature.<sup>5</sup>

Soviet officials have rejected these ideas very convincingly. They have provided no evidence to suggest that collectively they endorse the idea of *finite* deterrence based upon the ability to kill or destroy some "magic fraction" of American civilian assets. On the contrary, Soviet leaders appear to believe that a defense posture should serve to defend the country and that there is no identifiable level of sufficiency. The premises and assumptions upon which American arms control thinking is based are simply not shared by the Russians. President Carter is but the latest senior American to learn that Soviet leaders cannot be persuaded to agree to arms control plans that are not in the best Soviet competitive interest. In the SALT negotiations and in the talks on MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe), the United States and NATO have sought, at times, to negotiate with the Russians on the basis of a falsely presumed commonality of East-West interests.

Despite the evidence apparent in Soviet declarations and in the Soviet military build-up observed over the past decade,<sup>6</sup> American theory and attempts to put it into practice in

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the arms control field often show a heroic ignorance of—or disregard for—the world outside, particularly the world as seen by others. Americans are known as a people of boundless vision, impatient of obstacles, real or apparent. However, vision in arms control matters is at a severe discount. Impatience simply encourages an adversary to sit tight, talk tough, and wait for a better offer tomorrow.<sup>7</sup>

American arms controllers, by and large, have yet to come to terms with the existence of an adversary who does not share their objectives and aspirations. Arms control theory in the United States was, with few exceptions, designed by tough-minded defense intellectuals who discerned pragmatic mutual advantages in a strategic relationship where competition was tempered with limited cooperation. Those tough-minded defense intellectuals did not understand adequately the heavily political Soviet view of armaments, nor did they credit the Soviet Union with a determination to prevail.

It may be impractical to ask that American politicians and officials model their arms control behavior on the Soviet example,<sup>8</sup> but it is not unreasonable to require of American negotiators that they review the arms control record in detail—with a view to identifying what factors produced what outcomes—and ensure that the U.S. strategic posture and doctrine has internal and external consistency (that is, that the separate parts relate sensibly one to another and the whole speaks intelligently to the distinctive needs of American foreign policy) before SALT options are proffered to the Russians.


### Understanding Arms Control

The body of ideas that merits description as American arms control or arms race theory should be criticized because it is inappropriate to the nature of the world in which we live—and not necessarily because it lacks abstract merit.<sup>9</sup> The beginning of wisdom in the understanding of arms control matters is the recognition of the truth in the proposition that you cannot solve or alleviate, through arms control, problems that apparently you are unwilling to resolve unilaterally. Arms control negotiating outcomes are the products of contests between differing degrees of bargaining leverage (which is wielded by such elementary factors as “money up front” on weapon systems and political determination), not the clash of strategic ideas on the subject of stability.

The history of the arms control endeavor illustrates the

merit of the paradox that arms control is worth achieving only between potential enemies, yet the mutually perceived fact of potential enmity limits very sharply what can be accomplished in cooperation through arms control.

1. For an excellent, terse expression of this perspective, see Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, *Strategy and Arms Control*, New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961.
2. For a superior example, see Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Cambridge: Harvard, 1960, Part IV ("Surprise Attack: A Study in Mutual Mistrust").
3. See "Statement by the United States Representative [Foster] at the Geneva Surprise Attack Conference, December 18, 1958," in *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, Vol. II, 1957-1959, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960, pp. 1316-24. A superb analysis of the American approach to the conference is Johan J. Holst, "Strategic Arms Control and Stability: A Retrospective Look," in Holst and William Schneider, eds., *Why ABM? Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy*, New York: Pergamon, 1969, Ch. 12.
4. This idea was expressed, with increasing inflexibility, in Robert McNamara's annual "Posture Statements" in the late 1960s. A very useful analysis of deterrence ideas is Richard Rosecrance, *Strategic Deterrence Reconsidered*, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1975 (Adelphi Paper No. 116).
5. A classic period statement was George W. Rathjens, *The Future of the Strategic Arms Race: Options for the 1970s*, New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1969. Its central postulate was that the arms race functioned by means of an interstate action-reaction mechanism.
6. See Albert Wohlstetter, *Legends of the Strategic Arms Race*, Washington: United States Strategic Institute, 1975 (USSI Report 75-1). Wohlstetter demolishes the myth of perennial American overestimation of Soviet military capabilities.
7. See U.S. Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations. *American Shortcomings in Negotiating with Communist Powers*, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970 (Memorandum by Fred C. Ikle).
8. It should suffice were American officials to read and inwardly digest the wisdom to be found in Fred C. Ikle, *How Nations Negotiate*, New York: Harper, 1964.
9. I have offered detailed critiques of our arms control/arms race theory in, *inter alia*, "The Arms Race Is About Politics," *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1972-73, pp. 117-29, and "Détente, Arms Control and Strategy: Perspectives on SALT," *The American Political Science Review*, Dec. 1976, pp. 1242-56.



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## BACKGROUND BOOKS

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### STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL

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Efforts to limit armies and armaments are a frayed but still unbroken thread of man's history. Oddly, no single good survey on arms control from the earliest times to the Atomic Age has yet been written in English. And much of the published analysis of contemporary nuclear issues is strongly flavored with advocacy.

A brief run-down of early attempts to deal with the spread and use of weaponry appears in the first three chapters of **INTERNATIONAL ARMS CONTROL: Issues and Agreements** by the Stanford Arms Control Group, edited by John H. Barton and Lawrence D. Weiler (Stanford, 1976, cloth & paper). Mention is made of Isaiah 2:4 (8th century B.C.), "*They shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruninghooks*"; of a disarmament conference of 14 feudal states held in 546 B.C. in Honan, China, ending a 70-year series of wars; of pre-Renaissance "rules of warfare" (including the Mohammedan ban on poisoning wells); of Columbia University Professor Francis Lieber's *Civil War Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field*, which became the basis of the turn-of-the-century Hague Regulations on international warfare.

Multinational efforts to reduce the levels of armaments made prior to World War II get capsule coverage from the Stanford writers. Most of these attempts were failures—the exception being a temporary success in limiting the naval competition involving Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy.

All this was pre-nuclear. But the Stanford book provides much more

than a quick review of the distant past; it is principally a thorough introduction to arms control efforts since Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It has many companions. There are at least as many detailed, often controversial studies of the arms race since the Bomb as there are years since 1945. We present here a sampling of works on the creation and detonation of the first atomic bomb and on recent strategic arms and disarmament issues.

For background, there is Martin J. Sherwin's **A WORLD DESTROYED: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance** (Knopf, 1975). Sherwin describes the development of the bomb and the diplomatic implications of the decision to use it against Japan. Additional detail (not as startling as the title implies) is provided by Anthony Cave Brown and Charles B. MacDonald in **THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE ATOMIC BOMB** (Dial, 1977, cloth; Dell, 1977, paper). The authors present excerpts from the formerly classified history of the Manhattan Project, as well as the bulk of the *Smyth Report*, first published in 1945 just after World War II ended in the Pacific.

The story is continued over the years 1945–62 by editors Morton Grodzins and Eugene Rabinowitch in **THE ATOMIC AGE: Scientists in National and World Affairs** (Basic Books, 1963, cloth; Simon & Schuster, 1965, paper)—a collection of critiques and proposals concerning the development and control of nuclear weapons reprinted from the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. Harold K. Jacobson and Eric Stein, in **DIPLOMATS, SCIENTISTS, AND POLITICIANS: The United States and the Nuclear Test Ban Negotiations** (Univ. of Michigan, 1966), follow the

diplomats' zigzag trail from initial discussions in 1957 to the signing in Moscow of the Test Ban Treaty in 1963.

Two useful books by Herbert F. York, a former weapons scientist turned arms controller, are **THE ADVISORS: Oppenheimer, Teller, and the Superbomb** (Freeman, 1975), and **RACE TO OBLIVION: A Participant's View of the Arms Race** (Simon & Schuster, 1970, cloth; 1971, paper). The original title of *Race* was *Ultimate Absurdity*.

One good general review of the entire post-Korea era is Jerome H. Kahan's **SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy** (Brookings, 1975, cloth & paper), a solid account of U.S. policy on strategic arms, 1953-74, and an analysis of the requirements for a condition of stable deterrence in the 1970s. Another is Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke's **DETERRENCE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: Theory and Practice** (Columbia, 1974, cloth & paper); case studies, from the 1948 Berlin blockade through the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, lead into proposals for reformulating some of the theories on which U.S. policy has been based.

John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Noguee's **THE POLITICS OF DISARMAMENT: A Study in Soviet-American Gamesmanship** (Praeger, 1962) is an out-of-print, critical account of the "disarmament minuet." In **THE GAME OF DISARMAMENT: How the United States and Russia Run the Arms Race** (Pantheon, 1976), noted Swedish writer-diplomat Alva Myrdal analyzes the pressures that prevent the superpowers from taking major steps toward disarmament and offers her proposals for the "lesser states" to break the continuing deadlock between Russia and the United States.

Reports of the SALT I negotiations as seen from the perspective of participants are **COLD DAWN: The Story of SALT** (Holt, 1973) by former Kissinger aide John Newhouse, and **SALT: The First Strategic Arms Negotiation** (Doubleday, forthcoming, 1978) by Gerard C. Smith, who headed the U.S. SALT delegation for a time.

Books focusing on the Soviet Union and arms control include some accounts published a decade ago but still useful reading on the early years of the missile race, before and after the Cuban crisis. In this category are Lincoln P. Bloomfield, Walter C. Clemens, Jr., and Franklin Griffiths' **KHRUSHCHEV AND THE ARMS RACE: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament, 1954-1964** (M.I.T., 1966); Roman Kolko et al., **THE SOVIET UNION AND ARMS CONTROL: A Superpower Dilemma** (Johns Hopkins, 1970, cloth & paper); and Arnold L. Horelick and Myron Rush, **STRATEGIC POWER AND SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY** (Univ. of Chicago, 1966).

Walter C. Clemens, Jr., in a solo effort, **THE SUPERPOWERS AND ARMS CONTROL: From Cold War to Interdependence** (Lexington, 1973), takes the story to SALT I. Thomas W. Wolfe, a leading U.S. analyst of Soviet affairs, makes a careful assessment in **THE SALT EXPERIENCE: Its Impact on U.S. and Soviet Strategic Policy and Decisionmaking** (Rand, 1975). Finally, Colin S. Gray's **THE SOVIET-AMERICAN ARMS RACE** (Lexington, 1976) is a provocative examination of the dynamics of the arms race. Gray says that "the United States has been profoundly ill equipped, intellectually and in terms of political institutions, to conduct protracted arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union."