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conflict and be hypersensitive to personal criticism. Mao liked to take big risks in politics: the rush to collectivize in 1955, the Cultural Revolution, and the Nixon visit are good examples. Avoiding day-to-day administration, his style was to withdraw for extended periods, reflect on solutions, and then suddenly intervene with his own ideas.

Maoism and Chinese Oil

"Political Implications of the Petroleum Industry in China" by Jessica Leatrice Wolfe, in *Asian Survey* (June 1976), University of California Press, Berkeley, Calif. 94720.

China's fast-growing petroleum industry—315 million barrels produced in 1972, increasing by 20–25 percent annually—has attracted attention in the West especially since the 1973–74 energy crisis. Most specialists look at China's oil exports potential. But it is more valuable to observe Maoist principles of economic development, argues Jessica Leatrice Wolfe, a graduate student in business administration at Berkeley. The Chinese appear to have exempted the oil industry from certain ideological constraints; they are importing *en masse* foreign-developed processing techniques and equipment, bypassing Mao's maxims of national self-reliance and "technical democracy" (the mass application of human muscle to improve production). "Self-reliance emerges greatly diluted," Wolfe comments. "The Chinese are in fact increasingly dependent on foreign technological imports." Furthermore, the author suggests, this deviation may widen existing political and ideological cleavages. However, the Chinese still follow Mao's idea of "simultaneous development" of complementary economic sectors. The petroleum industry's growth is geared to the expansion of agriculture (which uses more and more petroleum products as mechanization progresses), the economy's infrastructure (roads, pipelines, etc.), finance capital, domestic consumption, and exports. And China is beginning to use oil as an instrument of foreign policy, selling to Japan to keep Tokyo from buying from Moscow, and to Southeast Asia nations as a gesture of friendship.

Nation-Building in Nkrumah's Ghana

"Army in a Multi-Ethnic Society" by J. Bayo Adekson, in *Armed Forces and Society* (Feb. 1976), Social Sciences Building, Chicago, Ill. 60637.

What is the armed forces' role in an ethnically fragmented society? J. Bayo Adekson, a Nigerian doctoral candidate at Brandeis University, examines the experience of Ghana under Kwame Nkrumah (1957–66). When Nkrumah became prime minister in March 1957, he recognized that tribalism (there are four major ethnic groups in Ghana) could seriously threaten national unity. He thought a well-trained national

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army—loyal only to the regime—could maintain order in the new society and aid “the more positive task of nation-building” through civic action.

Nkrumah moved to give more equitable representation in the army's ranks to the various tribes, at the same time deemphasizing old tribal loyalties. “There should be no reference to Fantis, Ashantis, Ewes, Gas, Dagaombas, ‘strangers’ and so forth,” Nkrumah wrote. “We should call ourselves Ghanaians.” The soldierly virtues were later proclaimed as applicable to the entire society as Nkrumah, through regimentation and sustained ideological education, sought to build a “militantly nationalistic, supra-ethnic culture—a kind of military socialism.”

But by 1962, Nkrumah had gone on the political defensive. He reversed his nationalist policies and deliberately fostered ethnic differences in the military and elsewhere to divide his political foes. Gradually, tribalism revived. In the Army's 1966 anti-Nkrumah coup, the original plotters, all Ewes, added an Ashanti, a Ga, and a Fante only at the last moment. Nkrumah's last ditch supporters were almost all northerners, whom he had favored with top army and police posts, or members of Nkrumah's own tribe, the Nzima.

Hanoi's General Looks Back

“The Great Spring Victory” by Van Tien Dung, in *Nhan Dan*; translated by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, in *Daily Report: Asia & Pacific* (June 7, 1976 and July 7, 1976), National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce, Springfield, Va. 22151.

In early 1975, Senior General Van Tien Dung coordinated North Vietnam's battle forces—first in the opening attacks on the Central Highlands, then, in the climactic push on Saigon in April 1975 that ended the Vietnam War. Dung describes the unexpectedly swift “Great Spring Victory” in a 40,000-word series of articles in Hanoi's *Nhan Dan* newspaper. Predictably, his vivid, spirited account is laced with tributes to the late Ho Chi Minh, Communism, and the wisdom of the Politburo. But he also makes clear the Politburo's great relief at Washington's crucial failure to react to the initial North Vietnamese capture of Phuoc Binh in January 1975. He jibes at South Vietnamese President Thieu, cites Saigon's declining morale and weaponry, but also implicitly recognizes past South Vietnamese tenacity, and the decimation of the Viet Cong. Indeed, Dung, in passing, seems to contrast Hanoi's 1975 triumph with past battlefield disappointments—at Tet in 1968, in Laos in 1971, and in the 1972 Easter offensive. And unlike Western commentators, he rarely mentions General Vo Nguyen Giap, the victor of Dienbienphu, long described as the “mastermind” of Hanoi's war against the Americans and their Saigon allies.