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**OTHER NATIONS**

army—loyal only to the regime—could maintain order in the new society and aid “the more positive task of nation-building” through civic action.

Nkrumah moved to give more equitable representation in the army's ranks to the various tribes, at the same time deëmphasizing old tribal loyalties. “There should be no reference to Fantis, Ashantis, Ewes, Gas, Dagaombas, ‘strangers’ and so forth,” Nkrumah wrote. “We should call ourselves Ghanaians.” The soldierly virtues were later proclaimed as applicable to the entire society as Nkrumah, through regimentation and sustained ideological education, sought to build a “militantly nationalistic, supra-ethnic culture—a kind of military socialism.”

But by 1962, Nkrumah had gone on the political defensive. He reversed his nationalist policies and deliberately fostered ethnic differences in the military and elsewhere to divide his political foes. Gradually, tribalism revived. In the Army's 1966 anti-Nkrumah coup, the original plotters, all Ewes, added an Ashanti, a Ga, and a Fante only at the last moment. Nkrumah's last ditch supporters were almost all northerners, whom he had favored with top army and police posts, or members of Nkrumah's own tribe, the Nzima.

### *Hanoi's General Looks Back*

“The Great Spring Victory” by Van Tien Dung, in *Nhan Dan*; translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, in *Daily Report: Asia & Pacific* (June 7, 1976 and July 7, 1976), National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, Va. 22151.

In early 1975, Senior General Van Tien Dung coordinated North Vietnam's battle forces—first in the opening attacks on the Central Highlands, then, in the climactic push on Saigon in April 1975 that ended the Vietnam War. Dung describes the unexpectedly swift “Great Spring Victory” in a 40,000-word series of articles in Hanoi's *Nhan Dan* newspaper. Predictably, his vivid, spirited account is laced with tributes to the late Ho Chi Minh, Communism, and the wisdom of the Politburo. But he also makes clear the Politburo's great relief at Washington's crucial failure to react to the initial North Vietnamese capture of Phuoc Binh in January 1975. He jibes at South Vietnamese President Thieu, cites Saigon's declining morale and weaponry, but also implicitly recognizes past South Vietnamese tenacity, and the decimation of the Viet Cong. Indeed, Dung, in passing, seems to contrast Hanoi's 1975 triumph with past battlefield disappointments—at Tet in 1968, in Laos in 1971, and in the 1972 Easter offensive. And unlike Western commentators, he rarely mentions General Vo Nguyen Giap, the victor of Dienbienphu, long described as the “mastermind” of Hanoi's war against the Americans and their Saigon allies.